

DIRECT TESTIMONY
OF
JANIS FREETLY
FINANCE DEPARTMENT
FINANCIAL ANALYSIS DIVISION
ILLINOIS COMMERCE COMMISSION

UNITED CITIES GAS COMPANY
A DIVISION OF ATMOS ENERGY CORPORATION

PROPOSED GENERAL INCREASE IN GAS RATES

DOCKET No. 00-0228

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Introduction

Q. Please state your name and business address.

A. My name is Janis Freetly. My business address is 527 East Capitol Avenue, P.O. Box 19280, Springfield, Illinois 62794-9280.

Q. What is your current position with the Illinois Commerce Commission (ICC)?

A. I am currently employed as a Financial Analyst in the Finance Department of the Financial Analysis Division.

Q. Please describe your qualifications and background.

A. In May of 1995, I earned a Bachelor of Business degree in Marketing from Western Illinois University. I received a Master of Business Administration degree, with a concentration in Finance, from Western Illinois University in May of 1998. I have been employed by the ICC in my present position since September of 1998. I have previously testified before the Commission on various financial issues.

Q. What is the purpose of your testimony in this proceeding?

A. The purpose of my testimony is to present the overall cost of capital and to recommend a fair rate of return on rate base for the utility operations of United Cities Gas Company, a division of Atmos Energy Corporation (Atmos or the

18 Company). I will also respond to the direct testimony of Company witness, Dr.
19 Donald A. Murry.

20 **Cost of Capital**

21 **Q. Please summarize your cost of capital findings.**

22 A. United Cities Gas Company is a division of Atmos Energy Corporation; it is not a
23 stand alone company with its own capital structure. Therefore, the overall cost of
24 capital should be that of Atmos, to which I will be referring throughout this testimony.
25 The overall cost of capital for Atmos ranges from 9.07% to 9.30%, with a midpoint
26 estimate of 9.18%, as shown on Schedule 12.0.

27 **Q. What is the overall cost of capital for a public utility?**

28 A. The overall cost of capital is the sum of the component costs of the capital structure
29 (i.e., debt, preferred stock, and common equity) after each is weighted by its
30 proportion to total capital. It represents the rate of return the utility needs to earn on
31 its assets to satisfy contractual obligations to, or the market requirements of, its
32 investors.

33 **Q. Why is it important to determine a reasonable cost of capital for a public**
34 **utility?**

35 A. A primary objective of regulation is to minimize the cost of reliable service to
36 ratepayers while allowing public utilities to earn a fair and reasonable rate of return.
37 When a public utility is authorized a rate of return on rate base equal to a
38 reasonable cost of capital, the interests of ratepayers and investors are properly
39 balanced. If the authorized rate of return is greater than a reasonable cost of
40 capital, ratepayers are burdened with excessive rates. Conversely, if the authorized
41 rate of return is less than a reasonable cost of capital, the utility may be unable to
42 raise capital at a reasonable cost and ultimately may be unable to raise sufficient
43 capital to meet demands for service. Therefore, the interests of ratepayers and
44 investors are best served when a utility's allowed rate of return is set equal to a
45 reasonable overall cost of capital.

46 **Capital Structure**

47 **Q. What capital structure did the Company propose for setting rates?**

48 A. The Company proposes to use a historical test year for the year ended September
49 30, 1999 for determining the return on rate base. In contrast, Atmos proposes to
50 use a forecasted September 30, 2000 capital structure, as is shown on Schedule
51 1.0. On Schedule D-1, Atmos mistakenly labels the September 30, 2000 capital
52 structure as September 30, 1999.

53 **Q. Is the Company's proposed capital structure appropriate for determining**
54 **Atmos' overall rate of return?**

55 A. Since this proceeding will set rates for future service, the capital structure should
56 reflect the best available estimates of its components for the period during which
57 those rates will remain effective. The capital structure should reflect all known and
58 measurable changes, including security issuances and retirements. The capital
59 structure proposed by Atmos is based on forecasted data for the year ended
60 September 30, 2000. The balances suggested by the Company are based on a
61 forecast that it did not adequately support. Moreover, the Company's forecast does
62 not reflect the effect that its \$385 million debt-financed acquisition of Louisiana Gas
63 Service Company will have on its capital structure. Therefore the Company's
64 proposed capital structure should not be used in determining the overall rate of
65 return.

66 **Q. Does capital structure affect the overall cost of capital?**

67 A. Yes. Financial theory suggests capital structure will affect the value of a firm and,
68 therefore, its cost of capital, to the extent it affects the expected level of cash flows
69 that accrue to third parties (i.e., other than debt and stock holders). Employing debt
70 as a source of capital reduces a company's income taxes,¹ thereby reducing the

¹ The tax advantage debt has over equity at the corporate level is partially offset at the individual investor level. Debt investors receive returns largely in the form of current income (i.e., interest). In contrast, equity investors receive returns in the form of both current income (i.e., dividends) and capital appreciation

71 cost of capital. However, as reliance on debt as a source of capital increases, so
72 does the probability of bankruptcy. As bankruptcy becomes more probable,
73 expected payments to attorneys, trustees, accountants and other third parties
74 increase. Simultaneously, the expected value of the income tax shield provided by
75 debt financing declines. Beyond a certain point, a growing dependence on debt as
76 a source of funds increases the overall cost of capital. Therefore, the Commission
77 should not determine the overall rate of return from a utility's actual capital structure if
78 it determines that capital structure adversely affects the overall cost of capital.

79 An optimal capital structure would minimize the cost associated with the capital a
80 utility raises and maintain its financial integrity. Unfortunately, determining whether a
81 capital structure is optimal remains problematic because (1) the cost of capital is a
82 continuous function of the capital structure, rendering its precise measurement
83 along each segment of the range of possible capital structures problematic; (2) the
84 optimal capital structure is a function of operating risk, which is dynamic; and (3) the
85 relative costs of the different types of capital vary with dynamic market conditions.
86 Consequently, one should determine whether the capital structure is consistent with
87 the financial strength necessary to access the capital markets under all conditions,
88 and if so, whether the cost of that financial strength is reasonable.

89 **Q. What capital structure do you recommend?**

(i.e., capital gains). Taxes on capital gains are lower than taxes on interest and dividend income because capital gains tax rates are lower, and taxes on capital gains are deferred until realized.

90 A. For determining Atmos' return on rate base I recommend using an imputed capital
91 structure. Because the Company's forecasted capital structure was inadequately
92 supported, I began with the actual September 30, 1999 capital structure as reported
93 by the Company on Revised Schedule D-1. I then adjusted the balance of long-
94 term debt and common equity to eliminate the debt and equity of the non-utility
95 subsidiaries of Atmos, based on the Company's response to Staff data requests
96 FD-2.10, FD-2.15, and FD-4.01. Next, I added \$385 million long-term debt to
97 reflect the Company's intent to issue additional debt to acquire the Louisiana gas
98 operations of Louisiana Gas Service Company and LGS Natural Gas Company
99 from Citizens Utilities Company. This additional long-term debt resulted in a pro
100 forma total debt to capitalization ratio of 73.23% and a pro forma common equity
101 ratio of 26.77%.

102 I then compared these capitalization ratios to industry standards. For the four
103 quarters ended March 2000, the weighted average common equity ratio for the gas
104 distribution utilities on *Standard & Poor's Utility Compustat* equaled 49.66% with a
105 standard deviation of 4.97%. Standard and Poor's categorizes debt securities on
106 the basis of default risk. Although no formula exists for determining a debt rating,
107 Standard & Poor's publishes benchmark values of various financial ratios according
108 to business position rating and debt rating.² The Standard & Poor's benchmark
109 values for gas distribution utilities that share Atmos' business position rating of "3"

110 range from 47.5% to 53% for the A debt rating and 53% to 61% for the BBB debt
111 rating.³

112 The pro forma common equity ratio that I computed for Atmos is below the *Utility*
113 *Compustat* average for a gas distribution utility. The pro forma total debt ratio that I
114 calculated is above the benchmark range for gas distribution utilities with debt
115 ratings of A and BBB. The above suggests that this pro forma capital structure is
116 not reasonable due to a very high total debt to capitalization ratio for Atmos.

117 Therefore, I imputed a capital structure consisting of 67% total debt and 33%
118 common equity, as shown on Schedule 1.0. The September 30, 1999 pro forma
119 capital structure does not reflect any additional increase in common equity from the
120 retention of earnings or the issuance of stock pursuant to Atmos' Employee Stock
121 Ownership Program. Moreover, the Company has represented that it does not
122 expect its debt ration to exceed 67%; hence, I imputed the capital structure based
123 on that representation. Although this indicates a relatively high degree of financial
124 leverage for Atmos, if the resulting risk is not passed through to ratepayers in the
125 form of higher costs of debt and equity, then it would be reasonable to use this
126 capital structure to set rates in this proceeding. Therefore, my cost of capital
127 recommendation assumes Atmos' new debt will be issued at interest rates
128 commensurate with Atmos' current A- credit rating and my cost of equity

² Standard & Poor's business position scores assess the qualitative attributes of a firm, with "1" being considered the lowest risk and "10" the highest risk.

129 recommendation will be based on Atmos' financial leverage before the issuance of
130 the \$385 million in debt.⁴ Hence, Atmos' post-acquisition capital structure would
131 not adversely affect its rate of return in this proceeding.

132 **Q. How did you measure the balance of short-term debt?**

133 A. I calculated twelve monthly averages from the monthly ending balances of short-term
134 debt for the period from April 1999 through March 2000. I then averaged the twelve
135 monthly average balances to arrive at the average balance of short-term debt
136 outstanding over that period. Since short-term debt balances tend to fluctuate
137 substantially during a year, any single balance might not be representative of the
138 amount utilized throughout the year. I chose the April 1999 to March 2000 period
139 because it is centered in time at September 30, 1999, the measurement date for
140 the other components of the capital structure. Schedule 2.0 presents the calculation
141 of the average balance of short-term debt.

142 **Q. Why did you not subtract the monthly ending balances of construction-**
143 **work-in-progress (CWIP) accruing an allowance for funds used during**
144 **construction (AFUDC) from the corresponding monthly ending balances of**
145 **short-term debt?**

³ Standard & Poor's *Utilities & Perspectives*, June 21, 1999, p. 3

⁴ Standard & Poor's, *Utilities & Perspectives*, June 19, 2000, p. 11.

146 A. In response to Staff data request FD-1.05, the Company stated “The records of the
147 Company do not provide actual monthly balances of CWIP accruing AFUDC.” I
148 made several attempts to follow-up with the Company to attain the monthly ending
149 balances, but to no avail. Without the Company’s input, I could not subtract the
150 monthly ending balance of CWIP accruing AFUDC from the corresponding monthly
151 ending balances of short-term debt. Therefore, I used only the actual monthly ending
152 balances of short-term debt to compute the average balance of short-term debt
153 outstanding.

154 **Cost of Short-Term Debt**

155 **Q. What is the cost of short-term debt for Atmos?**

156 A. Atmos issues short-term debt in the form of commercial paper and through
157 committed and uncommitted credit facilities. Atmos’ commercial paper was rated
158 A-2 by Standard & Poor’s and P-2 by Moody’s.⁵ The interest rate on commercial
159 paper varies with grade and term to maturity. The Federal Reserve reports that the
160 maturity of commercial paper averages thirty days.⁶ Therefore, to estimate the cost
161 of short-term debt, I converted the June 22, 2000, 6.83% discount rate on thirty-day,

⁵ Standard & Poor’s, Utilities and Perspectives, June 19, 2000, p.11; Mergent Bond Record, May 2000, p. 360.

⁶ “About Commercial Paper and Rate Calculations,” Federal Reserve Release, www.federalreserve.gov/Releases/CP/about.htm.

162 “A-2/P-2 nonfinancial” commercial paper into an annual yield of 6.93% using the
163 following formula:⁷

164
$$\text{Annual yield} = \left(\frac{\text{discount rate} \times \left(\frac{\text{days to maturity}}{360} \right)}{1 - \text{discount rate} \times \left(\frac{\text{days to maturity}}{360} \right)} \right) \times \left(\frac{365}{\text{days to maturity}} \right)$$

165 **Q. Have the non-utility subsidiaries of Atmos caused the cost of short-term**
166 **debt to increase?**

167 A. In my judgement, they have not.

168 **Q. How did you reach that conclusion?**

169 A. First, I compared the financial performance of the consolidated operations of Atmos
170 to the financial performance of the utility operations of Atmos. Over the 1998-1999
171 period, the financial ratios indicate that Atmos’ financial performance would have
172 been worse absent the non-utility subsidiaries, as shown on Schedule 3.0.

173 Therefore, I found no evidence that Atmos’ non-utility subsidiaries increased its cost
174 of short-term debt.

175 **Q. Are you aware of any means that would quantify the precise effect the non-**
176 **utility subsidiaries have on Atmos’ cost of short-term debt?**

⁷ “Commercial Paper,” Federal Reserve Release, June 23, 2000,

177 A. No.

178 **Cost of Long-Term Debt**

179 **Q. What is the embedded cost of long-term debt for Atmos?**

180 A. The embedded cost of long-term debt for the utility operations of Atmos is 8.33%.

181 This cost includes the additional \$385 million in long-term debt, reflecting the June

182 20, 2000, 8.31% yield on A-rated public utility debt, as shown on Schedule 4.0.⁸

183 **Q. Have the non-utility subsidiaries of Atmos increased the cost of long-term**
184 **debt?**

185 A. In my judgement, they have not.

186 **Q. How did you reach that conclusion?**

187 A. The ratio analysis that I described above indicated that Atmos' financial
188 performance would have been worse absent the non-utility subsidiaries. Therefore,

189 I found no evidence that Atmos' non-utility subsidiaries increased its cost of long-
190 term debt.

www.federalreserve.gov/Releases/CP/default.htm.

⁸ Moody's Investors Service, *Long-Term Corporate Bond Yield Averages*, June 26, 2000, www.moodys.com/economics.nsf/web/economyd?OpenDocument.

191

Cost of Common Equity

192 **Q. How did you measure the investor required rate of return on common equity**
193 **for Atmos?**

194 A. I measured the investor required rate of return on common equity for Atmos with the
195 discounted cash flow (DCF) and risk premium models. DCF and risk premium
196 models cannot be applied directly to Atmos' gas utility operations because its
197 common stock is not market-traded. Therefore, I applied those models to a sample
198 of twelve gas distribution companies comparable in risk to Atmos' gas utility
199 operations.

200

Comparable Sample

201 **Q. How did you select a sample of public utilities comparable in risk to Atmos?**

202 A. According to financial theory, the market-required rate of return on common equity is
203 a function of operating and financial risk. Thus, the method used to select a sample
204 should reflect both the operating and financial characteristics of a firm. I selected a
205 sample with eight financial and operating ratios: (1) common equity; (2) cash flow to
206 capitalization; (3) cash flow to debt; (4) expenditures to net plant; (5) fixed asset
207 turnover; (6) funds flow interest coverage; (7) operating profit margin; and (8)
208 operating revenue stability. The last ratio was measured with the coefficient of
209 determination of a least-squares regression of the natural logarithm of the quarterly

210 operating revenue data against time.⁹ The operating revenue stability ratio was
211 measured over the period 1995-1999. Data from the period 1998-1999 were
212 averaged to normalize the remaining ratios.

213 I began with all market-traded electric, natural gas, and water companies on
214 Standard & Poor's *Utility Compustat* tape. Among those utilities, 105 gas
215 companies had sufficient data to calculate the financial and operating ratios. Next, I
216 conducted a principal components analysis of the financial and operating ratios.
217 Principal components constitute linear combinations of optimally-weighted variables
218 which are uncorrelated with one another.^{10,11} For each utility in the data base, the
219 principal components analysis calculates values for each component, known as
220 principal components scores, which have a mean of zero and a standard deviation
221 of one. From the principal components analysis, I retained four components for risk
222 analysis. Of the 22 gas utilities in the data base, I eliminated ten from the sample
223 due to pending mergers. I then computed the average of the factor scores for the
224 remaining twelve gas utilities. Next I compared the average factor scores for the
225 twelve gas utilities with those of Atmos' gas utility to ascertain the comparability of
226 the sample. Schedule 5.0 presents the four principal components for the remaining
227 twelve gas utilities ("comparable sample").

⁹ Dummy variables were added to the regression model to incorporate seasonality.

¹⁰ A principal component can be described mathematically as follows:

$$c_i = b_{i1} \times x_1 + b_{i2} \times x_2 + \dots + b_{in} \times x_n$$

where c_i = the utility's score on principal component i ;
 b_{in} = the weight for ratio x_n to create component c_i ; and

228 **Q. Does the sample include any incremental risk or increased cost of capital**
229 **which is the direct or indirect result of the affiliation of Atmos' public utility**
230 **operations with unregulated or nonutility companies?**

231 A. No. The operating and financial ratios from which the sample was constructed
232 reflect only the utility operations of Atmos, not the operations of its non-utility
233 subsidiaries.¹²

234 **DCF Analysis**

235 **Q. Please describe DCF analysis.**

236 A. DCF analysis is a market-based approach for establishing a security's value. This
237 value reflects all relevant risks the market associates with the security. DCF
238 analysis establishes a cost of common equity capital directly from investors' rate of
239 return requirements.

240 According to DCF theory, a security price equals the present value of the cash flow
241 investors expect it to generate. Specifically, the market value of common stock
242 equals the cumulative value of the expected stream of future dividends after each is
243 discounted by the investor required rate of return.

x_n = the utility's value on variable n

¹¹ The variables are optimally weighted when the resulting principal components explain the maximum amount of variance in the data base.

¹² The ratios were computed using financial statements reflecting only the regulated utility operations of Atmos provided by the Company in response to Staff data request FD-2.05.

244 **Q. Please describe the DCF model with which you measured the investor**
245 **required rate of return on common equity.**

246 A. As it applies to common stocks, DCF analysis is generally employed to determine
247 appropriate stock prices given a specified discount rate. Since a DCF model
248 incorporates time-sensitive valuation factors, it must correctly reflect the timing of
249 the dividend payments that stock prices embody. Incorporating stock prices that the
250 financial market sets on the basis of quarterly dividend payments into a model that
251 ignores the time value of quarterly cash flows constitutes a misapplication of DCF
252 analysis.

253 The companies in the sample pay dividends quarterly. Therefore, I applied a
254 constant-growth DCF model that measures the annual required rate of return on
255 common equity as follows:

$$256 \quad k = \frac{\sum_{q=1}^4 D_{0,q} (1+g)(1+k)^{1-[x+0.25(q-1)]}}{P} + g.$$

257 That model assumes dividends will grow at a constant rate, and the market value of
258 common stock (i.e., stock price) equals the sum of the discounted value of each
259 dividend. Schedule 6.0 describes the derivation of the model.

260 **Q. How did you estimate the growth rate parameter?**

261 A. Determining the market-required rate of return with the DCF methodology requires
262 a growth rate that reflects the expectations of investors. Although the current market
263 price reflects aggregate investor expectations, market-consensus expected growth
264 rates cannot be measured directly. Therefore, I measured market-consensus
265 expected growth indirectly with growth rates forecasted by securities analysts that
266 are disseminated to investors.

267 I examined analysts' projected earnings growth rates in the May 18, 2000, edition of
268 Institutional Brokers Estimate System (IBES) and data provided by Zacks
269 Investment Research (Zacks) as of June 21, 2000. IBES and Zacks summarize and
270 publish the earnings growth expectations of financial analysts employed by the
271 research departments of investment brokerage firms. Both provide forward-looking
272 estimates of expected earnings growth. Schedule 7.0 presents the analyst growth
273 rate estimates for the companies in the comparable sample.

274 **Q. How were these growth rates incorporated into your DCF analysis?**

275 A. Since market-consensus expected growth is unobservable, any DCF estimate of
276 the investor required rate of return includes an unknown degree of measurement
277 error. To reflect that uncertainty, I grouped growth rate estimates based on the
278 lower and higher observed mean growth rate of each company which ultimately
279 leads to a range for the cost of common equity. The growth rate ranges for the
280 companies in the sample are presented in Schedule 7.0.

281 **Q. How did you measure the stock price?**

282 A. For each company in the two samples, I measured its current stock price with its
283 closing market price from June 20, 2000. Those stock prices are presented in
284 Schedule 8.0. A current stock price reflects all information that is available and
285 relevant to the market; thus, it represents the investors' assessment of the common
286 stock's current value.

287 Since stock prices reflect the market's expectation of the cash flows the securities
288 will produce and the rate at which those cash flows are discounted, an observed
289 change in the market price does not necessarily indicate the required rate of return
290 on common equity has changed. Rather, price changes may simply reflect
291 investors' re-evaluation of the expected dividend growth rate. In addition, stock
292 prices change with the approach of dividend payment dates. Consequently, when
293 estimating the required return on common equity with the DCF model, analysts
294 should measure the expected dividend yield and the corresponding expected
295 growth rate concurrently. Using a historical stock price along with current growth
296 expectations or combining an updated stock price with past growth expectations will
297 likely produce an inaccurate estimate of the market-required rate of return on
298 common equity.

299 **Q. Please explain the significance of the column titled "Next Dividend Payment**
300 **Date" shown on Schedule 8.0.**

301 A. Estimating year-end dividend values requires measuring the length of time between
302 each dividend payment date and the first anniversary of the stock observation date.
303 For the first dividend payment, that length of time is measured from the “Next
304 Dividend Payment Date.” Subsequent dividend payments occur in quarterly
305 intervals.

306 **Q. How did you estimate the next four expected quarterly dividends?**

307 A. Most utilities declare and pay the same dividend per share for four consecutive
308 quarters before adjusting the rate. Therefore, I assumed the dividend rate will adjust
309 during the same quarter it changed during the preceding year. If the utility did not
310 change its dividend during the last year, I assumed the rate would change during the
311 next quarter. The lower and higher expected growth rates were applied to the
312 current dividend rate to estimate the expected dividend rate. Schedule 8.0 presents
313 the current quarterly dividends. Schedule 9.0 presents the expected quarterly
314 dividends.

315 **Q. Based on your DCF analysis, what is the estimated required rate of return**
316 **on common equity for the comparable sample?**

317 A. The DCF analysis estimates of the required rate of return on common equity range
318 from 11.58% to 12.04% for the comparable sample as shown on Schedule 10.0.
319 Those estimates are derived from the growth rates from Schedule 7.0, the stock

320 price and dividend payment dates from Schedule 8.0, and the expected quarterly
321 dividends from Schedule 9.0.

322 **Risk Premium Analysis**

323 **Q. Please describe the risk premium model.**

324 A. The risk premium model is based on the theory that the market-required rate of
325 return for a given security equals the risk-free rate of return plus a risk premium
326 associated with that security. A risk premium represents the additional return
327 investors expect in exchange for assuming the risk inherent in an investment.
328 Mathematically, a risk premium equals the difference between the expected rate of
329 return on a risk factor and the risk-free rate. If the risk of a security is measured
330 relative to a portfolio, then multiplying that relative measure of risk and the portfolio's
331 risk premium produces a security-specific risk premium for that risk factor.

332 The risk premium methodology is consistent with the theory that investors are risk-
333 averse. That is, investors require higher returns to accept greater exposure to risk.
334 Thus, if investors had an opportunity to purchase one of two securities with equal
335 expected returns, they would purchase the security with less risk. Conversely, if
336 investors had an opportunity to purchase one of two securities with equal risk, they
337 would purchase the security with the higher expected return. In equilibrium, two
338 securities with equal quantities of risk have equal required rates of return.

339 The Capital Asset Pricing Model (CAPM) is a one-factor risk premium model that
340 mathematically depicts the relationship between risk and return as:

341
$$R_j = R_f + \beta_j \times (R_m - R_f)$$

342 where R_j \equiv the required rate of return for security j ;

343 R_f \equiv the risk-free rate;

344 R_m \equiv the expected rate of return for the market portfolio; and

345 β_j \equiv the measure of market risk for security j .

346 In the CAPM, the risk factor is market risk which is defined as risk that cannot be
347 eliminated through portfolio diversification. To implement the CAPM, one must
348 estimate the risk-free rate of return, the expected rate of return on the market
349 portfolio and a security or portfolio-specific measure of market risk.

350 **Q. How did you measure market risk on a security-specific basis?**

351 A. Beta is widely recognized by the financial community as a measure of risk in a
352 portfolio context. When multiplied by the market risk premium, a security's beta
353 produces a market risk premium specific to that security.

354 The beta for a security or portfolio of securities is estimated with the following model
355 using an ordinary least-squares technique:

356
$$R_{j,t} - R_{f,t} = \alpha_j + \beta_j \times (R_{m,t} - R_{f,t}) + e_{j,t}$$

357 where $R_{j,t}$ \equiv the return on security j in period t ,
358 $R_{f,t}$ \equiv the risk-free rate of return in period t ,
359 $R_{m,t}$ \equiv the return on the market portfolio in period t ,
360 a_j \equiv the intercept term for security j ;
361 b_j \equiv beta, the measure of market risk for security j ; and
362 $e_{j,t}$ \equiv the residual term in period t for security j .

363 A beta can be calculated for firms with market-traded common stock. I calculated a
364 beta for the comparable sample in three steps. First, I subtracted the U.S. Treasury
365 bill return from the average percentage change in company stock prices and the
366 percentage change in the Standard & Poor's Composite Index (S&PCI) to estimate
367 each portfolio's return in excess of the risk-free rate. Second, the excess returns of
368 the sample were regressed against the excess returns of the S&PCI to estimate a
369 raw beta. The regression analysis employs sixty monthly observations of stock
370 return and U.S. Treasury bill yield data. Third, I adjusted the raw beta estimate
371 through the following equation:

372
$$b_{adjusted} = 0.33743 + 0.66257 \times b_{raw}.$$

373 That adjustment is based upon the theory that betas regress towards the market
374 mean value of 1.0 over time and represents an attempt to estimate a forward-
375 looking beta.

376 **Q. What is the beta estimate for the sample?**

377 A. The adjusted beta for the comparable sample, estimated over sixty months ending
378 May 2000, equals 0.52.

379 **Q. How did you estimate the risk-free rate of return?**

380 A. I examined the suitability of the yields on three-month U.S. Treasury bills and thirty-
381 year U.S. Treasury bonds as estimates of the risk-free rate of return.

382 **Q. Why did you examine the yields on U.S. Treasury bills and bonds as**
383 **measures of the risk-free rate?**

384 A. The proxy for the nominal risk-free rate should contain no risk premium and reflect
385 similar inflation and real risk-free rate expectations to the security being analyzed
386 through the risk premium methodology.¹³ The yields of fixed income securities
387 include premiums for default and interest rate risk. Default risk pertains to the
388 possibility of default on principal or interest payments. Securities of the United
389 States Treasury are virtually free of default risk by virtue of the federal government's
390 fiscal and monetary authority. Interest rate risk pertains to the effect of unexpected
391 interest rate fluctuations on the value of securities.

¹³ Real risk-free rate and inflation expectations comprise the non-risk related portion of a security's rate of return.

392 Since common equity theoretically has an infinite life, its market-required rate of
393 return reflects the inflation and real risk-free rates anticipated to prevail over the long
394 run. U.S. Treasury bonds, the longest term treasury securities, are issued with
395 terms to maturity of thirty years; U.S. Treasury notes are issued with terms to
396 maturity ranging from two to ten years; U.S. Treasury bills are issued with terms to
397 maturity ranging from ninety-one days to one year. Therefore, U.S. Treasury bonds
398 are more likely to incorporate within their yields the inflation and real risk-free rate
399 expectations that drive, in part, the prices of common stocks than either U.S.
400 Treasury notes or Treasury bills.

401 Although U.S. Treasury bond yields are more likely to incorporate the inflation and
402 real risk-free rate expectations embodied in the returns demanded from common
403 stock, U.S. Treasury bill yields contain a smaller premium for interest rate risk. Due
404 to relatively long terms to maturity, U.S. Treasury bond yields contain an interest rate
405 risk premium that diminishes their usefulness as measures of the risk-free rate.
406 Thus, in terms of interest rate risk, U.S. Treasury bill yields more accurately measure
407 the risk-free rate.

408 **Q. Given that the inflation and real risk-free rate expectations that are reflected**
409 **in the yields on U.S. Treasury bonds and the prices of common stocks are**
410 **similar, does it necessarily follow that the inflation and real risk-free rate**
411 **expectations that are reflected in the yields on U.S. Treasury bills and the**
412 **prices of common stocks are dissimilar?**

413 A. No. To the contrary, short and long-term inflation and real risk-free rate
414 expectations, including those that are reflected in the yields on U.S. Treasury bills,
415 U.S. Treasury bonds, and the prices of common stocks should equal over time. Any
416 other assumption unrealistically implies that the real risk-free rate and inflation are
417 expected to systematically and continuously rise or fall.

418 Although expectations for short and long-term real risk-free rates and inflation
419 should equal over time, in finite time periods, short and long-term expectations may
420 differ. Short-term interest rates tend to be more volatile than long-term interest
421 rates.¹⁴ Consequently, over time U.S. Treasury bill yields are less biased (i.e., more
422 accurate) but less reliable (i.e., more volatile) estimators of the long-term risk-free
423 rate than U.S. Treasury bond yields. In comparison, U.S. Treasury bond yields are
424 more biased (i.e., less accurate) but more reliable (i.e., less volatile) estimators of
425 the long-term risk-free rate. Therefore, an estimator of the long-term nominal risk-
426 free rate should not be chosen mechanistically. Rather, the similarity in current short
427 and long-term nominal risk-free rates should be evaluated. If those risk-free rates
428 are similar, then U.S. Treasury bill yields should be used to measure the long-term
429 nominal risk-free rate. If not, some other proxy or combination of proxies should be
430 found.

¹⁴ Fabozzi and Pollack, ed., *The Handbook of Fixed Income Securities*, Fourth Edition, Irwin, p. 789.

431 **Q. What are the current yields on three-month U.S. Treasury bills and thirty-**
432 **year U.S. Treasury bonds?**

433 A. Three-month U.S. Treasury bills are currently yielding 5.92%. Thirty-year U.S.
434 Treasury bonds are currently yielding 5.99%. Both estimates are derived from
435 quotes for June 20, 2000.¹⁵ Schedule 11.0 presents the published quotes and
436 effective yields.

437 **Q. Of the U.S. Treasury bill and bond yields, which is currently a better proxy**
438 **for the long term risk-free rate?**

439 A. In terms of the gross domestic product (GDP) price index, WEFA forecasts the
440 inflation rate will average 1.9% annually during the 2000-2019 period.¹⁶ In terms of
441 the consumer price index (CPI), the *Survey of Professional Forecasters (Survey)*
442 forecasts the inflation rate will average 2.7% during the 2000-2009 period.¹⁷ In
443 terms of real GDP growth, WEFA forecasts the real risk-free rate will average 3.0%
444 during the 2000-2019 period.¹⁸ The *Survey* forecasts real GDP growth will average
445 2.7% during the 2000-2009 period.¹⁹ Those forecasts imply a long-term, nominal
446 risk-free rate between 5.0% and 5.4%.²⁰ Therefore, to the extent inflation and real

¹⁵ Federal Reserve Statistical Release, *H.15 Selected Interest Rates*, June 23, 2000.

¹⁶ WEFA Group, *U.S. Long-Term Economic Outlook*, vol. 1, First Quarter 2000, pp. 4.4-4.5.

¹⁷ Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, *Survey of Professional Forecasters*, May 22, 2000.

¹⁸ WEFA Group, *U.S. Long-Term Economic Outlook*, vol. 1, First Quarter 2000, pp. 4.2-4.3.

¹⁹ Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, *Survey of Professional Forecasters*, May 22, 2000.

²⁰ Nominal interest rates are calculated as follows:

447 GDP growth expectations coincide with WEFA and *Survey* forecasts, the U.S.
448 Treasury bill yield more closely approximates the long-term risk-free rate.
449 Therefore, I conclude that the U.S. Treasury bill yield is currently the superior proxy
450 for the long-term risk-free rate.

451 **Q. How was the expected rate of return on the market portfolio estimated?**

452 A. The expected rate of return on the market was estimated by conducting a DCF
453 analysis on the firms composing the Standard & Poor's Composite Index. That
454 analysis uses dividends and closing market prices as of March 31, 2000 as
455 reported in the April 2000 edition of Standard & Poor's *Security Owner's Stock*
456 *Guide*. Growth rate estimates were obtained from the March 2000 edition of *IBES*
457 *Monthly Summary Data* and April 9, 2000 Zacks reports. Firms not paying a
458 dividend as of March 31, 2000, or for which neither IBES nor Zacks growth rates
459 were available were eliminated from the analysis. The resulting company-specific
460 estimates of the expected rate of return on common equity were then weighted
461 using relative market value data from Salomon Brothers, *Performance and Weights*
462 *of the S&P500: First Quarter 2000*. The estimated weighted average expected

$$r = (1 + R) \times (1 + i) - 1.$$

where r ≡ nominal interest rate;
 R ≡ real interest rate; and
 i ≡ inflation rate.

463 rate of return for the remaining 396 firms, composing 73% of the market
464 capitalization of the S&PCI, equals 15.94%.

465 **Q. What is the risk premium estimate of the required rate of return on common**
466 **equity for the comparable sample?**

467 A. The risk premium model indicates that the required rate of return on common equity
468 is 11.13% for the comparable sample. This estimate results from measuring the
469 risk-free rate with U.S. Treasury bill yields. The computation of that estimate is
470 shown on Schedule 11.0.

471 **Recommendation**

472 **Q. Based on your analysis, what is your estimate of the required rate of return**
473 **on common equity for Atmos?**

474 A. A thorough analysis of the required rate of return on common equity requires both
475 the application of financial models and the analyst's informed judgment. An
476 estimate of the required rate of return on common equity based solely on judgment
477 is inappropriate. Nevertheless, because techniques to measure the required rate of
478 return on common equity necessarily employ proxies for investor expectations,
479 judgment remains necessary to evaluate the results of such analyses. Based on my
480 analysis, in my judgment, the investor required rate of return for Atmos' common
481 equity ranges from 11.15% to 11.85%.

482 **Q. Please summarize how you formed the range for the investor required rate**
483 **of return on Atmos' common equity.**

484 A. The models from which the individual company estimates were derived are correctly
485 specified and thus contain no source of bias. Moreover, I am unaware of bias in any
486 of my proxies for investor expectations.²¹ Consequently, estimates for a sample as
487 a whole are subject to less measurement error than individual company estimates.
488 Therefore, I formed a range for the sample by: 1) averaging the DCF-derived
489 estimates of the required rate of return on common equity, or 11.81%, and rounding
490 to the nearest five hundredth of a percent, or 11.85%; 2) adopting the U.S. Treasury
491 bill yield as the risk-free rate proxy for the reasons stated above and rounding the
492 resulting risk premium estimate of the required rate of return on common equity
493 (11.13%), to the nearest five hundredth of a percent, or 11.15%.

494 **Q. Should the investor required rate of return on common equity be adjusted**
495 **for issuance costs?**

496 A. Yes. In Docket No. 90-0008, cons., the Commission allowed recovery of issuance
497 costs associated with common stock issues in 1989 and 1991.²² Subsequent to
498 that rate proceeding, the Company incurred common equity issuance expenses in

²¹ Except as discussed above in regard to U.S. Treasury bond yields as proxies for the long-term risk-free rate.

²² Docket No. 90-0008, Order on Remand, September 30, 1992, pp. 6-9.

499 1992, totaling \$931 thousand, and 1995, totaling \$1,110 thousand.²³ Therefore, the
500 \$2.042 million in costs associated with those two common stock issues remain
501 unrecovered.

502 **Q. How should the issuance cost adjustment be calculated?**

503 A. The common equity issuance cost adjustment should be calculated using the
504 following formula:

$$\text{Issuance Cost Adjustment} = \frac{\text{ROE} \times \text{Unrecovered Issuance Costs}}{\text{Common Equity Balance}}$$

505 where *ROE* = the investor required rate of return on common equity.

506 **Q. Would the above formula include an allowance for issuance cost recovery?**

507 A. No. Any attempt to recover a cost requires the establishment of an amortization
508 period. However, common equity's indefinite life-span renders any finite recovery
509 period arbitrary, leading to a failure to match cost recovery with the benefits
510 associated with common equity capital. Therefore, the above formula permits a
511 return on, but not a return of, those costs. Permitting a return on common equity
512 issuance costs without recovery of those costs is consistent with the manner in
513 which issuance costs for perpetual preferred stock are treated for setting rates.

²³Docket 96-0618, Direct Testimony of Alan S. Pregozen, March 1997, p. 35.

514 **Q. What is the common equity issuance cost adjustment?**

515 A. Using Atmos' September 30, 1999 balance of common equity of \$377.663 million
516 and an investor-required rate of return on common equity equal to the low-end of my
517 recommended range, or 11.15%, the common equity issuance cost adjustment
518 equals 0.06%.²⁴ At an investor-required rate of return on common equity equal to
519 the high-end of my recommended range, or 11.85%, the common equity issuance
520 cost adjustment also equals 0.06%. Therefore, Atmos' cost of common equity,
521 including issuance costs, ranges from 11.21% to 11.91%, with a 11.56% midpoint.

522 **Q. Why did you calculate the issuance cost adjustment with Atmos' entire**
523 **balance of common equity?**

524 A. Since Atmos has unregulated subsidiaries, both the utility and its subsidiaries are
525 responsible for the costs incurred to issue common stock. Therefore, to spread
526 those costs over both utility and subsidiary operations, the balance of common
527 equity for the entire company, including unregulated subsidiaries, should be used in
528 the issuance cost adjustment calculation.

²⁴Company Schedule D-1, Revised.

529

Overall Cost of Capital

530 **Q. What is the overall cost of capital for Atmos in this proceeding?**

531 A. As shown on Schedule 12.00, the overall cost of capital for Atmos ranges from
532 9.07% to 9.30% with a midpoint estimate of 9.18%. The midpoint estimate is
533 based on a cost of common equity of 11.56%.

534

Response to Dr. Murry

535 **Q. Please summarize your evaluation of Dr. Murry's analysis of Atmos' cost of**
536 **common equity.**

537 A. Dr. Murry's analysis contains several errors that result in his over-estimation of the
538 cost of common equity for Atmos. Critical errors occur in the DCF and the standard
539 historical and size-adjusted CAPM analyses. The large number of errors in Dr.
540 Murry's analysis makes commenting on them all infeasible. Therefore, absence of a
541 comment on any particular aspect of Dr. Murry's analysis should not be interpreted
542 that I find it reasonable.

543

DCF Analyses

544 **Q. Please describe the errors in Dr. Murry's DCF analyses.**

545 A. Dr. Murry's DCF analyses contain numerous errors; however I will comment on only
546 one. Dr. Murry improperly measures stock prices in two of his DCF analyses.

547 **Q. Please describe why Dr. Murry's measurement of stock price is improper.**

548 A. To estimate stock price, Dr. Murry averaged the highest and lowest observed stock
549 price for the twelve months ending December 31, 1999, as reported by *Value Line*
550 *Investment Survey*.²⁵ To estimate a more current cost of equity, he averages the
551 highest and lowest observed stock prices over a two week period, from December
552 28, 1999 through January 10, 2000.²⁶ Both of these approaches have several
553 deficiencies. First, averaging the most extreme stock price observations for a given
554 period is unlikely to accurately measure the mean stock price for that period.
555 Second, since stock prices reflect all concurrently available and relevant
556 information, average stock prices must include observations that no longer have any
557 relevance to current and expected market conditions. Third, DCF models include
558 time-sensitive factors; therefore implementing the model with stock price
559 observations from various points in time renders valid implementation of the model
560 problematic. Dr. Murry's combination of expected dividends that were not known
561 until December 24, 1999,²⁷ with stock price observations from January through
562 December 1999 violates DCF valuation principals.

²⁵ Company response to Staff data request FD-1.12.

²⁶ Company response to Staff data request FD-1.13.

²⁷ Company response to Staff data requests FD-1.27 and FD-2.19.

563 **Q. Should average stock prices be used to reduce the effect of volatility?**

564 A. No. Measurement error is a problem inherent in cost of common equity analysis
565 and should be avoided as much as possible. Introducing old stock prices into an
566 analysis substitutes one alleged source of measurement error, volatile stock prices,
567 for another, irrelevant stock prices. Stock prices can be influenced by temporary
568 imbalances in supply and demand; however, any distortions such imbalances might
569 have on the measured cost of common equity can be reduced with samples.

570 **CAPM Analyses**

571 **Q. Please describe the errors Dr. Murry committed in this standard historical**
572 **CAPM analysis.**

573 A. In his standard historical CAPM analysis, Dr. Murry adds a risk premium that is
574 supposedly specific to a security to the current yield on long-term corporate bonds.
575 This analysis has several flaws. First, Dr. Murry's CAPM model uses an
576 inappropriate proxy for the risk-free rate. Dr. Murry's CAPM model can be depicted
577 mathematically as follows:

578
$$R_j = R_c + b_j \times (R_m - R_c)$$

579 where $R_j \equiv$ the required rate of return for security j ;

580 $R_c \equiv$ the corporate bond rate;

581 R_m ≡ the expected rate of return for the market portfolio; and

582 b_j ≡ the measure of risk for security j .

583 The above model is almost identical to the CAPM except that it substitutes a risky
 584 debt rate, R_c , for the risk-free rate, R_f . That substitution has no basis in financial
 585 theory. The consequences of the substitution of a risky debt rate for the risk-free
 586 rate can be illustrated mathematically as follows:

587 Since $R_c = R_f + (R_c - R_f)$ then

588 Dr.
$$\begin{aligned} R_j &= R_f + (R_c - R_f) + b_j \times (R_m - [R_f + (R_c - R_f)]) \\ &= R_f + (R_c - R_f) + b_j \times [(R_m - R_f) - (R_c - R_f)] \\ &= R_f + (R_c - R_f) + b_j \times (R_m - R_f) - b_j \times (R_c - R_f) \\ 589 \text{Murry}' &= R_f + (1 - b_j) \times (R_c - R_f) + b_j \times (R_m - R_f) \end{aligned}$$

590 s CAPM model adds to CAPM cost of common equity estimates an amount equal
 591 to $(1 - b_j) \times (R_c - R_f)$. Since the cost of risky debt, R_c , exceeds the risk-free rate, R_f ,
 592 Dr. Murry's risk premium model over-estimates the cost of common equity for
 593 companies with betas less than one.

594 In addition, Dr. Murry's CAPM model inappropriately incorporates two different long-
 595 term corporate bond yields. Consequently, his CAPM analysis violates a
 596 fundamental tenet of financial theory: investors require identical returns from two
 597 securities with identical risk. Dr. Murry estimated the required rate of return on the
 598 market currently equals 15.30%.²⁸ Consequently, a security with the same risk as

²⁸Prepared Direct Testimony of Donald A. Murry, Ph.D., Schedule DAM-13.

599 the market, that is, with a beta equal to one, would also have a required rate of
600 return of 15.30%. Yet, Dr. Murry's current risk premium model would estimate that
601 company's rate of return at 16.75% as follows:

$$602 \qquad 7.55\% + 1.0 \times (15.30\% - 6.10\%) = 16.75\%.$$

603 Thus, Dr. Murry's risk premium model over-estimates the cost of common equity.

604 Furthermore, the historical CAPM analysis has two additional deficiencies. First, it
605 relies on the notion that historical risk premiums are appropriate estimates for
606 expected risk premiums. Realized returns possess several shortcomings in that
607 regard. The returns an investment generates are unlikely to have equaled investor
608 return requirements due to unpredictable economic, industry-related, or company-
609 specific events. Even if an investment's return equaled investor requirements in a
610 given period, both the price of, and the investment's sensitivity to, each source of
611 risk changes over time. Consequently, the past relationship between two
612 investments, such as utility common equity and utility debt, is unlikely to remain
613 constant. Finally, the magnitude of the historical risk premium depends upon the
614 measurement period.

615 Second, Dr. Murry averages the earned return on small and large company stocks
616 to estimate the earned return on the market. That is inappropriate because the beta
617 he uses in his analysis is based on the NYSE index, which comprises mostly large

618 company stocks.²⁹ As shown below, beta is based, in part, on the volatility of the
619 market:

$$b_j = \frac{\text{Cov}(R_j, R_m)}{s_m^2}$$

620 where $\text{Cov}(R_j, R_m) \equiv$ the covariance of the returns on security j and the market; and

621 $s_m^2 \equiv$ the variance (i.e., volatility) of returns on the market.

622 Since small stocks have been more volatile than large stocks,³⁰ betas estimated in
623 relation to a market index composing both small and large stocks would likely be
624 lower than betas based on large stocks alone.

625 **Size-adjusted CAPM**

626 **Q. Is Dr. Murry's adjustment for a size-based risk premium appropriate?**

627 A. No. Dr. Murry's size-adjusted CAPM has no theoretical basis. Rather, it is based
628 on an empirical study that is not applicable to United Cities Gas Company.

629 Regardless, should a size-based risk premium be adopted, it should be based on
630 the size of Atmos Energy Corporation.

²⁹Statman, "Betas compared: Merrill Lynch vs. Value Line," *Journal of Portfolio Management*, Winter 1981, p. 42.

³⁰Company response to Staff data request FD-1.18.

631 **Q. Why should Atmos be the basis for a size adjustment?**

632 A. United Cities Gas Company is an operating division of Atmos. As such, it has
633 neither debt nor equity. To the extent that a size premium exists, it would be borne
634 by the entity that issues common stock to the public, that is, Atmos.

635 **Q. Please explain the significance of the absence of a theoretical basis for a**
636 **size-based risk premium.**

637 A. Since a size-based risk premium has no theoretical basis, to the extent that a
638 correlation between firm size and return exists, that relationship is likely the result of
639 some other factor or factors that are related to both size and return, such as liquidity
640 or information costs. Relatively illiquid securities impose costs on the investor since
641 he or she may be unable to sell them at a fair price on a timely basis. Gathering
642 information regarding the expected cash flows and risks of a security imposes costs
643 that an investor must recover through the returns that the security generates. The
644 securities of smaller companies tend to be less liquid than those of larger
645 companies since the potential breadth of the market for the former is usually more
646 limited. Similarly, if fewer sources of information regarding smaller companies
647 exist, then obtaining information might be more expensive.

648 If the securities of Atmos are less liquid or the availability of information regarding
649 Atmos is more restricted than the average security, then adding a size-based
650 premium to a CAPM analysis of Atmos' cost of common equity might be proper.

651 The study reported in Ibbotson Associates, which forms the basis of Dr. Murry's
652 size-based risk premium adjustment, is not restricted to utilities. Rather, it is based
653 on the stocks listed on the New York Stock Exchange.³¹ Yet, utilities, unlike most
654 stocks listed on the New York Stock Exchange, are subject to uniform reporting
655 requirements. Moreover, their rates and conditions of service are publicly reported.
656 Therefore, the cost of obtaining information regarding smaller utilities in general,
657 and Atmos in particular, is unlikely to be as high as that of unregulated companies
658 that are similar in size. That was confirmed in a study which found no size premium
659 for utilities.³²

660 Even for non-utilities, evidence of the existence of a size-based risk premium is not
661 very strong. Ibbotson Associates' data shows that out of a 1926-1998 study period,
662 small stocks consistently out-performed large stocks only during the 1962-1998
663 period.³³ Frenholz found that a statistical property he termed the "crossover effect"
664 was the primary cause of the difference between large and small company stock
665 returns. The "crossover effect" measures the effect on rate of return of those stocks
666 that switch from one size portfolio to another.³⁴ Fernholz states that as random
667 price changes affect the size of stocks, some stocks cross over from one size
668 portfolio to another. When a stock that starts in the large stock portfolio experiences
669 a random negative price change that moves it into the small stock portfolio, its

³¹ Ibbotson Associates, *SBBI 1999 Yearbook*, pp. 127-143.

³² Wong, "Utility Stocks and the Size Effect: an Empirical Analysis," *Journal of the Midwest Finance Association*, 1993, pp. 95-101.

³³ Ibbotson Associates, *SBBI 1999 Yearbook*, pp. 100-101.

670 resulting negative return is assigned to, and therefore reduces, the return on the
671 large stock portfolio. Conversely, when that same stock experiences a random
672 positive price change that moves it back into the large stock portfolio, its resulting
673 positive return is assigned to, and therefore increases, the return on the small stock
674 portfolio.³⁵ The combination of portfolio construction and random (i.e., non-
675 systematic) price movements creates a biased source of measurement error. Thus,
676 the “crossover effect” may be less a market return phenomenon than a modeling
677 problem. That is, the “small stock effect” may be nothing more than a statistical
678 anomaly.

679 In another study of domestic stocks listed on the NYSE and AMEX, Jensen,
680 Johnson and Mercer, (hereinafter “Jensen”) found that small stock premiums appear
681 to be related to monetary policy. Specifically, changes in monetary policy play a
682 prominent role in determining the magnitude of small stock premiums. During
683 expansive monetary periods, defined as months following a reduction in the Federal
684 Reserve discount rate, Jensen found that small stock returns were significantly
685 greater than large stock returns. Conversely, during restrictive monetary periods,
686 defined as months following an increase in the discount rate, Jensen found that
687 small stock returns were not significantly greater than large stock returns.³⁶
688 Nevertheless, the applicability of the Jensen results to small utility stocks is doubtful.

³⁴ Fernholz, “Crossovers, Dividends, and the Size Effect,” *Financial Analysts Journal*,
May/June 1998, pp. 73-75.

³⁵ Fernholz, “Crossovers, Dividends, and the Size Effect,” *Financial Analysts Journal*,
May/June 1998, p. 73.

689 First, since the Jensen study was based on largely non-utility companies, their
690 findings that small stocks outperformed large stocks during “expansionary”
691 monetary periods is not surprising. During monetary expansions, as the supply of
692 loanable funds increases, investors are more likely to invest in speculative, small
693 company stocks. However, during monetary contractions, as the supply of loanable
694 funds decreases, investors are more likely to switch from speculative investments to
695 safer ones – the well-known “flight to quality.” It is counter-intuitive to claim that
696 investors would consider the smaller firms in the regulated utility sector to be
697 speculative investments. Moreover, Jensen did not control their measurement of the
698 small stock premium for risk as measured by beta or other means.³⁷ Therefore,
699 their study does not support Dr. Murry’s size-based risk premium adjustment.

700 Even if a size-based risk premium exists, Dr. Murry’s estimates of the size of the
701 premium are questionable. First, Dr. Murry’s size-based risk premiums are based
702 on historical returns, which implies that historical risk premiums are appropriate
703 estimates for expected risk premiums. As described previously, that implication is
704 questionable at best.

705 Second, as noted previously, Dr. Murry’s historical size-based risk premium is
706 based on the realized returns of the stocks listed on the New York Stock

³⁶ Jensen, Johnson, and Mercer, “The Inconsistency of Small-Firm and Value Stock Premiums,”
Journal of Portfolio Management, p. 35.

³⁷ Jensen, Johnson, and Mercer, “The Inconsistency of Small-Firm and Value Stock Premiums,”
Journal of Portfolio Management, pp. 30 and 34.

707 Exchange.³⁸ That implies that small utility stocks are similar to small industrial
708 stocks, a very questionable premise that Dr. Murry did not verify. Ibbotson
709 Associates issued a similar warning against applying its results outside stocks
710 listed on the New York Stock Exchange.³⁹

711 Third, two principals of Ibbotson Associates, Roger Ibbotson and Paul Kaplan along
712 with James Peterson (hereinafter "Ibbotson"), have asserted that biases in beta
713 estimates for small companies are largely due to a lag in the amount of time that it
714 takes some information to be incorporated into the prices of less frequently traded
715 stocks.⁴⁰ Ibbotson found that incorporating that lag into beta estimates for small
716 companies partially explains the "size effect" in common stock returns.⁴¹ Therefore,
717 before one bases an adjustment of the cost of common equity for "small" utilities on
718 studies of predominantly industrial NYSE stocks, one should first investigate
719 whether the Ibbotson lag-factor is present in the stock returns of small utilities.

720 **Q. Did you perform such an analysis?**

³⁸ Ibbotson Associates, *SBI 1999 Yearbook*, pp. 127-143.

³⁹ Ibbotson Associates, *SBI 1999 Yearbook*, p. 137.

⁴⁰ Ibbotson, Kaplan and Peterson, "Estimates of Small-Stock Betas Are Much Too Low," *Journal of Portfolio Management*, Summer 1997, pp. 105 and 110.

⁴¹ Ibbotson, Kaplan and Peterson, "Estimates of Small-Stock Betas Are Much Too Low," *Journal of Portfolio Management*, Summer 1997, p. 105.

721 A. Yes. I calculated the traditional and lag betas for both of my samples and Dr.
722 Murry's sample from the following model using an ordinary least-squares
723 technique:⁴²

$$724 \quad R_{j,t} - R_{f,t} = \alpha_j + \mathbf{b}_j \times (R_{m,t} - R_{f,t}) + \mathbf{b}_{lag,j} \times (R_{m,t-1} - R_{f,t-1}) + \varepsilon_{j,t}$$

725 where $R_{j,t}$ \equiv the return on security j in period t ,

726 $R_{f,t}$ \equiv the risk-free rate of return in period t ,

727 $R_{m,t}$ \equiv the return on the market portfolio in period t ,

728 \mathbf{a}_j \equiv the intercept term for security j ;

729 \mathbf{b}_j \equiv traditional beta for security j ;

730 $\mathbf{b}_{lag,j}$ \equiv lagged beta for security j ; and

731 $\mathbf{e}_{j,t}$ \equiv the residual term in period t for security j .

732 The above equation is similar to that used to estimate "traditional" betas except that
733 a term for the "lagged" beta, (i.e., $\mathbf{b}_{lag,j} \times (R_{m,t-1} - R_{f,t-1})$) is added. The lagged beta
734 equaled -0.12 for my comparable sample. For Dr. Murry's sample, the lagged beta
735 equaled -0.11.⁴³ In all cases, the lagged betas were not statistically different from
736 zero. That is, Ibbotson's size-based lag-factor does not appear to be present in the
737 stock returns of the utilities in my comparable sample or Dr. Murry's sample.

⁴² Ibbotson, Kaplan and Peterson, "Estimates of Small-Stock Betas Are Much Too Low," *Journal of Portfolio Management*, Summer 1997, p. 106.

⁴³ The adjusted beta for Dr. Murry's sample equals 0.55; the adjusted sum beta (i.e., the sum of the adjusted beta and the adjusted lag beta) equals 0.47.

738 Finally, Dr. Murry's application of the Ibbotson Associates' historical size-based risk
739 premiums are probably inconsistent with the manner in which Ibbotson Associates
740 measured them. While Dr. Murry adds the historical size premium to his CAPM-
741 based risk premium analysis which is based on adjusted Value Line betas, the
742 studies I have reviewed on the effect of size on returns employ raw betas.⁴⁴ Since
743 the Ibbotson Associates size-based risk premiums are a function of raw beta, Dr.
744 Murry should have used the same type of beta as Ibbotson Associates.

745 **Q. Does this conclude your direct testimony?**

746 **A.** Yes, it does.

⁴⁴ Wong, "Utility Stocks and the Size Effect: An Empirical Analysis," *Journal of Midwest Finance Association*, 1993, p. 96; Ibbotson, Kaplan, and Peterson, "Estimates of Small-Stock Betas Are Much Too Low," *Journal of Portfolio Management*, Summer 1997, p.106.