

61-90	8	8	6	0.53
91-150	6	6	5	0.42
151-300	4	4	4	0.31
301-500	3	3	3	0.23
501-1000	2	2	2	0.17
1001-1500	1	1	1	0.11
1501-2000	0.5	0.5	0.5	0.05
2000+	0	0	0	0
Measure Type	%	%	%	%
Modification	Add	Add	Subtract	Add

<3> MR-7 & 8's column applies both for LIS trunks and Unbundled Loops (UBL)
 <4> On NI-1, the variance table only applies in instances where the parity comparison applies -- i.e., Qwest's blocking rates exceed 1%, as the appropriate comparison for that measurement is the retail analog or a 1% standard, whichever is higher.

When the variance factors in Table 5 are used, for any performance submeasure where the CLEC volume is ten or below, a performance **[*149]** submeasure will not be considered missed for the purposes of Section 10.3 until the number of payment occurrences is >1 (the one free miss rule). If the method of determining conformance in Section 6.1 using the variance factors in Table 2 or the variance factors in Table 5 with the one free miss rule results in a conclusion of conformance, then for the purposes of Section 10.3, the performance measurement is considered met. If both methods described in this Section result in a performance measurement miss, Qwest's payment obligation, if any, in this Section shall be the lesser of the payment amounts determined using the two methods.

10.4 All Tier 2 payments (including Tier 1Y payments not owed to the CLEC, as set forth in Section 8.3), any special payments assessed by the Monitor, and the 50% share of payments for inaccurate reporting not self-corrected by Qwest) shall be paid into a Special Fund that Qwest shall keep in an interest-accruing bank account ("Tier 2 Special Fund" or "Special Fund").

10.5 This Special Fund shall pay for the Independent Monitor at least until the first three-year review. When there are insufficient funds in the Special Fund for this purpose, **[*150]** Qwest shall advance the necessary funds.

10.6 Other potential uses for this fund include: paying a technical advisor for the Commission's CPAP Revision process; paying a consultant for the three-year review; and, if the Commission so decides, paying for additional audits of Qwest's performance measurement and reporting, and paying other administrative expenses.

10.7 Upon implementation of the CPAP, the Commission shall decide how to use the remainder of this fund. The uses shall be competitively neutral efforts in the telecommunications field that do not benefit Qwest directly.

11.0 Cap on Tier 1 and Tier 2 Payments

11.1 There shall be an annual cap of \$ 100 million on payments for performance under the CPAP. The cap shall apply to Tier 1X, Tier 1Y, and Tier 2 payments as explained in Section 11.3.

11.2 The following shall not count toward the annual cap: any penalties imposed by the Independent Monitor to maintain the integrity of the CPAP; any penalties imposed by the Commission; any penalties imposed directly by the CPAP for failure to report, failure to report timely, or failure to report accurately; any liquidated damages under another Interconnection **[*151]** Agreement; any interest payments; and any damages in an associated action.

11.3 Tier 1Y and Tier 2 penalties shall be subject to a monthly cap of 1/12 of the annual cap of \$ 100 million. Following is a description of how the monthly cap shall work:

If the total payments (Tier 1X, 1Y, 2) do not exceed the monthly cap, Qwest shall make all payments.

If the total payments (Tier 1X, 1Y, 2) do exceed the monthly cap, Qwest shall pay all Tier 1X payments (even if they alone exceed the monthly cap). Other than Tier 1X and payments specified in Section 11.2, Qwest shall not make payments in excess of the monthly cap. The balance in excess of the monthly cap shall roll forward and be paid when Qwest's total monthly penalties are below the monthly cap, whenever that occurs (even if that should take longer than a year).

In a month in which Qwest's total payment is below the monthly cap, any deferred payments plus interest will be due, but only to the extent that the deferred payments do not cause the total monthly payment to exceed the monthly cap. In the event all Tier 1Y and Tier 2 payments cannot be made in any month due to the monthly cap, Qwest **[*152]** will pay Tier 1Y payments first (up to the monthly cap) and then, from the remaining money, pay Tier 2 payments (up to the monthly cap).

The deferred payments shall be paid with interest on the relevant amount. The interest rate shall be equal to twice the Commission prescribed customer deposit rate.

If Qwest wishes to make any Tier 1Y and Tier 2 payments over and above the monthly cap in order to avoid paying interest on the deferred amount, it may do so.

11.4 If Qwest payments equal or exceed the annual cap for two years in a row or equal or exceed 1/3 of the annual cap in a combination of two consecutive months, the Commission shall have the authority to open a proceeding to request Qwest to explain the non-conforming performance and show that it did not result from Qwest's failure to avoid reasonably foreseeable risks. If the Commission concludes that Qwest failed to act in a prudent manner to avoid reasonably foreseeable consequences, the Commission may raise the cap to the amount which Qwest would have paid in the higher of the prior two years, may ask the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") to halt Qwest's long distance marketing authority **[*153]** for a particular interval, may levy a fine, and/or may take other appropriate action.

12.0 Timing and Form of Payment

12.1 All Tier 1 payments to CLEC and all Tier 2 payments to the Special Fund shall be made on the last business day of the month following the due date of the performance measurement report for the month for which payment is being made.

12.2 All payments shall be in cash. Qwest shall be allowed, after obtaining the individual agreement of CLEC, to make such cash payments through the use of electronic fund transfers to CLEC and the Special Fund. However, once Qwest and CLEC agree on a method of payment (*i.e.*, wire transfer or check), Qwest shall not change the method of payment without the permission of CLEC. Qwest shall be able to offset cash payment to CLEC with a bill credit applied against any non-disputed charges that are more than 90 days past due.

12.3 Qwest shall provide monthly payment information at the same time that the performance reports are due. Monthly payment information shall include the payment calculations.

12.4 In the case of late payments, Qwest shall pay interest to CLEC and to the Special Fund, as applicable, **[*154]** calculated at twice the Commission prescribed customer deposit rate, on the amount in question. Should Qwest demonstrate to the relevant CLEC or to the Independent Monitor that it overpaid, it shall be able to deduct from future payments any past overpayment, along with interest calculated at the Commission prescribed customer deposit rate for the amount in question.

13.0 Reporting

13.1 Qwest will provide the Commission and CLECs opting into the CPAP with a monthly report of Qwest's performance for the PIDs. These reports shall contain any carry-over payment amounts and calculations as well as the current month's information. Qwest will collect, analyze, and report performance data for these PID measurements. Qwest will store such data in easy-to-access electronic form for three years after they have been produced and for an additional three years in an archived format. Any failure to follow these requirements shall be treated as a violation of the CPAP integrity requirements discussed in Sections 17.5 and 17.8.

13.2 On or before the last business day of each month following the relevant performance period, Qwest shall post the individual CLEC monthly reports **[*155]** to a secure part of the CPAP website and the aggregate state report to the public part of the CPAP website. In addition, Qwest must officially file with the Commission, one hard copy and one electronic copy in an Excel format, of all CLEC individual monthly reports under seal and one hard copy and one electronic copy in an Excel format of the state aggregate report in the public file. If CLEC requests a hard copy of its individual report, Qwest should make that hard copy available at no cost to CLEC.

13.3 In the case of late reporting, Qwest shall make a payment to the Special Fund of \$ 500 per calendar day for each day the report is late. This amount represents the total payment for missing a reporting deadline, rather than a payment per report and does not count against the cap described in Section 11.1. This payment shall begin on the report due date and continue until the report is actually distributed.

13.4 If any inaccurate reporting is revealed by any annual audit, Commission audit or mini-audit, Qwest shall make any payments due to the CLEC as a result of the inaccurate reporting plus an additional payment of 50% of the amount due as a result of the underpayment. **[*156]** Half of the 50% payment shall be paid into the Tier 2 Special Fund, and half shall be paid to the CLEC.

13.5 In addition to the Section 13.4 payment, if as a result of an inaccurate report, any bill over \$ 25,000 is adjusted upwards by 25% or more, Qwest shall also incur a late reporting payment as set forth in Section 13.3. This payment shall begin on the report due date and shall continue until the day the discrepancy is resolved.

13.6 If a discrepancy is revealed solely by Qwest, and Qwest self-corrects the discrepancy prior to the monthly payment being due, no additional liability shall be assessed. If Qwest self-corrects the erroneous reports before an audit on the relevant measurements in question begins but after the relevant payment is made, it shall be responsible for paying the additional amount owed due to the non-conforming performance as well as interest on this amount at the rate of two times the Commission prescribed customer deposit rate.

13.7 If a discrepancy is revealed by a Qwest-CLEC data reconciliation process or any other inquiry, Qwest shall pay the additional amount owed as well as interest on any late additional amount at the rate of three [*157] times the Commission prescribed customer deposit rate.

13.8 If a Qwest-CLEC data reconciliation process forces Qwest to adjust its payment upwards three months in a row, Qwest must pay the additional amount and an additional penalty to Tier 1Y as if the discrepancy had been revealed by an audit (see Section 14.12) for that third month and for each consecutive month that CLEC reveals additional payments via data reconciliation.

13.9 If a Qwest-CLEC data reconciliation process forces Qwest to adjust its payment upward five times in a calendar year, Qwest must pay the additional amount and an additional penalty to Tier 1Y as if the discrepancy had been revealed by an audit for that fifth month and for all other months in that calendar year that the CLEC reveals additional payments via data reconciliation.

14.0 Audits of Performance Results

14.1 Qwest shall carefully document any and all changes that Qwest makes to the Performance Measurement and Reporting System. This change log shall be displayed on a public website dedicated to the CPAP. The Performance Measurement and Reporting System is defined to include at least: elements of Qwest's Regulatory Reporting [*158] System that constitute the data collection programs (i.e., the software code used by Qwest to determine which data fields are used and how they are used), the underlying data extracted by the data collection programs and data reference tables (e.g., USOC tables, wire center tables, etc., used in the calculation of measurements), the data staging programs (programming code used to organize and consolidate the data), the calculation programming (the code used to implement the formula defined for a measurement), and the report generation programs (including the report format and report file creation. This change log shall contain, at a minimum, a detailed description of the change (in plain English); the effects of the change, the reason for the change, the dates of notification and of implementation, and whether the change received Commission approval. Qwest shall also record if the change is fundamental or non-fundamental (see Sections 14.2 and 14.3).

14.2 Qwest shall be allowed to change the Performance Measurement And Reporting System as defined in Section 14.1 in ways that are non-fundamental (i.e., system changes for which the [*159] relevant performance data can be replicated under the old approach) without preapproval, but shall promptly record these changes on the change log. Omitted or inaccurate changes shall result in Qwest being required to pay a \$ 2500 fine, plus interest at the Commission prescribed customer deposit rate accrued from the time the change took effect. The payment shall go to the Tier 2 Special Fund and does not count against the annual cap described in Section 11.1.

14.3 Before making any changes to the Performance Measurement and Reporting System in a manner whereby the relevant data cannot be reconstructed under the prior approach (i.e., a fundamental change to its measurement system), Qwest shall record the proposed change to the change log and notify the Auditor retained for the purpose of auditing performance measurements under this CPAP to request an evaluation of the proposed change. The Auditor will evaluate the impact of the proposed change and report, in writing, the results of that evaluation to the Commission and Qwest. Qwest shall immediately post the Auditor's report on the public CPAP website. Upon receiving the report of the impact evaluation from the Auditor, **[*160]** the Commission shall have 15 days to take action to prevent Qwest from making such change and to decide on a process for resolving the issue. During the first seven day period following the filing and recording of the Auditor's report, interested parties may file comments on the proposed change and Auditor's report. If the Commission takes no action on the issue during the 15 day period, Qwest shall be free to make the proposed change.

If Qwest makes a fundamental change pursuant to this Section without obtaining approval, it shall be liable for \$ 100,000 payable to the Special Fund. If Qwest cannot reproduce reliable performance data, the Independent Monitor shall determine what payments are due based upon the data collected by the affected CLECs along with any appropriate interest and late payment penalties.

14.4 Qwest shall keep a record of all exclusions (i.e., those allowed by the PIDs, authorized by the Commission or otherwise excluded for any reason) and of each basis for each exclusion. Such records shall be kept in easy-to-access electronic format for three years and an additional three years in an archived format.

14.5 As part of the data reconciliation process, **[*161]** CLEC shall have the right to request access to the raw, excluded data and business rules or other basis relied upon by Qwest to exclude the data from the most recent month's report. The records and data must be turned over, in a mutually-agreeable format within two weeks of the request.

14.6 An independent audit of the results of the performance submeasures identified in Appendix A and the financial payments calculated based upon Qwest's performance results shall be performed annually. The first audit shall begin one year after the effective date the CPAP, and the second and third annual audits shall begin one year after the completion of the prior year's audit. Qwest shall pay for the first three audits; thereafter, the Commission shall determine whether the audits shall be paid by the Special Fund or by Qwest. The annual audit shall encompass both the performance reports and payment amounts. The audit shall include at least the following: (1) problem areas requiring further oversight as identified in the previous audit(s); (2) any submeasures changed or being changed from a manual to electronic system; (3) the accuracy of the measurements and reports designated in Tier **[*162]** 1A; (4) submeasures responsible for 80% of the payments paid by Qwest over the prior year (to the extent that they are not covered by the Tier 1A audit); and (5) whether Qwest is exercising a proper duty of care in evaluating which, if any, performance results can be properly excluded from its wholesale performance requirements.

14.7 A thorough scrutiny of Qwest's measurement and reporting system shall not be required for the annual audit. If, after examining the structure of the performance and measurement system, receiving input from CLECs, examining exclusions made by Qwest, and evaluating the nature of any changes, as well as some representative examples, the Auditor can confidently conclude that

the measurement and reporting system is reliable, the Auditor need not perform a more extensive audit.

14.8 The Auditor shall be chosen by the Commission, with input from Qwest, CLECs, and other interested persons. The Auditor shall perform all of the auditing functions described above for the first three years. Any interested person may petition the Independent Monitor to disqualify the Auditor based upon gross neglect of duties, incompetence, or a significant conflict of interest. **[*163]** The Auditor shall respond to the petition within a reasonable time. The Independent Monitor shall then be authorized, in its discretion, to open a proceeding to consider the petition for disqualification.

14.9 CLEC may request a mini-audit of the performance measurement results covering Qwest's performance to CLEC for any submeasures. However, a CLEC will not be allowed to commence such an audit unless and until (1) CLEC has requested access to the raw data and business rules and attempted to meet with Qwest to attempt data reconciliation for any discrepancies by presenting its own version of the data calculation and comparing it to Qwest's to demonstrate the areas in which Qwest allegedly erred, and (2) Qwest and CLEC are unable to reach agreement about any alleged discrepancy through the Qwest-CLEC data reconciliation process. Qwest must provide the necessary expertise and work in good faith to attempt to answer CLEC concerns. Qwest's experts must be available for requested meetings to take place within 10 business days of the CLEC request, but Qwest may attempt to resolve the issue over the phone or via email before holding a face-to-face meeting.

14.10 Upon CLEC request, **[*164]** data files of the CLEC raw data, or any subset thereof, and business rules or other basis used to generate the reports as part of the data reconciliation process will be transmitted, without charge, to CLEC, within two weeks of the request, in a mutually acceptable format, protocol, and transmission medium.

14.11 The scope of the mini-audit allowed under this CPAP is limited to the relevant measures and submeasures that were the subject of and determined to be suspect, through the Qwest-CLEC data reconciliation process.

14.12 The mini-audit shall be conducted by the Auditor designated for annual audits, unless CLEC demonstrates to the Independent Monitor good cause that another entity should perform the mini-audit. CLEC shall pay the Auditor's fees and expenses, and CLEC and Qwest shall bear their own costs. If a mini-audit identifies a non-conformance that materially affects the results (material being defined as a deficiency that requires an additional payment of at least 10% more than the total amount paid on the submeasures examined by the mini-audit) by Qwest, Qwest shall pay the Auditor's fees and expenses. In addition, Qwest shall resolve the identified problems and **[*165]** shall pay any applicable payments under the late payment provisions. Qwest shall also pay other CLECs any appropriate payments and penalties based on problems uncovered in the mini-audit. If the Auditor does not identify any non-conformance, CLEC shall not be allowed to request another mini-audit during the six months after the initial mini-audit request; however, CLEC is nevertheless permitted to request Qwest-CLEC data reconciliation during that time.

14.13 If CLEC proves to the Independent Monitor via the dispute resolution process that Qwest did not work in good faith to resolve the issues prior to the initiation of a mini-audit, the Independent Monitor can shift the Auditor's fees and expenses to Qwest, and the six-month moratorium on mini-audits shall then be waived.

14.14 The Commission reserves the right to choose to conduct an audit itself, with the assistance of an outside Auditor if it chooses. Such an audit shall be paid for through the Special Fund. If the audit reveals any material non-conformance (as defined above) in Qwest's performance reporting, Qwest shall reimburse the costs of the audit and, where appropriate, shall make applicable payments to CLECs [*166] or Special Fund as described above.

15.0 Waiver of Payments

15.1 Qwest may seek a waiver of the obligation to make payments pursuant to this CPAP by seeking an exception from the Independent Monitor on any of the following grounds:

- (1) *Force majeure*, as defined in SGAT Section 5.7 (as to benchmark standards, but not as to parity submeasures);
- (2) A work stoppage (as to benchmark standards, but not as to parity submeasures);
- (3) An act or omission by CLEC that is in bad faith and designed to "game" the payment process;
or
- (4) A material failure by CLEC to follow the applicable business rules.

15.2 Any waiver request must contain an explanation of the circumstances that justify the waiver, and any and all relevant documentation relied upon to support the request. To establish that the circumstances warrant granting of a requested waiver, Qwest must show the existence of those circumstances by a preponderance of the evidence. For any such action, Qwest shall be required to pay the disputed credits or place the disputed amount of money into an interest-bearing escrow account until the matter is resolved. CLEC must respond to any such waiver requests within 10 [*167] business days and the Independent Monitor shall have 10 business days after the response is filed to rule on the requested waiver, subject to review by the Commission as specified by the Dispute Resolution Process in Section 17.0.

16.0 Limitations

16.1 The payments imposed by the CPAP shall not become available in Colorado until the first day of the second month after Qwest receives Section 271 authority for the State of Colorado. Each CLEC shall have the option of electing the CPAP *in toto* as set forth in this CPAP SGAT or of negotiating an alternative regime with Qwest. The CLECs need not adopt the *Interconnection, Unbundled Network Elements, Ancillary Services, and Resale SGAT* in its entirety in order to adopt the CPAP SGAT. Qwest will not be liable for Tier 1 payments to CLEC until the Commission has approved an interconnection agreement between the CLEC and Qwest which adopts the provisions of this CPAP.

16.2 Qwest's agreement to implement these enforcement terms, and specifically its agreement to make any payments hereunder, will not be considered as an admission against interest or an admission of liability in any legal, regulatory, or other proceeding relating [*168] in whole or in part to the same performance. CLEC may not use (1) the existence of this enforcement plan or (2) Qwest's Tier 1 or Tier 2 payments as evidence that Qwest has discriminated in the provision of any facilities or services under Sections 251 or 252 of the Act or has violated any state or federal law or regulation. Qwest's conduct underlying its performance measures, however, is not made inadmissible by this SGAT term. By accepting this performance remedy plan, CLEC agrees that

Qwest's performance with respect to this remedy plan may not be used as an admission of liability or culpability for a violation of any state or federal law or regulation. (Nothing herein is intended to preclude Qwest from introducing evidence of any Tier 1 payments under these provisions for the purpose of precluding additional payments or offsetting any payments against any other damages or payments a CLEC might recover.) The terms of this paragraph do not apply to any proceeding before the Commission or the FCC to determine whether Qwest has met, or continues to meet, the requirements of Section 271 of the Act.

16.3 This CPAP contains a comprehensive set of performance submeasures, statistical **[*169]** methodologies, and payment mechanisms that are designed to function together, and only together, as an integrated whole. To elect the CPAP, CLEC must adopt the CPAP in its entirety, into its interconnection agreement with Qwest in lieu of other alternative standards or relief, except as stated in Sections 16.4, 16.6, and 16.7.

16.4 In electing the CPAP, CLEC shall surrender any rights to remedies under state wholesale service quality rules (in that regard, this CPAP shall constitute an "agreement of the parties" to opt out of those rules, as specified in 4 CCR 723-43-10 of those rules) or under any interconnection agreement designed to provide such monetary relief for the same performance issues addressed by the CPAP. The CPAP shall not limit either non-contractual legal or non-contractual regulatory remedies that may be available to CLEC.

16.5 Whether or not a CLEC opts into the CPAP, Qwest shall be responsible for making payments to the Tier 2 Special Fund, including Tier 1Y payments not owed to the CLEC as set forth in Section 8.3, for the wholesale performance provided to that CLEC.

16.6 Tier 1X and Tier 1Y payments to CLECs **[*170]** are in the nature of liquidated damages. Before CLEC shall be able to file an action seeking contract damages that flow from an alleged failure to perform in an area specifically measured and regulated by the CPAP, CLEC must first seek permission through the Dispute Resolution Process set forth in Section 17.0 to proceed with the action. This permission shall be granted only if CLEC can present a reasonable theory of damages for the non-conforming performance at issue and evidence of real world economic harm that, as applied over the preceding six months, establishes that the actual payments collected for non-conforming performance in the relevant area do not redress the extent of the competitive harm. If CLEC can make this showing, it shall be permitted to proceed with this action. Any damages awarded through this action shall be offset with payments made under this CPAP. If the CLEC cannot make this showing, the action shall be barred. To the extent that CLEC's contract action relates to an area of performance not addressed by the CPAP, no such procedural requirement shall apply.

16.7 If for any reason CLEC agreeing to this CPAP is awarded compensation for the same harm for which **[*171]** it received payments under the CPAP, the court or other adjudicatory body hearing such claim may offset the damages resulting from such claim against payments made for the same harm. Only that relevant finder of fact, and not Qwest in its discretion, can judge what amount, if any, of CPAP payments should be offset from any judgment for a CLEC in a related action.

16.8 If Qwest believes that some Tier 2 payments duplicate payments that are made to the state under other service quality rules, Qwest may make the payments to a special interest bearing escrow account and then dispute the payments via the Independent Monitor. If Qwest can show

that the payments are indeed duplicative, it may retain the money (and its interest) that are found to duplicate other state payments. Otherwise the money will go to the Tier 2 Special Fund.

16.9 The Commission shall have the right to modify this plan at any time as appropriate.

17.0 Dispute Resolution Process

17.1 The dispute resolution process specified in this CPAP does not replace or in any way limit, among other things, the processes for resolving interconnection disputes not within the ambit of the CPAP.

17.2 The Commission **[*172]** shall appoint an Independent Monitor to resolve disputes identified in Section 17.5. The salary and expenses of the Independent Monitor shall be paid by the Special Fund. If at any time, the Special Fund does not contain sufficient funds to pay for the Independent Monitor, Qwest shall advance the funds until the Special Fund contains the necessary funds to cover these expenses.

17.3 In the event that any person determines that the Independent Monitor has acted with gross neglect of duties, committed any ethical impropriety, has a significant conflict of interest, or is incompetent to perform the assigned task, the person may contact the Chief Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) of the Commission. The Chief ALJ shall be authorized in its sole discretion to file a petition, to remove the Independent Monitor. The Commission shall rule on the petition within two months, including any hearing that it may hold to resolve disputed facts.

17.4 If the Independent Monitor position is vacant at any time, the parties shall file requests for dispute resolution with the Chief ALJ, who shall then be responsible for fulfilling the duties of the Independent Monitor or designating another ALJ **[*173]** to do so. If the Commission decides during the CPAP Revision Process that it wishes to assign some or all of the Independent Monitor's duties either to the Commission ALJs or to Commission staff persons, it shall be free to do so; and the contract with the Independent Monitor shall so provide.

17.5 The Independent Monitor shall be responsible, at least initially, for the following functions, which may be modified by the Commission as it deems appropriate, with input from the parties, and for other responsibilities as set out in the CPAP (see, for example, Section 17.12). The Independent Monitor shall resolve all challenges to the accuracy of any performance measurements or reports, as evaluated through the auditing process in Section 14.0, as well as any disputes over the CPAP integrity requirements (that is, the rules that enable the CPAP to function, such as data collection and retention requirements, maintaining the PIDs as approved, and so forth). If Qwest is repeatedly penalized for failing to meet the performance requirements under any given PID, the Independent Monitor shall have the authority to require Qwest to perform a root-cause analysis. The Independent **[*174]** Monitor shall evaluate, including necessary investigation of, all allegations that Qwest has misinterpreted, wrongly applied, or violated the relevant business rules that govern the applicable payments to be made pursuant to the CPAP. For example, for disputes about whether particular CLEC actions qualify as exclusions from a measure, where such disputes were not settled by the Qwest-CLEC data reconciliation process or an audit, the Independent Monitor shall be authorized to decide what payments should have been made. The Independent Monitor shall also entertain challenges to disqualify the Auditor based upon gross neglect of duties, incompetence, or a significant conflict of interest. The Independent Monitor shall approve or deny permission for a CLEC to bring an overlapping lawsuit for

contractual remedies. Finally, the Independent Monitor shall assess any additional penalties under this plan, such as penalties for bringing frivolous disputes.

17.6 The dispute resolution process envisioned by the CPAP provides a means of resolving issues raised by the CPAP reports, payment calculations and processes. This process is akin to the dispute resolution processes that might be established [*175] in other Interconnection Agreements, except it applies exclusively to the CPAP.

17.7 The Independent Monitor shall employ a slightly modified version of the Commission's expedited dispute resolution procedure set forth in 4 CCR 723-1-61(k), but if the Independent Monitor so chooses, it shall be able to submit any desired material procedural changes to the Commission, which shall solicit comments from all interested persons before making a decision whether to adopt the procedural change. The procedural changes may be limited to a particular dispute or may apply to all future disputes as deemed appropriate by the Commission.

17.8 The CPAP's dispute resolution process shall not be resorted to unless and until the problem is raised at the Vice President-Vice President level at least two weeks before a dispute is submitted to the Independent Monitor. As part of its request for dispute resolution, the party making the request ("complainant") must provide a statement including specific facts that the complainant engaged (or attempted to engage) in good faith negotiations to resolve the disagreement, and that, despite [*176] these good faith efforts, the parties failed to resolve the issue.

17.9 Insofar as there is a dispute about any business rule or requirement of the CPAP, any ruling issued by the Independent Monitor shall bind all parties unless and until it is reversed or modified by the Commission. If the Independent Monitor's decision is reversed or modified upon review, any payments affected by the Commission's decision must be refunded.

17.10 The Commission's review, while plenary, shall not include consideration of any evidence not presented to the Independent Monitor. Appeals must be filed within five business days of the Independent Monitor's decision, and the opposing party shall have five business days to respond. The Commission shall then have 15 business days to rule on the appeal. A party shall have five business days to seek reconsideration or rehearing and the Commission shall have 10 business days to rule on any such motions. As a term of participation in the CPAP, all decisions after a motion for reconsideration and rehearing are final and shall be appealable to federal court under the standard in the Federal Arbitration Act.

17.11 In all actions before [*177] the Independent Monitor, the losing party shall pay all relevant attorney's fees and costs -- including monies spent to prove that the problem exists -- as determined by the Independent Monitor.

17.12 With regard to requiring payments that were erroneously withheld, the Independent Monitor shall enforce penalties for late payments and inaccurate reporting, as may be applicable. With regard to CPAP integrity requirements, the Independent Monitor shall be able to order the appropriate payments for misreporting along with the 50% premium, and shall be able to levy an additional payment of up to \$ 100,000 if the Independent Monitor finds that such action materially affected the payments, was willful, and was taken without any legitimate business justification. Any action by CLEC that materially affects the relevant payments, lacks any legitimate business justification, and can be explained solely as an effort willfully to "game" the CPAP shall be grounds for the Independent Monitor's invalidating all payments received as a result of such actions. In addition, if the Independent Monitor finds it appropriate, CLEC shall be required to pay to Qwest a payment equaling 50% of the [*178] amount at issue and shall also be subject to an additional

payment amount up to \$ 100,000. In all actions before the Independent Monitor, the losing party shall pay all relevant attorney fees and costs, including monies spent to prove that the problem exists, as determined by the Independent Monitor.

18.0 Effective Date, Reviews and Termination

18.1 The effective date of the CPAP is the date on which Qwest obtains § 271 approval from the FCC for Colorado. Dates for reviews of the CPAP are calculated from this effective date.

18.2 Reviews of the CPAP occur every six months, commencing with the effective date of the CPAP. Under the six-month CPAP review process, a Commission staff person shall submit a report to the Commission at the five month mark to recommend a series of changes, if any, to the CPAP, noting which of those were agreed to by all parties and which were contested.

18.3 In order to prepare the six-month review report, the relevant Commission staff person (along with any technical advisor the Commission may choose to retain and pay from the Tier 2 Special Fund) shall request feedback on possible changes and shall meet with parties (individually or [*179] together) and the Independent Monitor beginning no later than 90 days into the relevant cycle.

18.4 After the Commission staff person submits a six-month review report to the Commission on any suggested changes, parties shall have two weeks to file exceptions to, or comment on, that report. The Commission will rule within four weeks of receiving the parties' exceptions and/or comments on what changes, if any, should be instituted.

18.5 The Commission shall conduct a proceeding to resolve any disputed issues.

18.6 The six-month CPAP review process shall focus on refining, shifting the relative weighing of, deleting, and adding new PIDs; however, the six-month review is not limited to these areas. With the exception of the areas specifically identified in Section 18.7 as eligible for review only at the three-year and six-year reviews, any other part of the CPAP is eligible for review during the six-month CPAP review. After the Commission considers such changes through the six-month process, it shall determine what set of changes should be embodied in an amended SGAT that Qwest will file in order to effectuate these changes.

18.6.1 If, pursuant to Section [*180] 8.2, a PID continues to trigger a payment escalation for six months or more, that PID shall automatically be reviewed during a six-month review pursuant to this Section, in order to determine if there are issues with that PID, such as poor definition, that need to be addressed. In order to minimize this likelihood, the sound practice for introducing PIDs is to work through a collaborative forum before bringing a proposed PID addition or change to the Commission. The preferred approach is to introduce new PIDs as diagnostic measures, allowing for some reporting of actual data before determining the relevant standard and appropriate penalties.

18.7 Parties may suggest more fundamental changes to the plan; but, unless the suggestion is highly exigent, the suggestion shall either be declined or deferred until the three-year review. The following areas of the CPAP will be eligible for change only at the three-year and six-year reviews:

(1) The statistical methodology (Sections 4.0, 5.0 and 6.0) except for additions to the variance tables for new Tier 1A measures;

- (2) The payment caps (Sections 11.0 and 18.8);
- (3) The duration of the CPAP (Section 18.11);
- (4) The **[*181]** payment regime structure (Sections 2.0, 7.0, 8.0, 9.0, 10.1, 10.2, 10.3, and 10.4) except for the addition of payment amounts for new Tier 2 measures and of payment amounts for violations of change management requirements;
- (5) The legal operation of the CPAP (Sections 15.0 and 16.0);
- (6) The Independent Monitor (Section 17.0) with the exception of assignment of the Independent Monitor function to an Administrative Law Judge;
- (7) Any proposal that does not relate directly to measuring and/or providing payments for non-discriminatory wholesale performance.

18.7.1 If, at the conclusion of a six-month CPAP review, the Commission orders a change in any areas identified in Section 18.7 without Qwest's consent, the Commission decision shall be stayed automatically during the course of any judicial challenge up to issuance of a final non-appealable order on the merits. This provision shall not apply if there is no judicial challenge.

18.8 Qwest shall calculate separately, payments owed under the CPAP that do not include changes made at the six-month review ("baseline CPAP") and payments owed under a CPAP revised to reflect changes made at the six-month review ("revised **[*182]** CPAP"). If payments calculated under the revised CPAP are more than 110% of payments calculated under the baseline CPAP, Qwest shall limit payments to the affected CLECs and to the Special Fund to a 10% increase ("10% collar") above the total baseline CPAP payment liability. Any CLEC affected by this limitation of payments shall be eligible for payments above the 10% collar from the Special Fund. If the Special Fund does not contain sufficient funds to provide such payments to CLECs, Qwest shall make up the difference. Any funds that Qwest provides to make up the difference will be offset against Qwest's future Special Fund liabilities. At any six-month review, if the total payment liability for the revised CPAP is below 110% of the total payment liability for the baseline CPAP for the preceding six month period, the revised CPAP shall become the baseline CPAP for the next six month period, otherwise, the same baseline CPAP shall remain in effect for the next six month period.

18.9 If Qwest or CLEC wishes to modify a PID outside of the six-month review process and before the Three-Year Review set forth in the CPAP, the change must be approved by the Independent Monitor **[*183]** and then also approved by the Commission.

18.10 Thirty (30) months after the effective date of the CPAP, the Commission shall initiate a comprehensive review of the CPAP (the "Three-Year Review") with the assistance of an outside, independent expert. Such expert shall be paid from the Special Fund. When there are insufficient funds in the Special Fund for this purpose, Qwest shall advance the funds. The Three-Year Review shall:

- (1) Seek to refine the payment amounts by developing an evidentiary basis for the harm associated with particular non-conforming wholesale performance and to adjust the CPAP's payment amounts accordingly. Such evidence shall be the only basis for making upward or downward adjustments to the CPAP's payment amounts during the three-year review.
- (2) Evaluate whether there are available economical alternatives to Qwest's wholesale service offerings and whether such alternatives provide competitors with a meaningful opportunity to compete. This process shall thus consider the rationale for removing measures (or submeasures) both based on Qwest's demonstration of its ability to deliver reliable wholesale performance in

certain areas and/or the fact that [*184] Qwest's critical role in the market as a provider of key wholesale inputs is dissipating to the extent that the Commission can lift performance assurance requirements (either on a measure or submeasure basis).

(3) Focus on whether some areas -- disaggregated by either product type or geographic area -- no longer need to be measured and/or subject to payments for non-conforming wholesale performance.

(4) Evaluate whether the revision process should take place at a semi-annual, annual, or other interval.

At the Three-Year Review, the Commission cannot require Qwest, under the authority granted to it under the CPAP, to undertake any new obligations. At the Three-Year Review, if it chooses to do so, the Commission may order changes in the CPAP. The Commission decision shall be effective according to its terms unless stayed by action of the Commission or by action of a court of competent jurisdiction.

18.11 Except as provided in this Section, this CPAP will expire six years from its effective date. Only Tier 1A submeasures and payments will continue beyond six years, and these Tier 1A submeasures and payments shall continue until the Commission orders otherwise. Five [*185] and one-half years after the CPAP's effective date, a review shall be conducted with the objective of phasing-out the CPAP entirely. This review shall focus on ensuring that phase-out of the CPAP is indeed appropriate at that time, and on identifying any submeasures in addition to the Tier 1A submeasures that should continue as part of the CPAP.

19.0 Voluntary Performance Assurance Plan

19.1 This CPAP represents Qwest's voluntary offer to provide performance assurance.

APPENDIX A

This appendix lists the submeasures to be included within the Performance Assurance Plan, classified either under Tier 1A, Tier 1B, Tier 1C or Tier 2. All submeasures not otherwise so designated rely on, and incorporate by reference, the Performance Indicator Definitions (PIDs) developed and approved by the Regional Oversight Committee's (ROC) Technical Advisory Group (TAG). For Tier 1A submeasures, the average performance Qwest gives a CLEC in the current month shall be compared to the average of prior six months retail performance subject to a "variance factor" (see Section 6.1, Table 2). In areas where this document suggests a standard that is in dispute (both procedurally and substantively) [*186] as part of the Commission's Section 271 review (namely, the standards for collocation, TBD1 (premature disconnects), subloops, conditioned loops and line sharing and line splitting), the standard listed herein is meant as a default standard that would give way in the event that the Commission adopts a different one.

TIER 1A

INTERCONNECTION

Trunk Blocking

NI-1A LIS Trunks to Qwest Tandem Offices (Percent)

NI-1B LIS Trunks to Qwest End Offices (Percent)

Provisioning

For LIS Trunks:

OP-3D	Installation Commitments Met (Percent)
OP-3E	Installation Commitments Met (Percent)
OP-4D n1	Installation Interval (Average Days)
OP-6A-4 n1	Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-6B-4 n1	Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-4E n1	Installation Interval (Average Days)
OP-6A-5 n1	Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-6B-5 n1	Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-5	New Service Installation without Trouble Reports (Percent)

-----Footnotes-----

n1 Submeasures for OP-4 are included with OP-6 as "families" OP-4A with (OP-6A-1 & OP-6B-1 combined); OP-4B with (OP-6A-2 & OP-6B-2 combined); OP-4C with (OP-6A-3 & OP-6B-3 combined); OP-4D with (OP-6A-4 & OP-6B-4 combined); and OP-4E with (OP-6A-5 & OP-6B-5 combined). Submeasures within each family share a single payment opportunity with only the submeasure (OP-4 or OP-6A & OP-6B combined) with the highest payment being paid.

-----End Footnotes-----

[*187] Maintenance and Repair

For LIS Trunks:

MR-5A	All Troubles Cleared within 4 Hours (Percent)
MR-5B	All Troubles Cleared within 4 Hours (Percent)
MR-6D	Mean Time to Restore (Hours:Minutes)
MR-6E	Mean Time to Restore (Hours:Minutes)
MR-7D	Repair Repeat Report Rate (Percent)
MR-7E	Repair Repeat Report Rate (Percent)
MR-8	Trouble Rate (Percent)

SWITCHING CUSTOMERS

For Unbundled Loops:

OP-13A	Analog	Coordinated Cuts on Time (Percent)
OP-13A	All Other	Coordinated Cuts on Time (Percent)
OP-7		Coordinated Hot Cut Interval (Percent)
OP-8B		Number Portability Timeliness (Hours:Minutes)
OP-8C		Number Portability Timeliness (Hours:Minutes)
NP-1A		NXX Code Activation (Percent)
OP-17		Timeliness of Disconnects associated with LNP Orders (Percent)
MR-11		LNP Trouble Reports Cleared within 24 Hours (Percent)
MR-12		LNP Trouble Reports-Mean Time to Restore (Hours:Minutes)

OP-13A would not be subject to a severity measurement as part of the Tier 1X calculation. Instead, OP-7 (Coordinated Hot Cut -- Unbundled Loop), which will be reconfigured to measure the out-of-

service time for a coordinated hot cut, which provide the following **[*188]** particularized severity function:

Hrs Out of Service	Payment
1-1.99	\$ 225
2-2.99	\$ 450
3-3.99	\$ 675
4-4.99	\$ 800
5+	\$ 1025

COLLOCATION

Collocation is measured on (1) whether the feasibility studies are completed on time (e.g., within 10 days); (2) whether the installation commitment is met; (3) how many days late is particular feasibility study; and (4) how many days is a particular installation of the requested space. The applicable standard for making collocation space available shall be the CLEC's interconnection agreement, the Commission standard, or the FCC regulation, whichever is applicable. For addressing these issues, the relevant calculations and the associated payments shall be:

Days Late for Feasibility Study	Payment	Days Late For Installation	Payment
1-10	\$ 45	1-10	\$ 150
11-20	\$ 90	11-20	\$ 300
21-30	\$ 135	21-30	\$ 450
31-40	\$ 180	31-40	\$ 600
40+	\$ 300	40+	\$ 1000

ACCESS TO LOCAL LOOPS

Pre-Order

For Unbundled Loops:

PO-5A-1(b)	IMA Electronic LSRs	FOCs On Time (Percent)
PO-5A-2(b)	EDI Electronic LSRs	FOCs On Time (Percent)
PO-5B-1(b)	IMA Electronic/Manual LSRs	FOCs On Time (Percent)
PO-5B-2(b)	EDI Electronic/Manual LSRs	FOCs On Time (Percent)
PO-5C-(b)	Fax Manual LSRs	FOCs On Time (Percent)
PO-9B		Timely Jeopardy Notices (Percent)

[*189] Provisioning

For Unbundled Analog Loops:

OP-3A	non-designed	Installation Commitments Met (Percent)
OP-3B	non-designed	Installation Commitments Met (Percent)
OP-3C	non-designed	Installation Commitments Met (Percent)
OP-3D	designed	Installation Commitments Met (Percent)
OP-3E	designed	Installation Commitments Met (Percent)
OP-4A n1	non-designed	Installation Interval (Average Days)
OP-6A-1 n1	non-designed	Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-6B-1 n1	non-designed	Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-4B n1	non-designed	Installation Interval (Average Days)
OP-6A-2 n1	non-designed	Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-6B-2 n1	non-designed	Delayed Days (Average Days)

OP-4C n1	non-designed	Installation Interval (Average Days)
OP-6A-3 n1	non-designed	Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-6B-3 n1	non-designed	Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-4D n1	designed	Installation Interval (Average Days)
OP-6A-4 n1	designed	Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-6B-4 n1	designed	Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-4E n1	designed	Installation Interval (Average Days)
OP-6A-5 n1	designed	Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-6B-5 n1	designed	Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-5		New Service Installation without Trouble Reports (Percent)

[*190]

-----Footnotes-----

n1 Submeasures for OP-4 are included with OP-6 as "families" OP-4A with (OP-6A-1 & OP-6B-1 combined); OP-4B with (OP-6A-2 & OP-6B-2 combined); OP-4C with (OP-6A-3 & OP-6B-3 combined); OP-4D with (OP-6A-4 & OP-6B-4 combined); and OP-4E with (OP-6A-5 & OP-6B-5 combined). Submeasures within each family share a single payment opportunity with only the submeasure (OP-4 or OP-6A & OP-6B combined) with the highest payment being paid.

-----End Footnotes-----

For Unbundled Non-Loaded Loops (2-wire):

OP-3D		Installation Commitments Met (Percent)
OP-3E		Installation Commitments Met (Percent)
OP-4D n1		Installation Interval (Average Days)
OP-6A-4 n1		Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-6B-4 n1		Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-4E n1		Installation Interval (Average Days)
OP-6A-5 n1		Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-6B-5 n1		Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-5		New Service Installation without Trouble Reports (Percent)

For Unbundled Non-Loaded Loops (4-wire):

OP-3D		Installation Commitments Met (Percent)
OP-3E		Installation Commitments Met (Percent)
OP-4D n1		Installation Interval (Average Days)
OP-6A-4 n1		Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-6B-4 n1		Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-4E n1		Installation Interval (Average Days)
OP-6A-5 n1		Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-6B-5 n1		Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-5		New Service Installation without Trouble Reports (Percent)

For Unbundled DS1-Capable Loops:

OP-3D		Installation Commitments Met (Percent)
OP-3E		Installation Commitments Met (Percent)
OP-4D n1		Installation Interval (Average Days)

OP-6A-4 n1	Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-6B-4 n1	Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-4E n1	Installation Interval (Average Days)
OP-6A-5 n1	Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-6B-5 n1	Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-5	New Service Installation without Trouble Reports (Percent)

For Unbundled ISDN-Capable Loops:

OP-3D	Installation Commitments Met (Percent)
OP-3E	Installation Commitments Met (Percent)
OP-4D n1	Installation Interval (Average Days)
OP-6A-4 n1	Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-6B-4 n1	Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-4E n1	Installation Interval (Average Days)
OP-6A-5 n1	Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-6B-5 n1	Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-5	New Service Installation without Trouble Reports (Percent)

For Unbundled ADSL-Qualified Loops:

OP-3D	Installation Commitments Met (Percent)
OP-3E	Installation Commitments Met (Percent)
OP-4D n1	Installation Interval (Average Days)
OP-6A-4 n1	Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-6B-4 n1	Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-4E n1	Installation Interval (Average Days)
OP-6A-5 n1	Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-6B-5 n1	Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-5	New Service Installation without Trouble Reports (Percent)

For Unbundled Loops of DS3 and Higher:

OP-3D	Installation Commitments Met (Percent)
OP-3E	Installation Commitments Met (Percent)
OP-4D n1	Installation Interval (Average Days)
OP-6A-4 n1	Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-6B-4 n1	Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-4E n1	Installation Interval (Average Days)
OP-6A-5 n1	Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-6B-5 n1	Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-5	New Service Installation without Trouble Reports (Percent)

For Sub-Loop Unbundling:

OP-3A	Installation Commitments Met (Percent)
OP-3B	Installation Commitments Met (Percent)
OP-4A 1	Installation Interval (Average Days)
OP-6A-1 n1	Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-6B-1 n1	Delayed Days (Average Days)

OP-4B n1 Installation Interval (Average Days)
OP-6A-2 n1 Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-6B-2 n1 Delayed Days (Average Days)

[*191]

-----Footnotes-----

n1 Submeasures for OP-4 are included with OP-6 as "families" OP-4A with (OP-6A-1 & OP-6B-1 combined); OP-4B with (OP-6A-2 & OP-6B-2 combined); OP-4C with (OP-6A-3 & OP-6B-3 combined); OP-4D with (OP-6A-4 & OP-6B-4 combined); and OP-4E with (OP-6A-5 & OP-6B-5 combined). Submeasures within each family share a single payment opportunity with only the submeasure (OP-4 or OP-6A & OP-6B combined) with the highest payment being paid.

-----End Footnotes-----

Sub-loops -- because sub-loops track loops in all other respects (e.g., have three different intervals in Qwest's Standard Interval Guides depending on the number of sub-loops in an order), OP-3 and OP-4 for this submeasure shall track the approach taken for loops. In particular, the relevant interval (5 days for 1-8 subloops in an order; 6 days for 9-16 in an order; and 7 days for 17+) shall be the standard for OP-3 (i.e., the relevant interval must be met 90% of the time) and the intermediate standard -- i.e., 6 days -- shall be the relevant interval for OP-4.

For Unbundled Loop Conditioning:

OP-3D Installation Commitments Met (Percent)
OP-3E Installation Commitments Met (Percent)
OP-4D Installation Interval (Average Days)
OP-4E Installation Interval (Average Days)

[*192] Conditioned loops (i.e., accounting for the additional time necessary to "condition" a previously unconditioned loop to make it DSL ready) -- the interval, as envisioned by Qwest, is 15 days, which represents the target date for installing the product. Thus, OP-3 shall require that 90% of conditioned loops be installed within the interval, unless a dispatch to the location is necessary. As for OP-4, the relevant installation interval shall be set at 16.5 days, which reflects the recognition that 10% of the conditioned loops will not be installed within 15 days, so that the relevant interval should be marginally greater than the interval.

For Line Sharing/Line Splitting:

OP-3A Installation Commitments Met (Percent)
OP-3B Installation Commitments Met (Percent)
OP-3C Installation Commitments Met (Percent)
OP-4A n1 Installation Interval (Average Days)
OP-6A-1 n1 Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-6B-1 n1 Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-4B n1 Installation Interval (Average Days)
OP-6A-2 n1 Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-6B-2 n1 Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-4C n1 Installation Interval (Average Days)
OP-6A-3 n1 Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-6B-3 n1 Delayed Days (Average Days)

[*193]

-----Footnotes-----

n1 Submeasures for OP-4 are included with OP-6 as "families" OP-4A with (OP-6A-1 & OP-6B-1 combined); OP-4B with (OP-6A-2 & OP-6B-2 combined); OP-4C with (OP-6A-3 & OP-6B-3 combined); OP-4D with (OP-6A-4 & OP-6B-4 combined); and OP-4E with (OP-6A-5 & OP-6B-5 combined). Submeasures within each family share a single payment opportunity with only the submeasure (OP-4 or OP-6A & OP-6B combined) with the highest payment being paid.

-----End Footnotes-----

Line sharing/Line splitting together --the interval for line sharing and line splitting, which shall be measured on an aggregate basis, is 3 days. Thus, OP-3 shall be that 90% of such loops shall be installed with 3 days. As for OP-4, the relevant installation interval shall be set at 3.3 days, which reflects the recognition 10% of such loops will not be installed within 3 days, so that the relevant interval should be marginally greater than the interval.

Maintenance and Repair

For Unbundled Analog Loops:

MR-3D	All Troubles Cleared within 24 Hours (Percent)
MR-3E	All Troubles Cleared within 24 Hours (Percent)
MR-6D	Mean Time to Restore (Hours:Minutes)
MR-6E	Mean Time to Restore (Hours:Minutes)
MR-7D	Repair Repeat Report Rate (Percent)
MR-7E	Repair Repeat Report Rate (Percent)
MR-8	Trouble Rate (Percent)

For Unbundled Non-loaded Loops (2-wire):

MR-3D	All Troubles Cleared within 24 Hours (Percent)
MR-3E	All Troubles Cleared within 24 Hours (Percent)
MR-6D	Mean Time to Restore (Hours:Minutes)
MR-6E	Mean Time to Restore (Hours:Minutes)
MR-7D	Repair Repeat Report Rate (Percent)
MR-7E	Repair Repeat Report Rate (Percent)
MR-8	Trouble Rate (Percent)

For Unbundled Non-loaded Loops (4-wire):

MR-5A	All Troubles Cleared within 4 Hours (Percent)
MR-5B	All Troubles Cleared within 4 Hours (Percent)
MR-6D	Mean Time to Restore (Hours:Minutes)
MR-6E	Mean Time to Restore (Hours:Minutes)
MR-7D	Repair Repeat Report Rate (Percent)
MR-7E	Repair Repeat Report Rate (Percent)
MR-8	Trouble Rate (Percent)

For Unbundled DS1-Capable Loops:

MR-5A	All Troubles Cleared within 4 Hours (Percent)
MR-5B	All Troubles Cleared within 4 Hours (Percent)
MR-6D	Mean Time to Restore (Hours:Minutes)
MR-6E	Mean Time to Restore (Hours:Minutes)
MR-7D	Repair Repeat Report Rate (Percent)
MR-7E	Repair Repeat Report Rate (Percent)
MR-8	Trouble Rate (Percent)

For Unbundled ISDN-Capable Loops:

MR-3D	All Troubles Cleared within 24 Hours (Percent)
MR-3E	All Troubles Cleared within 24 Hours (Percent)
MR-6D	Mean Time to Restore (Hours:Minutes)
MR-6E	Mean Time to Restore (Hours:Minutes)
MR-7D	Repair Repeat Report Rate (Percent)
MR-7E	Repair Repeat Report Rate (Percent)
MR-8	Trouble Rate (Percent)

For Unbundled ADSL-Qualified Loops:

MR-3D	All Troubles Cleared within 24 Hours (Percent)
MR-3E	All Troubles Cleared within 24 Hours (Percent)
MR-6D	Mean Time to Restore (Hours:Minutes)
MR-6E	Mean Time to Restore (Hours:Minutes)
MR-7D	Repair Repeat Report Rate (Percent)
MR-7E	Repair Repeat Report Rate (Percent)
MR-8	Trouble Rate (Percent)

For Unbundled Loops of DS3 and Higher:

MR-5A	All Troubles Cleared within 4 Hours (Percent)
MR-5B	All Troubles Cleared within 4 Hours (Percent)
MR-6D	Mean Time to Restore (Hours:Minutes)
MR-6E	Mean Time to Restore (Hours:Minutes)
MR-7D	Repair Repeat Report Rate (Percent)
MR-7E	Repair Repeat Report Rate (Percent)
MR-8	Trouble Rate (Percent)

For Sub-Loop Unbundling:

MR-3A	All Troubles Cleared within 24 Hours (Percent)
MR-3B	All Troubles Cleared within 24 Hours (Percent)
MR-3C	All Troubles Cleared within 24 Hours (Percent)
MR-6A	Mean Time to Restore (Hours:Minutes)
MR-6B	Mean Time to Restore (Hours:Minutes)
MR-6C	Mean Time to Restore (Hours:Minutes)
MR-7A	Repair Repeat Report Rate (Percent)
MR-7B	Repair Repeat Report Rate (Percent)
MR-7C	Repair Repeat Report Rate (Percent)
MR-8	Trouble Rate (Percent)

[*194] For the MR-3, MR-6, MR-7, and MR-8 measures, the relevant analog product shall be ISDN-BRI.

For Line Sharing/Line Splitting:

MR-3A	All Troubles Cleared within 24 Hours (Percent)
MR-3B	All Troubles Cleared within 24 Hours (Percent)
MR-3C	All Troubles Cleared within 24 Hours (Percent)
MR-6A	Mean Time to Restore (Hours:Minutes)

- MR-6B Mean Time to Restore (Hours:Minutes)
- MR-6C Mean Time to Restore (Hours:Minutes)
- MR-7A Repair Repeat Report Rate (Percent)
- MR-7B Repair Repeat Report Rate (Percent)
- MR-7C Repair Repeat Report Rate (Percent)
- MR-8 Trouble Rate (Percent)

For the MR-3, MR-6, MR-7, and MR-8 measures, the relevant analog product shall be Qwest's DSL service, which is also provisioned and treated on a line shared basis.

TIER 1B

Pre-Order

For LSR:

PO-3A-1	IMA & rejected manually	LSR Rejection Notice Interval (Hours:Minutes)
PO-3B-1	EDI & rejected manually	LSR Rejection Notice Interval (Hours:Minutes)
PO-3C	Facsimile	LSR Rejection Notice Interval (Hours:Minutes)

For Resale and UNE-P:

PO-5A-1(a)	IMA Electronic LSRs	FOCs On Time (Percent)
PO-5A-2(a)	EDI Electronic LSRs	FOCs On Time (Percent)
PO-5B-1(a)	IMA Electronic/Manual LSRs	FOCs On Time (Percent)
PO-5B-2(a)	EDI Electronic/Manual LSRs	FOCs On Time (Percent)
PO-5C-(a)	Facsimile Manual LSRs	FOCs On Time (Percent)
PO-8D	(POTS)	Jeopardy Notice Interval (Average Days)
PO-9D	(POTS)	Timely Jeopardy Notices (Percent)

For LNP:

PO-5A-1(c)	IMA Electronic LSRs	FOCs On Time (Percent)
PO-5A-2(c)	EDI Electronic LSRs	FOCs On Time (Percent)
PO-5B-1(c)	IMA Electronic/Manual LSRs	FOCs On Time (Percent)
PO-5B-2(c)	EDI Electronic/Manual LSRs	FOCs On Time (Percent)
PO-5C-(c)	Facsimile Manual LSRs	FOCs On Time (Percent)

For LIS Trunks:

PO-5D		FOCs On Time (Percent)
PO-8C		Jeopardy Notice Interval (Average Days)
PO-9C		Timely Jeopardy Notices (Percent)

For Billing:

PO-7A	IMA-GUI	Billing Completion Notification Timeliness (Percent)
PO-7B	IMA-EDI	Billing Completion Notification Timeliness (Percent)

For Non-Designed Services:

PO-8A

Jeopardy Notice Interval (Average Days)

PO-9A

Timely Jeopardy Notices (Percent)

For Unbundled Loops:

PO-8B

Jeopardy Notice Interval (Average Days)

[*195] Provisioning

For Residential Single Line Service:

OP-3A

Installation Commitments Met (Percent)

OP-3B

Installation Commitments Met (Percent)

OP-3C

Installation Commitments Met (Percent)

OP-4A<1>

Installation Interval (Average Days)

OP-6A-1<1>

Delayed Days (Average Days)

OP-6B-1<1>

Delayed Days (Average Days)

OP-4B<1>

Installation Interval (Average Days)

OP-6A-2<1>

Delayed Days (Average Days)

OP-6B-2<1>

Delayed Days (Average Days)

OP-4C<1>

Installation Interval (Average Days)

OP-6A-3<1>

Delayed Days (Average Days)

OP-6B-3<1>

Delayed Days (Average Days)

OP-5

New Service Installation without Trouble Reports
(Percent)

For Business Single Line Service:

OP-3A

Installation Commitments Met (Percent)

OP-3B

Installation Commitments Met (Percent)

OP-3C

Installation Commitments Met (Percent)

OP-4A<1>

Installation Interval (Average Days)

OP-6A-1<1>

Delayed Days (Average Days)

OP-6B-1<1>

Delayed Days (Average Days)

OP-4B<1>

Installation Interval (Average Days)

OP-6A-2<1>

Delayed Days (Average Days)

OP-6B-2<1>

Delayed Days (Average Days)

OP-4C<1>

Installation Interval (Average Days)

OP-6A-3<1>

Delayed Days (Average Days)

OP-6B-3<1>

Delayed Days (Average Days)

OP-5

New Service Installation without Trouble Reports
(Percent)

For Centrex:

OP-3A

Installation Commitments Met (Percent)

OP-3B

Installation Commitments Met (Percent)

OP-3C

Installation Commitments Met (Percent)

OP-4A<1>

Installation Interval (Average Days)

OP-6A-1<1>

Delayed Days (Average Days)

OP-6B-1<1>

Delayed Days (Average Days)

OP-4B<1>

Installation Interval (Average Days)

OP-6A-2<1>

Delayed Days (Average Days)

OP-6B-2<1>	Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-4C<1>	Installation Interval (Average Days)
OP-6A-3<1>	Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-6B-3<1>	Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-5	New Service Installation without Trouble Reports (Percent)

For Centrex 21:

OP-3A	Installation Commitments Met (Percent)
OP-3B	Installation Commitments Met (Percent)
OP-3C	Installation Commitments Met (Percent)
OP-4A<1>	Installation Interval (Average Days)
OP-6A-1<1>	Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-6B-1<1>	Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-4B<1>	Installation Interval (Average Days)
OP-6A-2<1>	Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-6B-2<1>	Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-4C<1>	Installation Interval (Average Days)
OP-6A-3<1>	Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-6B-3<1>	Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-5	New Service Installation without Trouble Reports (Percent)

For PBX Trunks:

OP-3A	Installation Commitments Met (Percent)
OP-3B	Installation Commitments Met (Percent)
OP-3C	Installation Commitments Met (Percent)
OP-3D	Installation Commitments Met (Percent)
OP-3E	Installation Commitments Met (Percent)
OP-4A<1>	Installation Interval (Average Days)
OP-6A-1<1>	Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-6B-1<1>	Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-4B<1>	Installation Interval (Average Days)
OP-6A-2<1>	Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-6B-2<1>	Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-4C<1>	Installation Interval (Average Days)
OP-6A-3<1>	Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-6B-3<1>	Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-4D<1>	Installation Interval (Average Days)
OP-6A-4<1>	Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-6B-4<1>	Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-4E<1>	Installation Interval (Average Days)
OP-6A-5<1>	Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-6B-5<1>	Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-5	New Service Installation without Trouble Reports (Percent)

For Basic ISDN:

OP-3A	Installation Commitments Met (Percent)
OP-3B	Installation Commitments Met (Percent)

OP-3C	Installation Commitments Met (Percent)
OP-3D	Installation Commitments Met (Percent)
OP-3E	Installation Commitments Met (Percent)
OP-4A<1>	Installation Interval (Average Days)
OP-6A-1<1>	Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-6B-1<1>	Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-4B<1>	Installation Interval (Average Days)
OP-6A-2<1>	Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-6B-2<1>	Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-4C<1>	Installation Interval (Average Days)
OP-6A-3<1>	Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-6B-3<1>	Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-4D<1>	Installation Interval (Average Days)
OP-6A-4<1>	Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-6B-4<1>	Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-4E<1>	Installation Interval (Average Days)
OP-6A-5<1>	Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-6B-5<1>	Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-5	New Service Installation without Trouble Reports (Percent)

For UNE-P (POTS):

OP-3A	Installation Commitments Met (Percent)
OP-3B	Installation Commitments Met (Percent)
OP-3C	Installation Commitments Met (Percent)
OP-4A<1>	Installation Interval (Average Days)
OP-6A-1<1>	Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-6B-1<1>	Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-4B<1>	Installation Interval (Average Days)
OP-6A-2<1>	Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-6B-2<1>	Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-4C<1>	Installation Interval (Average Days)
OP-6A-3<1>	Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-6B-3<1>	Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-5	New Service Installation without Trouble Reports (Percent)

For Qwest DSL:

OP-3A	Installation Commitments Met (Percent)
OP-3B	Installation Commitments Met (Percent)
OP-3C	Installation Commitments Met (Percent)
OP-3D	Installation Commitments Met (Percent)
OP-3E	Installation Commitments Met (Percent)
OP-4A<1>	Installation Interval (Average Days)
OP-6A-1<1>	Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-6B-1<1>	Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-4B<1>	Installation Interval (Average Days)
OP-6A-2<1>	Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-6B-2<1>	Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-4C<1>	Installation Interval (Average Days)

OP-6A-3<1>	Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-6B-3<1>	Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-4D<1>	Installation Interval (Average Days)
OP-6A-4<1>	Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-6B-4<1>	Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-4E<1>	Installation Interval (Average Days)
OP-6A-5<1>	Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-6B-5<1>	Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-5	New Service Installation without Trouble Reports (Percent)

For Primary ISDN:

OP-3A	Installation Commitments Met (Percent)
OP-3B	Installation Commitments Met (Percent)
OP-3C	Installation Commitments Met (Percent)
OP-3D	Installation Commitments Met (Percent)
OP-3E	Installation Commitments Met (Percent)
OP-4A<1>	Installation Interval (Average Days)
OP-6A-1<1>	Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-6B-1<1>	Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-4B<1>	Installation Interval (Average Days)
OP-6A-2<1>	Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-6B-2<1>	Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-4C<1>	Installation Interval (Average Days)
OP-6A-3<1>	Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-6B-3<1>	Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-4D<1>	Installation Interval (Average Days)
OP-6A-4<1>	Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-6B-4<1>	Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-4E<1>	Installation Interval (Average Days)
OP-6A-5<1>	Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-6B-5<1>	Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-5	New Service Installation without Trouble Reports (Percent)

For DS0:

OP-3A	non-designed	Installation Commitments Met (Percent)
OP-3B	non-designed	Installation Commitments Met (Percent)
OP-3C	non-designed	Installation Commitments Met (Percent)
OP-3D	designed	Installation Commitments Met (Percent)
OP-3E	designed	Installation Commitments Met (Percent)
OP-4A<1>	non-designed	Installation Interval (Average Days)
OP-6A-1<1>	non-designed	Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-6B-1<1>	non-designed	Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-4B<1>	non-designed	Installation Interval (Average Days)
OP-6A-2<1>	non-designed	Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-6B-2<1>	non-designed	Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-4C<1>	non-designed	Installation Interval (Average Days)
OP-6A-3<1>	non-designed	Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-6B-3<1>	non-designed	Delayed Days (Average Days)

OP-4D<1>	designed	Installation Interval (Average Days)
OP-6A-4<1>	designed	Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-6B-4<1>	designed	Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-4E<1>	designed	Installation Interval (Average Days)
OP-6A-5<1>	designed	Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-6B-5<1>	designed	Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-5		New Service Installation without Trouble Reports (Percent)

For DS1:

OP-3D		Installation Commitments Met (Percent)
OP-3E		Installation Commitments Met (Percent)
OP-4D<1>		Installation Interval (Average Days)
OP-6A-4<1>		Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-6B-4<1>		Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-4E<1>		Installation Interval (Average Days)
OP-6A-5<1>		Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-6B-5<1>		Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-5		New Service Installation without Trouble Reports (Percent)

For DS3 and Higher:

OP-3D		Installation Commitments Met (Percent)
OP-3E		Installation Commitments Met (Percent)
OP-4D<1>		Installation Interval (Average Days)
OP-6A-4<1>		Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-6B-4<1>		Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-4E<1>		Installation Interval (Average Days)
OP-6A-5<1>		Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-6B-5<1>		Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-5		New Service Installation without Trouble Reports (Percent)

For Frame Relay:

OP-3D		Installation Commitments Met (Percent)
OP-3E		Installation Commitments Met (Percent)
OP-4D<1>		Installation Interval (Average Days)
OP-6A-4<1>		Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-6B-4<1>		Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-4E<1>		Installation Interval (Average Days)
OP-6A-5<1>		Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-6B-5<1>		Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-5		New Service Installation without Trouble Reports (Percent)

For UDIT -- DS1 Level:

OP-3D		Installation Commitments Met (Percent)
OP-3E		Installation Commitments Met (Percent)
OP-4D<1>		Installation Interval (Average Days)
OP-6A-4<1>		Delayed Days (Average Days)

OP-6B-4<1>	Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-4E<1>	Installation Interval (Average Days)
OP-6A-5<1>	Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-6B-5<1>	Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-5	New Service Installation without Trouble Reports (Percent)

For UDIT -- Above DS1 Level:

OP-3D	Installation Commitments Met (Percent)
OP-3E	Installation Commitments Met (Percent)
OP-4D<1>	Installation Interval (Average Days)
OP-6A-4<1>	Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-6B-4<1>	Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-4E<1>	Installation Interval (Average Days)
OP-6A-5<1>	Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-6B-5<1>	Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-5	New Service Installation without Trouble Reports (Percent)

For E911/911 Trunks:

OP-3D	Installation Commitments Met (Percent)
OP-3E	Installation Commitments Met (Percent)
OP-4D<1>	Installation Interval (Average Days)
OP-6A-4<1>	Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-6B-4<1>	Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-4E<1>	Installation Interval (Average Days)
OP-6A-5<1>	Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-6B-5<1>	Delayed Days (Average Days)
OP-5	New Service Installation without Trouble Reports (Percent)

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Maintenance and Repair

For Residential Single Line Service:

MR-3A	All Troubles Cleared within 24 Hours (Percent)
MR-3B	All Troubles Cleared within 24 Hours (Percent)
MR-3C	All Troubles Cleared within 24 Hours (Percent)
MR-6A	Mean Time to Restore (Hours:Minutes)
MR-6B	Mean Time to Restore (Hours:Minutes)
MR-6C	Mean Time to Restore (Hours:Minutes)
MR-7A	Repair Repeat Report Rate (Percent)
MR-7B	Repair Repeat Report Rate (Percent)

MR-7C Repair Repeat Report Rate (Percent)
MR-8 Trouble Rate (Percent)

For Business Single Line Service:

MR-3A All Troubles Cleared within 24 Hours (Percent)
MR-3B All Troubles Cleared within 24 Hours (Percent)
MR-3C All Troubles Cleared within 24 Hours (Percent)
MR-6A Mean Time to Restore (Hours:Minutes)
MR-6B Mean Time to Restore (Hours:Minutes)
MR-6C Mean Time to Restore (Hours:Minutes)
MR-7A Repair Repeat Report Rate (Percent)
MR-7B Repair Repeat Report Rate (Percent)
MR-7C Repair Repeat Report Rate (Percent)
MR-8 Trouble Rate (Percent)

For Centrex:

MR-3A All Troubles Cleared within 24 Hours (Percent)
MR-3B All Troubles Cleared within 24 Hours (Percent)
MR-3C All Troubles Cleared within 24 Hours (Percent)
MR-6A Mean Time to Restore (Hours:Minutes)
MR-6B Mean Time to Restore (Hours:Minutes)
MR-6C Mean Time to Restore (Hours:Minutes)
MR-7A Repair Repeat Report Rate (Percent)
MR-7B Repair Repeat Report Rate (Percent)
MR-7C Repair Repeat Report Rate (Percent)
MR-8 Trouble Rate (Percent)

For Centrex 21:

MR-3A All Troubles Cleared within 24 Hours (Percent)
MR- All Troubles Cleared within 24 Hours (Percent)

3B
MR- All Troubles Cleared within 24 Hours (Percent)
3C
MR- Mean Time to Restore (Hours:Minutes)
6A
MR- Mean Time to Restore (Hours:Minutes)
6B
MR- Mean Time to Restore (Hours:Minutes)
6C
MR- Repair Repeat Report Rate (Percent)
7A
MR- Repair Repeat Report Rate (Percent)
7B
MR- Repair Repeat Report Rate (Percent)
7C
MR-8 Trouble Rate (Percent)

For PBX Trunks:

MR- All Troubles Cleared within 24 Hours (Percent)
3A
MR- All Troubles Cleared within 24 Hours (Percent)
3B
MR- All Troubles Cleared within 24 Hours (Percent)
3C
MR- Mean Time to Restore (Hours:Minutes)
6A
MR- Mean Time to Restore (Hours:Minutes)
6B
MR- Mean Time to Restore (Hours:Minutes)
6C
MR- Repair Repeat Report Rate (Percent)
7A
MR- Repair Repeat Report Rate (Percent)
7B
MR- Repair Repeat Report Rate (Percent)
7C
MR-8 Trouble Rate (Percent)

For Basic ISDN:

MR- All Troubles Cleared within 24 Hours (Percent)
3A
MR- All Troubles Cleared within 24 Hours (Percent)
3B
MR- All Troubles Cleared within 24 Hours (Percent)
3C
MR- Mean Time to Restore (Hours:Minutes)
6A
MR- Mean Time to Restore (Hours:Minutes)
6B
MR- Mean Time to Restore (Hours:Minutes)

6C
MR-7A Repair Repeat Report Rate (Percent)
MR-7B Repair Repeat Report Rate (Percent)
MR-7C Repair Repeat Report Rate (Percent)
MR-8 Trouble Rate (Percent)

For UNE-P (POTS):

MR-3A All Troubles Cleared within 24 Hours (Percent)
MR-3B All Troubles Cleared within 24 Hours (Percent)
MR-3C All Troubles Cleared within 24 Hours (Percent)
MR-6A Mean Time to Restore (Hours:Minutes)
MR-6B Mean Time to Restore (Hours:Minutes)
MR-6C Mean Time to Restore (Hours:Minutes)
MR-7A Repair Repeat Report Rate (Percent)
MR-7B Repair Repeat Report Rate (Percent)
MR-7C Repair Repeat Report Rate (Percent)
MR-8 Trouble Rate (Percent)

For Qwest DSL:

MR-3D All Troubles Cleared within 24 Hours (Percent)
MR-3E All Troubles Cleared within 24 Hours (Percent)
MR-6D Mean Time to Restore (Hours:Minutes)
MR-6E Mean Time to Restore (Hours:Minutes)
MR-7D Repair Repeat Report Rate (Percent)
MR-7E Repair Repeat Report Rate (Percent)
MR-8 Trouble Rate (Percent)

For Primary ISDN:

MR-3D All Troubles Cleared within 24 Hours (Percent)
MR-3E All Troubles Cleared within 24 Hours (Percent)

MR-6D Mean Time to Restore (Hours:Minutes)
MR-6E Mean Time to Restore (Hours:Minutes)
MR-7D Repair Repeat Report Rate (Percent)
MR-7E Repair Repeat Report Rate (Percent)
MR-8 Trouble Rate (Percent)

For DS0:

MR-3D All Troubles Cleared within 24 Hours (Percent)
MR-3E All Troubles Cleared within 24 Hours (Percent)
MR-6D Mean Time to Restore (Hours:Minutes)
MR-6E Mean Time to Restore (Hours:Minutes)
MR-7D Repair Repeat Report Rate (Percent)
MR-7E Repair Repeat Report Rate (Percent)
MR-8 Trouble Rate (Percent)

For DS1:

MR-3D All Troubles Cleared within 24 Hours (Percent)
MR-3E All Troubles Cleared within 24 Hours (Percent)
MR-6D Mean Time to Restore (Hours:Minutes)
MR-6E Mean Time to Restore (Hours:Minutes)
MR-7D Repair Repeat Report Rate (Percent)
MR-7E Repair Repeat Report Rate (Percent)
MR-8 Trouble Rate (Percent)

For DS3 and Higher:

MR-3D All Troubles Cleared within 24 Hours (Percent)
MR-3E All Troubles Cleared within 24 Hours (Percent)
MR-6D Mean Time to Restore (Hours:Minutes)
MR-6E Mean Time to Restore (Hours:Minutes)
MR- Repair Repeat Report Rate (Percent)

7D
MR- Repair Repeat Report Rate (Percent)
7E
MR-8 Trouble Rate (Percent)

For Frame Relay:

MR- All Troubles Cleared within 24 Hours (Percent)
3D
MR- All Troubles Cleared within 24 Hours (Percent)
3E
MR- Mean Time to Restore (Hours:Minutes)
6D
MR- Mean Time to Restore (Hours:Minutes)
6E
MR- Repair Repeat Report Rate (Percent)
7D
MR- Repair Repeat Report Rate (Percent)
7E
MR-8 Trouble Rate (Percent)

For UDIT -- DS1 Level:

MR- All Troubles Cleared within 24 Hours (Percent)
3D
MR- All Troubles Cleared within 24 Hours (Percent)
3E
MR- Mean Time to Restore (Hours:Minutes)
6D
MR- Mean Time to Restore (Hours:Minutes)
6E
MR- Repair Repeat Report Rate (Percent)
7D
MR- Repair Repeat Report Rate (Percent)
7E
MR-8 Trouble Rate (Percent)

For UDIT -- Above DS1 Level:

MR- All Troubles Cleared within 24 Hours (Percent)
3D
MR- All Troubles Cleared within 24 Hours (Percent)
3E
MR- Mean Time to Restore (Hours:Minutes)
6D
MR- Mean Time to Restore (Hours:Minutes)
6E
MR- Repair Repeat Report Rate (Percent)
7D
MR- Repair Repeat Report Rate (Percent)
7E
MR-8 Trouble Rate (Percent)

For E911/911 Trunks:

MR-3D	All Troubles Cleared within 24 Hours (Percent)
MR-3E	All Troubles Cleared within 24 Hours (Percent)
MR-6D	Mean Time to Restore (Hours:Minutes)
MR-6E	Mean Time to Restore (Hours:Minutes)
MR-7D	Repair Repeat Report Rate (Percent)
MR-7E	Repair Repeat Report Rate (Percent)
MR-8	Trouble Rate (Percent)

[*197] TIER 1C

Billing

BI-1A	Time to Provide Recorded Usage Records (Average Days)
BI-1B	Time to Provide Recorded Usage Records (Percent)
BI-3A	Billing Accuracy -- Adjustments for Errors (Percent)
BI-3B	Billing Accuracy -- Adjustments for Errors (Percent)
BI-4A	Billing Completeness (Percent)
BI-4B	Billing Completeness (Percent)

Each billing measure (BI-1A/BI-1B; BI-3A/BI-3B; and BI-4A/BI-4B) will be subject to a per measure cap of a base payment of \$ 5,000 per month, subject to a maximum escalation of \$ 30,000 per measure.

TIER 2

Continuing Non-Conforming Performance

See Section 10.3.

Work Completion Timeliness

PO-6 Work Completion Notification Timeliness (Hours:Minutes)

This measure shall be on a Tier 2 basis (measuring aggregate performance to all CLECs) and shall be calculated as follows:

Performance	Monthly Payment
1-1.49 hrs	\$ 10,000
1.5-1.99 hrs	\$ 15,000
2-2.49 hrs	\$ 20,000
2.5-2.99 hrs	\$ 25,000
3-3.49 hrs	\$ 30,000
3.5-3.99 hrs	\$ 35,000
4-4.49 hrs	\$ 40,000
4.5-4.99	\$ 45,000
5+	\$ 50,000

Regionwide Wholesale Support Systems

The following submeasures, which relate to the quality of Qwest's computer systems and call centers, are recorded only on a regionwide (14 state) basis: **[*198]**

GA-1A Appointment Scheduler	Gateway Availability -- IMA-GUI (Percent)
GA-1B Fetch-N-Stuff	Gateway Availability -- IMA-GUI (Percent)
GA-1C Data Arbiter	Gateway Availability -- IMA-GUI (Percent)
GA-2	Gateway Availability -- IMA-EDI (Percent)
GA-3	Gateway Availability -- EB-TA (Percent)
GA-4	Gateway Availability -- EXACT (Percent)
GA-6	Gateway Availability -- GUI -- Repair (Percent)
PO-1A-1	Pre-Order/Order Response Times(Seconds)
PO-1B-1	Pre-Order/Order Response Times(Seconds)
PO-1A-2	Pre-Order/Order Response Times(Seconds)
PO-1B-2	Pre-Order/Order Response Times(Seconds)
PO-1A-3	Pre-Order/Order Response Times(Seconds)
PO-1B-3	Pre-Order/Order Response Times(Seconds)
PO-1A-4	Pre-Order/Order Response Times(Seconds)
PO-1B-4	Pre-Order/Order Response Times(Seconds)
PO-1A-5	Pre-Order/Order Response Times(Seconds)
PO-1B-5	Pre-Order/Order Response Times(Seconds)
PO-1A-6	Pre-Order/Order Response Times(Seconds)
PO-1B-6	Pre-Order/Order Response Times(Seconds)
PO-1A-7	Pre-Order/Order Response Times(Seconds)
PO-1B-7	Pre-Order/Order Response Times(Seconds)
PO-1A-8	Pre-Order/Order Response Times(Seconds)
PO-1B-8	Pre-Order/Order Response Times(Seconds)
OP-2	Calls Answered within Twenty Seconds -- Interconnect Provisioning Center (Percent)
MR-2	Calls Answered within Twenty Seconds -- Interconnect Repair Center (Percent)

[*199] PO-1A and PO-1B shall have their transaction types aggregated together.

For Colorado, Qwest shall make a Tier-2 payments based upon monthly performance results according to the following schedule. (On this measure, the total payment, for all 14 Qwest states, shall actually be a multiple of the one noted below.)

Measure	Performance	Payment
GA-1,GA-2,	1% or lower	\$ 1,000
GA-3,GA-4	>1% to 3%	\$ 10,000
GA-6	>3% to 5%	\$ 20,000
	> 5%	\$ 30,000
PO-1	2 sec or less	\$ 1,000
	>2 sec to 5 sec	\$ 5,000
	>5 sec to 10 sec	\$ 10,000
	> 10 sec	\$ 15,000

OP-2/MR-2	1% or less	\$ 1,000
	>1% to 3%	\$ 5,000
	>3% to 5%	\$ 10,000
	>5%	\$ 15,000

Handling of Local Service Requests

PO-10 LSR Accountability (Percent)

Performance	Payment
99-99.5	\$ 10,000
98.5-98.99	\$ 20,000
98-98.49	\$ 30,000
97.5-97.99	\$ 40,000
97-97.49	\$ 50,000
96.5-96.99	\$ 60,000
96-96.49	\$ 70,000
95.5-95.99	\$ 80,000
95-95.49	\$ 90,000
below 95%	\$ 100,000

If the PO-10 measure at the end of any month dips below 95%, the Commission may commence a proceeding to determine whether the problem is being remedied and to determine whether any other action is appropriate.

Electronic Flow Through **[*200]** Rates

For Resale:

PO-2A-1	IMA Flow-through LSRs	Electronic Flow-through (Percent)
PO-2A-2	GUI Flow-through LSRs	Electronic Flow-through (Percent)
PO-2B-1	IMA Flow-through Eligible LSRs	Electronic Flow-through (Percent)
PO-2B-2	GUI Flow-through Eligible LSRs	Electronic Flow-through (Percent)

For Unbundled Loops:

PO-2A-1	IMA Flow-through LSRs	Electronic Flow-through (Percent)
PO-2A-2	GUI Flow-through LSRs	Electronic Flow-through (Percent)
PO-2B-1	IMA Flow-through Eligible LSRs	Electronic Flow-through (Percent)
PO-2B-2	GUI Flow-through Eligible LSRs	Electronic Flow-through (Percent)

For LNP:

PO-2A-1	IMA Flow-through LSRs	Electronic Flow-through (Percent)
PO-2A-2	GUI Flow-through LSRs	Electronic Flow-through (Percent)
PO-2B-1	IMA Flow-through Eligible LSRs	Electronic Flow-through (Percent)
PO-2B-2	GUI Flow-through Eligible LSRs	Electronic Flow-through (Percent)

For UNE-P (POTS):

PO-2A-1	IMA Flow-through LSRs	Electronic Flow-through (Percent)
PO-2A-2	GUI Flow-through LSRs	Electronic Flow-through (Percent)
PO-2B-1	IMA Flow-through Eligible LSRs	Electronic Flow-through (Percent)
PO-2B-2	GUI Flow-through Eligible LSRs	Electronic Flow-through (Percent)

[*201] Qwest shall be required to meet a standard for either eligible flow-through (PO-2B-1 & PO-2B-2 aggregated) or actual flow-through (PO-2A-1 & PO-2A-2 aggregated). If Qwest misses the

standard for both PO-2B and PO-2A, it shall pay payments on the measure in which it performed closer to the relevant standard.

The following table sets out the relevant standard for measuring acceptable levels of actual flow-through (PO-2A) and flow-through eligible orders (PO-2B).

Flow-through Orders (PO-2A)	January 2002	July 2002	January 2003	July 2003
Resale	70%	80%	85%	85%
Unbundled Loops	50%	60%	70%	75%
LNP	70%	80%	85%	85%
UNE-P (POTS)	50%	65%	80%	85%
Flow-through Eligible Orders (PO-2B)				
Resale	80%	90%	95%	95%
Unbundled Loops	60%	70%	80%	85%
LNP	80%	90%	95%	95%
UNE-P (POTS)	60%	75%	90%	95%

The relevant payment shall be computed on a quarterly basis and shall take the performance on the better of the eligible flow through orders (PO-2B) or actual orders to flow through (PO-2A) and apply a \$ 75,000 payment for each 2.5% that the relevant measurement differs from the standard. This payment shall not exceed \$ 600,000 per submeasure (resale, unbundled [*202] loop, LNP, UNEP). By way of illustration, the payment table for eligible flow through orders for resale for beginning January, 2002 is:

Resale: 77.5%-79.99%	\$ 75,000
75.0%-77.49%	\$ 150,000
72.5%-74.99%	\$ 225,000
70.0%-72.49%	\$ 300,000
67.5%-69.99%	\$ 375,000
65.0%-57.49%	\$ 450,000
62.5%-64.99%	\$ 525,000
below 62.49%	\$ 600,000

Change Management Requirements

PO-16 Release Notification on Time (Calendar Days)

For failing to notify competitors of the first announcement on time, Qwest shall pay a payment of \$ 200/per day. For failing to notify competitors of subsequent release dates (i.e., the final requirements and final release notes), Qwest shall pay a payment of \$ 50/day.

GA-7 Timely Outage Resolution following Software Releases (Percent)

Failure to resolve software outages within 48 hours shall result in a \$ 100,000 payment by Qwest for each additional 48 hours out of service.

PO-18(CPAP) Interface Versions Availability (Percent)

A failure to reinstate a pulled version that had not been available for 6 months within 24 hours shall result in a \$ 50,000 payment, with half of the payment going to the CLEC who brings the complaint and [*203] the other half going into the Special Fund.

APPENDIX B

(PERFORMANCE INDICATOR DEFINITIONS -- TO BE SUPPLIED BY QWEST)