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GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS AND DEFINED TERMS	
ACRONYM	DEFINED TERM
AFUDC	Allowance for Funds Used During Construction
β	Beta
b	represents the retention rate that consists of the fraction of earnings that are not paid out as dividends
$b \times r$	Represents internal growth
CAPM	Capital Asset Pricing Model
CCR	Corporate Credit Rating
CE	Comparable Earnings
DCF	Discounted Cash Flow
g	Growth rate
IGF	Internally Generated Funds
ICC	Illinois Commerce Commission
LDC	Local Distribution Companies
Lev	Leverage adjustment
LT	Long Term
MM	Modigliani & Miller
M&A	Merger & Acquisition
P-E	Price-Earnings
r	represents the expected rate of return on common equity
Rf	Risk-free rate of return
Rm	Market risk premium
RSMs	Revenue Stabilization Mechanisms
s	Represents the new common shares expected to be issued by a firm
$s \times v$	Represents external growth
S&P	Standard & Poor's
v	Represents the value that accrues to existing shareholders from selling stock at a price different from book value

1 **I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATION**

2 **A. Identification of Witness**

3 Q. Please state your name, occupation and business address.

4 A. My name is Paul Ronald Moul. My business address is 251 Hopkins Road, Haddonfield,
5 New Jersey 08033-3062. I am Managing Consultant at the firm P. Moul & Associates,
6 an independent financial and regulatory consulting firm. My educational background,
7 business experience and qualifications are provided in NS Ex. 3.1.

8 **B. Purpose of Testimony and Itemized Attachments to Direct Testimony**

9 Q. What is the purpose of your direct testimony?

10 A. My testimony presents evidence, analysis and a recommendation concerning the
11 appropriate cost of common equity that the Illinois Commerce Commission (“ICC” or the
12 “Commission”) should allow North Shore Gas Company (“North Shore” or the
13 “Company”) an opportunity to earn as part of its weighted average cost of capital (i.e.,
14 overall rate of return) incorporated into rates based on a 2013 test year. My analysis and
15 recommendation are supported by the detailed financial data that I am sponsoring.

16 Q. What exhibits are you sponsoring?

17 A. I also am sponsoring the following exhibits:

Exhibit No.	Identification
NS Ex. 3.2	North Shore - Historical Capitalization and Financial Statistics
NS Ex. 3.3	Delivery Group - Historical Capitalization and Financial Statistics
NS Ex. 3.4	Combination Group - Historical Capitalization and Financial Statistics
NS Ex. 3.5	S&P Utilities - Historical Capitalization and Financial Statistics
NS Ex. 3.6	Dividend Yields
NS Ex. 3.7	Historical Growth Rates
NS Ex. 3.8	Projected Growth Rates
NS Ex. 3.9	Interest Rates for Investment Grade Public Utility Bonds
NS Ex. 3.10	Long-Term, Year-by-Year Total Returns for the S&P Composite Index, S&P Public Utility Index, and Long-Term Corporate Bonds and Public Utility Bonds
NS Ex. 3.11	Component Inputs for the Capital Asset Pricing Model
NS Ex. 3.12	Comparable Earnings Approach
NS Ex. 3.13	Appendices to Accompany the Direct Testimony of Paul R. Moul

18 Q. Please provide a list of the components of NS Ex. 3.13.

19 A. NS Ex. 3.13 is divided into seven (7) appendices. They include:

Appendix No.	Identification
PGL Ex. 3.13A	Evaluation of Risk
PGL Ex. 3.13B	Cost of Equity - General Approach
PGL Ex. 3.13C	Discounted Cash Flow Analysis
PGL Ex. 3.13D	Interest Rates
PGL Ex. 3.13E	Risk Premium Analysis
PGL Ex. 3.13F	Capital Asset Pricing Model
PGL Ex. 3.13G	Comparable Earnings Approach

20 The items covered in these appendices provide additional detailed information
21 concerning the explanation and application of the various financial models upon which I
22 rely.

23 **C. Summary of Conclusions and Overview**

24 Q. Based upon your analysis, what is your conclusion concerning the appropriate cost of
25 common equity for the Company for this case?

26 A. My conclusion is that the Company's rates should be based on a cost of common equity
27 of 10.75%. My recommended cost of equity has been included in the weighted average
28 cost of capital calculation presented in the testimony of Company witness Lisa J. Gast.
29 The weighted average cost of capital proposed by the Company would, if adopted by the
30 Commission, establish a compensatory level of return for the use of capital and provide
31 the Company with the ability to attract capital on reasonable terms.

32 Q. Have you also evaluated the reasonableness of the Company's capital structure ratios
33 from an industry perspective?

34 A. Yes. I have reviewed the capital structure ratios proposed by Ms. Gast and confirmed
35 that they are reasonable. A 50% common equity ratio is consistent with investor
36 expectations. Accordingly, I recommend that the Commission accept the capital
37 structure ratios proposed by Ms. Gast.

38 Q. How have you determined the cost of common equity in this case?

39 A. I have determined the cost of common equity for the Company using capital market and
40 financial data routinely relied upon by investors to assess the relative investment risk, and
41 hence the cost of equity, for a natural gas utility such as North Shore. In this regard, I
42 relied on three well-recognized "market" models to measure the cost of equity:
43 Discounted Cash Flow ("DCF"), Risk Premium, and Capital Asset Pricing Model
44 ("CAPM"). I also considered, as a check on my results using those three market models,
45 the Comparable Earnings ("CE") method. In general, the use of more than one model
46 provides a superior foundation to arrive at the cost of equity. As I discuss later in my
47 testimony, each model relies on different assumptions, and each has its own limitations.
48 In addition, at any point in time, reliance on a single model can provide an incomplete or

49 inaccurate measure of the cost of equity depending upon extraneous factors that may
50 influence the particular model and market sentiment. The specific application of these
51 models will be described later in my testimony.

52 I populated these models with data from two proxy groups of publicly traded
53 utility companies. I followed this approach because stock market data is required to
54 apply some of the cost of equity models and the stock of North Shore is not traded. My
55 approach is consistent with Section 9-230 of the Illinois Public Utilities Act (220 ILCS
56 5/9-230), which requires the Commission to determine a public utility's cost of equity
57 without regard to its increased risk resulting from its affiliation with non-utility
58 companies.

59 Q. What is your first proxy group?

60 A. My first proxy group consists of thirteen companies that are engaged in the delivery of
61 natural gas and electricity to customers. This group is identified on page 2 of NS Ex. 3.3
62 and I will refer to them as the "Delivery Group" throughout my testimony.

63 Q. How did you select the companies in your Delivery Group?

64 A. I began with utilities that are included in The Value Line Investment Survey. Value Line
65 is an investment advisory service that is widely used by investors and analysts, as well as
66 commissions in public utility rate cases. The Delivery Group includes companies that are
67 categorized by Value Line as part of its industry group "Natural Gas Utility." From that
68 list, I eliminated NiSource due to its electric generation and distribution operations and
69 natural gas pipeline and storage operations. I also eliminated UGI due to its highly
70 diversified businesses that include the distribution of propane and liquefied petroleum
71 gases and other non-regulated energy services. The members remaining include: AGL

72 Resources, Atmos Energy, Laclede Group, New Jersey Resources, Northwest Natural
73 Gas, Piedmont Natural Gas, South Jersey Industries, Southwest Gas, and WGL Holdings.
74 Eight of these companies were included in the proxy group that I used in the Company's
75 previous rate case. Southwest Gas Corporation has been added to the Delivery Group
76 because it has revenue stabilization mechanisms ("RSMs") in all of its jurisdictions.
77 With the exception of Laclede, which has a weather mitigated rate design, the other
78 members of the Delivery Group have RSMs. To these natural gas companies, I added
79 four electric utility holding companies whose utility subsidiaries are engaged principally
80 in the delivery of gas and electricity. These companies were selected from the "Electric
81 Utility (East)" industry group of Value Line, are not currently the target of a publicly-
82 announced merger or acquisition, and do not own a significant amount of electric
83 generation assets. They include: Consolidated Edison, Northeast Utilities, PEPCO
84 Holdings, and UIL Holdings. Each of these companies also have an RSM, making them
85 comparable to the natural gas utilities that are part of the Delivery Group and to North
86 Shore.

87 Q. Why did you include electric delivery utilities as well as gas delivery utilities in your
88 Delivery Group?

89 A. I have included electric delivery utilities to broaden the group of companies in the proxy
90 group and to include companies that possess risk traits that are similar to gas distribution
91 utilities. Due to consolidation in the energy sector, there are fewer publicly-traded
92 natural gas distribution utilities. A broader group of companies in the proxy group
93 provides a more credible representation of the risk characteristic of North Shore. And the
94 risk characteristics of utilities engaged primarily in the delivery of electricity closely
95 parallel the risk characteristics of utilities engaged primarily in the distribution of natural

96 gas.

97 Q. Have you employed a second group of utilities in your analysis?

98 A. Yes. I have used a second group of combination gas and electric utilities to supplement
99 the results of the models that I used with the Delivery Group data. This group consists of
100 regulated companies that: (i) have publicly traded common stock, (ii) are included in
101 Value Line, (iii) are engaged in the natural gas and electric utility businesses, (iv) operate
102 in the North Central Region of the U.S., (v) have not recently reduced or are expected to
103 reduce their common dividend, (vi) do not have major interstate pipeline operations, and
104 (vii) are not currently the target of a merger or acquisition. These companies include:
105 Alliant Energy, Black Hills, CMS Energy, DTE Energy, Integrys Energy Group, MGE
106 Energy, Vectren, Wisconsin Energy, and Xcel Energy. I will refer to these companies as
107 the “Combination Group” throughout my testimony.

108 Q. How have you performed your cost of equity analysis with the Delivery Group and
109 Combination Group?

110 A. I have applied the models and methods identified above for estimating the cost of equity
111 using the average data for both the Delivery Group and the Combination Group. I have
112 not measured the cost of equity for each of the individual companies within these groups,
113 because the determination of the cost of equity for an individual company can be
114 problematic. The use of group average data from a portfolio of utilities reduces the effect
115 of anomalous results for any individual company.

116 Q. What are the results of your cost of equity analysis?

117 A. The following table provides the indicated costs of equity for each proxy group and each
118 of the models that I employed.

	<u>Delivery Group</u>	<u>Combination Group</u>
DCF	8.98%	10.56%
RP	11.00%	11.00%
CAPM	11.17%	11.72%

119 The average of these model results is 10.74% (8.98% + 10.56% + 11.00% + 11.00% +
120 11.17% + 11.72% = 64.43% ÷ 6), which I rounded to 10.75% for the purpose of this case.

121 Q. Why is the DCF result for the Delivery Group so inconsistent with the other model
122 results?

123 A. One of the key components of the DCF return is the growth rate. For the natural gas
124 industry generally, and the Delivery Group in particular, growth prospects have been
125 negatively impacted by the recent economic conditions. In this regard, customer demand
126 and revenue growth have declined, which makes it more difficult for them to absorb cost
127 increases. Yet while costs continue to increase in the absence of significant revenue
128 growth, the dividend yields for the Delivery Group remain low in response to the low
129 interest rate environment. Together, the low dividend yields and low growth rates for the
130 Delivery Group produce a DCF result that is inconsistent with the other measures of the
131 cost of equity. It is quite apparent that the DCF result for the Delivery Group is an
132 outlier, as it is not in keeping with the results of the other models for the Delivery Group
133 and all results for the Combination Group. Hence, it cannot be said that the low DCF for
134 the Delivery Group simply reflects market conditions that contribute to low equity costs
135 for gas utilities. Otherwise, the results of the other models would reflect those market
136 conditions.

137 Q. How does including the outlier DCF result for the Delivery Group affect your
138 recommendation?

139 A. It makes my recommendation of 10.75% conservatively low for the Company. If I
140 exclude that result from my analysis, the average model result is 11.09% (10.56% +
141 11.00% + 11.00% + 11.17% + 11.72% = 55.45% ÷ 5).

142 Q. Does your cost of equity analysis and recommendation take into account the revenue
143 decoupling mechanism that the Commission approved in the Company's last three rate
144 cases?

145 A. Yes. The Company maintains Rider VBA, a tariff provision that is designed to decouple
146 forecast revenues from variations in sales related to usage due to weather, economic
147 conditions, energy efficiency efforts and other factors. All but one of the companies in
148 my Delivery Group has some form of RSM that is intended to accomplish the same result
149 as the Company's decoupling mechanism. The sole exception is Laclede, which does not
150 have an RSM but does have a weather mitigated rate design that recovers its fixed costs
151 more evenly during the heating season. This rate is designed to accomplish more assured
152 recovery of fixed costs in spite of variations in sales, which is the intent of decoupling of
153 revenues from variations in sales due to weather. As a group, the market prices of these
154 companies' common equity reflect the expectations of investors that the companies'
155 revenues are stabilized to some extent by a decoupling mechanism. Therefore my
156 analysis reflects the impacts of decoupling on investor expectations through the use of
157 market-determined models.

158 **II. PROXY GROUP ANALYSIS**

159 Q. Is it necessary to conduct a fundamental risk analysis to provide a framework for a

160 determination of a utility's cost of equity?

161 A. Yes, it is. It is necessary to establish a company's relative risk position within its
162 industry through an analysis of various factors that bear upon investors' assessment of
163 overall risk. The items that influence investors' evaluation of risk and its required returns
164 are described in NS Ex. 3.13A. As I discuss in NS Ex. 3.13A, the investment risk of a
165 firm is comprised of its business risk and financial risk. As explained there, business risk
166 is all risk other than financial risk. That is to say, if a company had incurred no financial
167 leverage (i.e., had no borrowed funds in its capital structure), then its investment risk
168 would be represented by its business risk. For the purpose of the analysis that follows, I
169 will focus first on items that relate to business risk and follow that by discussing financial
170 risk indicators. For this purpose, I compared the Company to not only the Delivery
171 Group and Combination Group that I previously described, but also the S&P Public
172 Utilities, which is an industry-wide proxy consisting of various regulated businesses. The
173 S&P Public Utilities is a widely recognized index that is comprised of electric power and
174 natural gas companies. These companies are identified on page 3 of NS Ex. 3.5. The
175 broad categories of financial data that I will discuss below are shown on NS Ex. 3.2, NS
176 Ex. 3.3, NS Ex. 3.4, and NS Ex. 3.5. The data cover the five-year period 2007-2011.

177 **A. Business Risk**

178 Q. Please describe some of the financial data that provides an indication of the business risk
179 of the Company, the Delivery Group, the Combination Group, and the S&P Public
180 Utilities.

181 A. Size. In terms of capitalization, the Company is significantly smaller than the
182 average size of the Delivery Group, and very much smaller than the average size of the
183 Combination Group and the S&P Public Utilities. All other things being equal, a smaller

184 company is riskier than a larger company because a given change in revenue or expense
185 has a proportionately greater impact on a small firm.

186 Return on Book Equity. Greater variability (i.e., uncertainty) of a firm's earned
187 returns signifies relatively greater levels of risk, as shown by the coefficient of variation
188 (standard deviation ÷ mean) of the rate of return on book common equity. The higher the
189 coefficient of variation, the greater degree of variability. For the five-year period, the
190 coefficients of variation were 0.293 (2.2% ÷ 7.5%) for the Company, 0.058 (0.6% ÷
191 10.3%) for the Delivery Group, 0.133 (1.2% ÷ 9.0%) for the Combination Group, and
192 0.107 (1.2% ÷ 11.2%) for the S&P Public Utilities. The Company's historical rates of
193 return have been much more variable than the Delivery Group, the Combination Group,
194 and the S&P Public Utilities, thus indicating higher business risk for the Company.

195 Operating Ratios. I have also compared operating ratios (the percentage of
196 revenues consumed by operating expense, depreciation, and taxes other than income).¹
197 The five-year average operating ratios were 93.2% for the Company, 88.3% for the
198 Delivery Group, 87.0% for the Combination Group, and 82.8% for the S&P Public
199 Utilities. The Company historically has had a high operating ratio, and thus higher
200 business risk than the other groups.

201 Quality of Earnings. Measures of earnings quality usually are revealed by the
202 percentage of AFUDC related to income available for common equity, the effective
203 income tax rate, and other cost deferrals. These measures of earnings quality usually
204 influence a firm's internally generated funds because poor quality of earnings would not
205 generate high levels of cash flow. Quality of earnings has not been a significant concern

¹ The complement of the operating ratio is the operating margin which provides a measure of profitability. The higher the operating ratio, the lower the operating margin.

206 for the Company, the Delivery Group, the Combination Group, or the S&P Public
207 Utilities.

208 Internally Generated Funds. Internally generated funds (“IGF”) provide an
209 important source of new investment capital for a utility and represent a key measure of
210 credit strength. Generally, a higher ratio of IGF to capital reflects lower business risk,
211 and vice versa. Historically, the five-year average percentage of IGF to capital
212 expenditures was 106.5% for the Company, 97.1% for the Delivery Group, 94.4% for the
213 Combination Group, and 93.0% for the S&P Public Utilities. In essence, the historical
214 IGF percentages are not representative of North Shore’s actual risk and in the future the
215 Company is forecasting an IGF to capital expenditures percentage of 39% in 2012 and
216 52% in 2013. The decline in the IGF percentage in 2012 and 2013 can be attributed to
217 end of bonus depreciation and a material increase in construction expenditures. For these
218 reasons, I conclude that the Company’s 2012 and 2013 IGF to capital ratio is more
219 representative and it is comparable to the ratios of the other groups.

220 **B. Financial Risk**

221 Q. Is a utility's credit quality rating an important factor in assessing the financial risk of a
222 company?

223 A. Yes. A company's credit quality rating is an important factor because it is influenced by
224 the financial risk of a company. It is also important because the cost of each type of
225 capital is directly related to the associated financial risk of a firm. So while a company's
226 credit quality risk is shown directly by the rating and yield on its bonds, these relative
227 risk assessments also bear upon the cost of equity. A firm's cost of equity must exceed its
228 borrowing cost to recognize the higher risk of equity.

229 Q. How do the measures of financial risk compare for the Company, the Delivery Group,
230 Combination Group and the S&P Public Utilities?

231 A. Credit Quality Ratings. The Long Term (“LT”) issuer rating by Moody’s
232 Investors Service (“Moody’s”) is A3 for North Shore and the corporate credit rating
233 (“CCR”) by Standard and Poor’s Corporation (“S&P”) is A- for North Shore. These
234 ratings focus upon the credit quality of the issuer of the debt, rather than upon the debt
235 obligation itself. As shown on page 2 of NS Ex. 3.3, the average Moody’s LT issuer
236 rating for the Delivery Group is A3, and the average S&P CCR rating is A-. These
237 average ratings are the same as North Shore’s ratings. The average rating for the
238 Combination Group is A3 from Moody’s and BBB+ from S&P, as shown on page 2 of
239 NS Ex. 3.4. The average Moody’s rating for the Combination Group is the same as
240 North Shore’s rating, while the average S&P rating is one notch below North Shore’s
241 rating. For the S&P Public Utilities, the average Moody’s rating is Baa1 and the average
242 S&P rating is BBB+, as showing on page 3 of NS Ex. 3.5. Here, the average Moody’s
243 ratings for the S&P Public Utilities is one notch below North Shore’s rating and the
244 average S&P is also one notch below North Shore’s rating.

245 Common Equity Ratio. The level of a company’s financial risk is measured
246 directly by the proportion of long-term debt and other senior capital that is contained in
247 its capitalization. Financial risk is also analyzed by comparing common equity ratios (the
248 complement of the ratio of debt and other senior capital). That is to say, a firm with a
249 high common equity ratio (and a low debt ratio) has lower financial risk, while a firm
250 with a low common equity ratio (and a high debt ratio) has higher financial risk. The
251 five-year average common equity ratios based on permanent capital are 57.1% for North
252 Shore, 51.9% for the Delivery Group, 48.6% for the Combination Group and 44.8% for

253 the S&P Public Utilities. It is difficult to make comparison of the common equity ratios
254 that include short-term debt, because the reported capital structures reflect the amount of
255 short-term debt at the end of the fiscal year reporting period. For North Shore and other
256 natural gas utilities, the balance of short-term debt has a seasonal cycle that typically
257 reaches its peak near the end of the fiscal year. The Company currently projects that its
258 capital structure for the 2013 test year will contain approximately 50% common equity, a
259 ratio that is very close to the recent historical equity ratios of both the Delivery Group
260 and the Combination Group.

261 Coverage. The level of fixed charge coverage (i.e., the multiple by which
262 available earnings cover fixed charges, such as interest expense) provides an indication of
263 the earnings protection for creditors. Higher levels of coverage, and hence higher
264 earnings protection for fixed charges, are usually associated with lower risk and superior
265 grades of creditworthiness. The five-year average interest coverage (excluding
266 Allowance for Funds Used During Construction, or AFUDC) was 3.85 times for the
267 Company, 3.86 times for the Delivery Group, 3.13 times for the Combination Group, and
268 3.19 times for the S&P Public Utilities.

269 Q. Please summarize your business and financial risk evaluation.

270 A. The Company's size is much smaller, its earnings variability has been substantially
271 higher than that of the proxy groups, and its operating ratios were higher than those of the
272 proxy groups. These indicators point to higher risk for North Shore. The Company and
273 the proxy groups have similar earnings quality and its fixed charge coverages have been
274 fairly similar to those of the proxy groups. The Company's historical IGF to construction
275 percentage has been higher, but certain factors have distorted the ratio for the Company.

276 While the historical comparison of common equity ratios shows a higher ratio for North

277 Shore and thus lower financial risk, the rate year common equity ratio is close to industry
278 averages. The Company's credit quality ratings are similar to or close to those of the
279 proxy groups. Based on my overall evaluation I conclude that the Delivery Group and
280 the Combination Group are sufficiently comparable to the Company to provide
281 reasonable measures of the rate of return on common equity for North Shore in this
282 proceeding.

283 **III. COST OF EQUITY – GENERAL APPROACH**

284 Q. Please describe the process you employed to determine the cost of equity for the
285 Company.

286 A. Although my fundamental financial analysis provides the required framework to establish
287 the risk relationships between the Company, the Delivery Group, the Combination Group
288 and the S&P Public Utilities, the cost of equity must be measured by standard financial
289 models that I describe in NS Ex. 3.13B. Differences in risk traits, such as size, business
290 diversification, geographical diversity, regulatory policy, financial leverage, and bond
291 ratings must be considered when analyzing the cost of equity indicated by the models.
292 Market-based financial ratios, such as earnings/price ratios and dividend yields, provide a
293 partial measure of the investor-required cost of equity. If all other factors are equal,
294 investors will require a higher rate of return for companies that exhibit greater risk, in
295 order to compensate for that risk. That is to say, a firm that investors perceive to have
296 higher risks will experience a lower price per share in relation to expected earnings.²

297 There are no market ratios available for the Company because its stock is not
298 traded. The Company's five-year average price-earnings multiple was fairly close for the

² For example, two otherwise similarly situated firms each reporting \$1.00 in earnings per share would have different market prices at varying levels of risk (i.e., the firm with a higher level of risk will have a lower share value, while the firm with a lower risk profile will have a higher share value).

299 Delivery Group, the Combination Group, and the S&P Public Utilities. The five-year
300 average dividend yields were somewhat higher for the Combination Group as compared
301 to the Delivery Group and similar to the S&P Public Utilities. The average market-to-
302 book ratios were highest for the S&P Public Utilities, followed by the Delivery Group
303 and finally the Combination Group.

304 It also is important to reiterate that no one method or model of the cost of equity
305 can be applied in an isolated manner. As noted in NS Ex. 3.13B, and elsewhere in my
306 direct testimony, each of the methods used to measure the cost of equity contains certain
307 incomplete and/or overly restrictive assumptions and constraints that are not optimal.
308 Therefore, I favor considering the results from a variety of methods.

309 **IV. DISCOUNTED CASH FLOW ANALYSIS**

310 Q. Please describe your use of the Discounted Cash Flow approach to determine the cost of
311 equity.

312 A. The details of my use of the DCF approach and the calculations and evidence in support
313 of my conclusions are set forth in NS Ex. 3.13C. I will summarize them here. The DCF
314 model seeks to explain the value of an asset as the present value of future expected cash
315 flows discounted at the appropriate risk-adjusted rate of return. In its simplest form, the
316 DCF return on common stock consists of a current cash (dividend) yield and future price
317 appreciation (growth) of the investment.

318 Among other limitations of the model, there is a certain element of circularity in
319 the DCF method when applied in rate cases. This is because investors' expectations for
320 the future depend in part upon regulatory decisions. In turn, when regulators depend
321 upon the DCF model to set the cost of equity, they rely upon investor expectations that
322 already include an assessment of how they will decide rate cases. Due to this circularity,

323 the DCF model may not fully reflect the true risk of a utility.

324 As I describe in NS Ex. 3.13C, the DCF approach has other limitations that
325 diminish its usefulness in the ratesetting process where, as in this case, the firm's market
326 capitalization diverges significantly from the book value capitalization. When this
327 situation exists, the market cost of equity generated by the DCF model will be mis-
328 specified if it is applied to a book value capital structure.

329 Q. Please explain the dividend yield component of a DCF analysis.

330 A. The DCF methodology requires the use of an expected dividend yield to establish the
331 investor-required cost of equity. The monthly dividend yields of the Delivery Group and
332 Combination Group for the twelve months ended March 2012 are shown graphically on
333 NS Ex. 3.6. Those monthly dividend yields reflect an adjustment to the month-end prices
334 to reflect the build up of the dividend in the price that has occurred since the last ex-
335 dividend date (i.e., the date by which a shareholder must own the shares to be entitled to
336 the dividend payment – usually about two to three weeks prior to the actual payment).
337 An explanation of this adjustment is provided in NS Ex. 3.13C.

338 For the twelve months ending March 2012, the average dividend yield was 3.94%
339 for the Delivery Group and 4.31% for the Combination Group based upon a calculation
340 using annualized dividend payments and adjusted month-end stock prices. The dividend
341 yields for the more recent six- and three- month periods were 3.89% and 3.96%,
342 respectively, for the Delivery Group and 4.22% and 4.28%, respectively, for the
343 Combination Group. In my analysis, I used the six-month average yields of 3.89% for
344 the Delivery Group and 4.22% for the Combination Group. The use of this dividend
345 yield reflects current capital costs, while avoiding spot yields.

346 For the purpose of a DCF calculation, the average dividend yield must be adjusted

347 to reflect the prospective nature of the dividend payments i.e., the higher expected
348 dividends for the future. Recall that the DCF is an expectational model that must reflect
349 investor anticipated cash flows for the Delivery Group and Combination Group. I have
350 adjusted the six-month average dividend yield in three different, but generally accepted
351 manners, and used the average of the three adjusted values as calculated in NS Ex. 3.13C.
352 That adjusted dividend yield is 3.99% for the Delivery Group and 4.35% for the
353 Combination Group.

354 Q. Please explain the underlying factors that influence investor's growth expectations.

355 A. As noted previously, investors are interested principally in the future growth of its
356 investment (i.e., the price per share of the stock). As I explain in NS Ex. 3.13C, future
357 earnings per share growth represent the DCF model's primary focus. This is because the
358 model assumes a constant price-earnings multiple, which in turn assumes that the price
359 per share of stock will grow at the same rate as earnings per share. In conducting a
360 growth rate analysis, a wide variety of variables can be considered when reaching a
361 consensus of prospective growth. The variables that can be considered include:
362 earnings, dividends, book value, and cash flow stated on a per share basis. Historical
363 values for these variables can be considered, as well as analysts' forecasts that are widely
364 available to investors. A fundamental growth rate analysis also can be formulated, which
365 consists of internal growth (" $b \times r$ "), where " r " represents the expected rate of return on
366 common equity and " b " is the retention rate that consists of the fraction of earnings that
367 are not paid out as dividends. The internal growth rate can be modified to account for
368 sales of new common stock -- this is called external growth (" $s \times v$ "), where " s "
369 represents the new common shares expected to be issued by a firm and " v " represents the
370 value that accrues to existing shareholders from selling stock at a price different from

371 book value. Fundamental growth, which combines internal and external growth, provides
372 an explanation of the factors that cause book value per share to grow over time. Hence, a
373 fundamental growth rate analysis is duplicative of expected book value per share growth.

374 Growth also can be expressed in multiple stages. This expression of growth
375 consists of an initial “growth” stage where a firm enjoys rapidly expanding markets, high
376 profit margins, and abnormally high growth in earnings per share. Thereafter, a firm
377 enters a “transition” stage where fewer technological advances and increased product
378 saturation begin to reduce the growth rate and profit margins come under pressure.
379 During the “transition” phase, investment opportunities begin to mature, capital
380 requirements decline, and a firm begins to pay out a larger percentage of earnings to
381 shareholders. Finally, the mature or “steady-state” stage is reached when a firm’s
382 earnings growth, payout ratio, and return on equity stabilizes at levels where they remain
383 for the life of a firm. The three stages of growth assume a step-down of high initial
384 growth to lower sustainable growth. Even if these three stages of growth can be
385 envisioned for a firm, the third “steady-state” growth stage, which is assumed to remain
386 fixed in perpetuity, represents an unrealistic expectation because the three stages of
387 growth can be repeated. That is to say, the stages can be repeated where growth for a
388 firm ramps-up and ramps-down in cycles over time.

389 My use of the constant growth DCF model to measure North Shore’s cost of
390 equity is consistent with the theoretical underpinnings of the model. Brealey, Myers and
391 Allen recommend multi-stage growth versions of the model for “firms having high
392 current rates of growth.”³ The example they give is the railroad industry in 2005 and
393 2006, a period in which the railroads “were expanding rapidly ... as they recovered from

³ R. Brealey, S. Myers and F. Allen, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE (9th Ed. 2008): p. 95.

394 a period of low profitability. Security analysts were forecasting continued recovery and
395 earnings growth at 12% to 15% for the next few years.” *Id.* By contrast, as I show
396 below, the historical and forecasted growth rates for the Delivery Group and
397 Combination Group are in the range of 4.5% to 5.5% indicating that the industry is
398 currently in the steady state growth phase and is likely to remain there for the period
399 relevant to the determination of the Company’s cost of equity in this rate case.

400 For similar reasons, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (“FERC”)
401 employs the constant growth DCF model for determining cost of equity for electric utility
402 wholesale rates. FERC reaffirmed its methodology in *Southern California Edison Co.*, 92
403 FERC ¶ 61,070 (2000). In that case, FERC decided that the two-stage growth DCF
404 model that it has historically applied to natural gas pipeline companies was not
405 appropriate for electric utilities due to significant differences between them. In
406 particular, FERC noted that unlike gas pipelines, the then-current growth rate estimates
407 for electric utilities were not “two to three times greater than GDP.” Moreover, electric
408 utilities typically have much higher dividend payout ratios resulting in “significantly
409 lower expected dividend growth rates than most other industrial companies.” Thus,
410 FERC applies the constant growth DCF model to determine ROEs for electric utilities
411 and relies on company-specific long-term growth rates in applying that model. FERC has
412 since extended its application of the constant growth DCF model to regional transmission
413 organizations. *Bangor Hydro-Electric Co.*, 117 FERC ¶ 61,129 (2006).

414 FERC’s reasoning for using the constant growth DCF model for electric utilities
415 applies equally to gas distribution utilities. The Delivery Group’s historical and forecast
416 growth rates are nowhere near “two to three times greater than GDP,” but are rather
417 within one or two percentage points of GDP. Like electric utilities, gas utilities,

418 including those in the Delivery Group, have relatively high dividend payout ratios in
419 comparison to pipelines and non-regulated companies and hence reinvest a relatively low
420 portion of their earnings. This distinction between energy utilities and other industries “is
421 critical, because retained earnings are a key source of dividend growth. The higher
422 payout ratio attributable to [energy] utilities cause these companies to have significantly
423 lower expected dividend growth rates than most other industrial companies (including
424 most gas pipeline companies).”

425 Q. What investor-expected growth rate is appropriate in a DCF calculation?

426 A. Investors consider both company-specific variables and overall market sentiment (i.e.,
427 level of inflation rates, interest rates, economic conditions, etc.) when balancing a
428 company’s capital gains expectations with its dividend yield requirements. I follow an
429 approach that is not rigidly formatted because investors are not influenced by a single set
430 of company-specific variables weighted in a formulaic manner. Therefore, in my
431 opinion, all relevant growth rate indicators using a variety of techniques must be
432 evaluated when formulating a judgment of investor expected growth.

433 Q. What company-specific data have you considered in your growth rate analysis?

434 A. I have considered the growth in the financial variables shown on NS Ex. 3.7 and NS Ex.
435 3.8. The bar graphs provided on NS Ex. 3.7 shows the historical growth rates in earnings
436 per share, dividends per share, book value per share, and cash flow per share for the
437 Delivery Group and Combination Group. The historical growth rates were taken from
438 the Value Line publication that provides these data. As shown on NS Ex. 3.7, the
439 historical growth of earnings per share was in the range of 4.75% to 5.88% for the
440 Delivery Group and 1.25% to 2.78% for the Combination Group.

441 NS Ex. 3.8 provides projected earnings per share growth rates taken from
442 analysts' forecasts compiled by IBES/First Call, Zacks, Reuters, and from the Value Line
443 publication. IBES/First Call, Zacks, and Reuters represent reliable authorities of
444 projected growth upon which investors rely. The IBES/First Call, Zacks, and Reuters
445 forecasts are limited to earnings per share growth, while Value Line makes projections of
446 other financial variables. The Value Line forecasts of dividends per share, book value
447 per share, and cash flow per share have also been included on NS Ex. 3.8 for the Delivery
448 Group and Combination Group.

449 Although five-year forecasts usually receive the most attention in the growth
450 analysis for DCF purposes, present market performance has been strongly influenced by
451 short-term earnings forecasts. Each of the major publications provides earnings forecasts
452 for the current and subsequent year. These short-term earnings forecasts receive
453 prominent coverage, and indeed they dominate these publications.

454 Q. Is a five-year investment horizon associated with the analysts' forecasts consistent with
455 the traditional DCF model?

456 A. No, but the fact that investors rely on growth forecasts no more than five years out
457 illustrates that the infinite form of the model contains an unrealistic assumption. Rather
458 than viewing the DCF in the context of an endless stream of growing dividends (e.g., a
459 century of cash flows), the growth in the share value (i.e., capital appreciation, or capital
460 gains yield) is most relevant to investors' total return expectations. Hence, the sale price
461 of a stock can be viewed as a liquidating dividend that can be discounted along with the
462 annual dividend receipts during the investment-holding period to arrive at the investor
463 expected return. The growth in the price per share will equal the growth in earnings per
464 share absent any change in price-earnings ("P-E") multiple -- a necessary assumption of

465 the DCF. As such, my company-specific growth analysis, which focuses principally
466 upon five-year forecasts of earnings per share growth, conforms with the type of analysis
467 that influences the actual total return expectation of investors. Moreover, academic
468 research focuses on five-year growth rates as they influence stock prices. Indeed, if
469 investors really required forecasts which extended beyond five years in order to properly
470 value common stocks, then I am sure that some investment advisory service would begin
471 publishing that information for individual stocks in order to meet the demands of
472 investors. The absence of such a publication is proof that investors do not require infinite
473 forecasts in order to purchase and sell stocks in the marketplace.

474 Q. What specific evidence have you considered in the DCF growth analysis?

475 A. Ideally, historical and projected earnings per share and dividends per share growth
476 indicators would be used to provide an assessment of investor growth expectations for a
477 firm; however, projections of future earnings growth provide the principal focus of
478 investor expectations. In this regard, it is worthwhile to note that Professor Myron
479 Gordon, the foremost proponent of the DCF model in rate cases, concluded that the best
480 measure of growth in the DCF model is a forecast of earnings per share growth.⁴ Hence,
481 to follow Professor Gordon's findings, projections of earnings per share growth, such as
482 those published by IBES/First Call, Zacks, Reuters, and Value Line, represent a
483 reasonable assessment of investor expectations.

484 As to the five-year forecast growth rates, NS Ex. 3.8 indicates that the projected
485 earnings per share growth rates for the Delivery Group are 4.32% by IBES/First Call,
486 4.77% by Zacks, 4.47% for Reuters, and 4.62% by Value Line. I elected not to use the

⁴ Gordon, Gordon & Gould, "Choice Among Methods of Estimating Share Yield," *The Journal of Portfolio Management* (Spring 1989).

487 Morningstar earnings forecasts in this case because its forecasts were suspended for
488 several months and did not resume until after my data were assembled. Furthermore, I
489 have not been able to verify the source (formerly Factset) of the new growth rates
490 published by Morningstar. The Value Line projections indicate that earnings per share
491 for the Delivery Group will grow prospectively at a higher rate (i.e., 4.62%) than the
492 dividends per share (i.e., 3.75%), which indicates a declining dividend payout ratio for
493 the future. For the Combination Group, the forecast growth rates are 5.25% by
494 IBES/First Call, 5.21% by Zacks, 5.59% by Reuters and 6.22% by Value Line. As
495 indicated earlier, and in NS Ex. 3.13C, with the constant price-earnings multiple
496 assumption of the DCF model, growth for these companies will occur at the higher
497 earnings per share growth rate, thus producing the capital gains yield expected by
498 investors.

499 Q. What conclusion have you drawn from these data regarding the applicable growth rate to
500 be used in the DCF model?

501 A. It is appropriate to consider all forecasts of earnings growth rates that are available to
502 investors. In this regard, I have considered the forecasts from IBES/First Call, Zacks,
503 Reuters, and Value Line. The IBES/First Call, Zacks, and Reuters growth rates are
504 consensus forecasts taken from a survey of analysts that make projections of growth for
505 these companies. The IBES/First Call, Zacks, and Reuters estimates are obtained from
506 the Internet and are widely available to investors free-of-charge. First Call is probably
507 quoted most frequently in the financial press when reporting on earnings forecasts. The
508 Value Line forecasts are also widely available to investors and can be obtained by
509 subscription or free-of-charge at most public and collegiate libraries.

510 The forecasts of earnings per share growth, as shown on NS Ex. 3.8 provide a

511 range of growth rates of 4.32% to 4.77% for the Delivery Group and 5.21% to 6.22% for
512 the Combination Group. Although the DCF growth rates cannot be established solely
513 with a mathematical formulation, it is my opinion that investor-expected growth rates of
514 4.50% for the Delivery Group and 5.50% for the Combination Group are reasonable
515 point estimates for earnings per share growth rates for the DCF analyses in this case. The
516 Value Line forecast of dividend per share growth is inadequate in this regard due to the
517 forecast decline in the dividend payout that I previously described.

518 Q. Are the dividend yield and growth components of the DCF adequate to explain the rate of
519 return on common equity when it is used in the calculation of the weighted average cost
520 of capital?

521 A. Only if the capital structure ratios are measured with the market value of debt and equity.
522 If book values are used to compute the capital structure ratios, then an adjustment is
523 required.

524 Q. Please explain why.

525 A. If regulators use the results of the DCF (which are based on the market price of the stock
526 of the companies analyzed) to compute the weighted average cost of capital with a book
527 value capital structure used for ratesetting purposes, those results will not reflect the
528 higher level of financial risk associated with the book value capital structure. Where, as
529 here, a stock's market price diverges from a utility's book value, the potential exists for a
530 financial risk difference, because the capitalization of a utility measured at its market
531 value contains more equity, less debt and therefore less risk than the capitalization
532 measured at its book value.

533 This shortcoming of the DCF has persuaded one regulatory agency to adjust the

534 cost of equity upward to make the return consistent with the book value capital structure.
535 Provisions for this risk difference were made by the Pennsylvania Public Utility
536 Commission in the following cases:

- 537 • January 10, 2002 for Pennsylvania-American Water Company in Docket No. R-
538 00016339 -- 60 basis points adjustment.
539
- 540 • August 1, 2002 for Philadelphia Suburban Water Company in Docket No. R-
541 00016750 -- 80 basis points adjustment.
542
- 543 • January 29, 2004 for Pennsylvania-American Water Company in Docket No. R-
544 00038304 (affirmed by the Commonwealth Court on November 8, 2004) -- 60 basis
545 points adjustment.
546
- 547 • August 5, 2004 for Aqua Pennsylvania, Inc. in Docket No. R-00038805 -- 60 basis
548 points adjustment.
549
- 550 • December 22, 2004 for PPL Electric Utilities Corporation in Docket No. R-00049255
551 -- 45 basis points adjustment.
552
- 553 • February 8, 2007 for PPL Gas Utilities Corporation in Docket No. R-00061398 -- 70
554 basis points adjustment.
555

556 It must be recognized that in order to make the DCF results relevant to the
557 capitalization measured at book value (as is done for rate setting purposes); the market-
558 derived cost rate cannot be used without modification. As I will explain later in my
559 testimony, the results of the DCF model can be modified to account for differences in risk
560 when the book value capital structure contains more financial leverage than the market
561 value capital structure.

562 Q. But, the Commission has previously declined to adopt your leverage adjustment. Do you
563 agree with the Commission's reasoning in this regard?

564 A. No. Although accurately describing the financial leverage adjustment that I proposed, the
565 Commission was mistaken in linking it to another adjustment to the DCF that was
566 rejected in the Ameren Order (Docket Nos. 06-0070/06-0071/06-0072) that the

567 Commission cited. Perhaps a better explanation on my part would clarify the distinction
568 between these approaches.

569 The adjustment that I label as a “leverage adjustment” is merely a convenient way
570 of relating the result of the simple DCF model (i.e., $D/P + g$), which is premised on a
571 market-value capital structure, to results appropriate for the capital structure used in
572 ratemaking, which is computed with book value weights rather than market value
573 weights. The capital structure ratios measured at the utility’s book value show more
574 financial leverage, and higher risk, than the capitalization measured at its market value.
575 Please refer to NS Ex. 3.13C for the comparison. In pioneering work, Nobel laureates
576 Modigliani and Miller developed several theories about the role of leverage in a firm's
577 capital structure.⁵ As part of that work, Modigliani and Miller established that, as the
578 borrowing of a firm increases, the expected return on stockholders' equity also increases.
579 This principle is the basis for my leverage adjustment which recognizes that the expected
580 return on equity increases with the increased risk associated with the higher financial
581 leverage shown by the book value capital structure, as compared to the market value
582 capital structure that contains lower financial risk. If I expressed my return solely in the
583 context of the book value weights that we use to set the weighted average cost of capital,
584 and ignore the familiar $D/P + g$ expression entirely, then there would be no separate
585 element to reflect the financial leverage change. This is because the equity return
586 applicable to the book value common equity ratio is equal to 7.33%, which is the return
587 for the Delivery Group applicable to its equity with no debt in its capital structure (i.e.,
588 the cost of capital is equal to the cost of equity with a 100% equity ratio) plus 1.64%

⁵ F. Modigliani and M.H. Miller “The Cost of Capital, Corporation Finance, and the Theory of Investments,” American Economic Review, (June 1958), at 261-297. F. Modigliani and M.H. Miller “Taxes and the Cost of Capital: A Correction.” American Economic Review, (June 1963), 433-443.

589 compensation for having a 45.88% debt ratio, plus 0.01% for having a 0.29% preferred
590 stock ratio (see pages 13 and 14 of NS Ex. 3.13C). The sum of the parts is 8.98% (7.33%
591 + 1.64% + 0.01%) and there is no need to even address the cost of equity in terms of D/P
592 + g.⁶ To be completely transparent, I identify a separate leverage “adjustment” in the
593 traditional DCF formula, but there is no need to do so other than providing separate
594 identification for this factor. To express this same return in the context of the familiar
595 DCF model, I summed the 3.99% dividend yield, the 4.50% growth rate, and the 0.49%
596 for the leverage adjustment in order to arrive at the same 8.98% (3.99% + 4.50% +
597 0.49%) return. I know of no means to mathematically solve for the 0.49% leverage
598 adjustment by expressing it in the terms of any particular relationship of market price to
599 book value. The 0.49% adjustment is merely a convenient way to compare the 8.98%
600 return computed directly with the Modigliani & Miller formulas to the 8.49% return
601 generated by the DCF model based on a market value capital structure. My point is that
602 when we use a market-determined cost of equity developed from the DCF model, it
603 reflects a level of financial risk that is different (in this case, lower) from the Company’s
604 capital structure stated at book value. My point has nothing to do with targeting any
605 particular market-to-book ratio.

606 Q. Is your leverage adjustment dependent upon the market valuation or book valuation from
607 an investor’s perspective?

608 A. The only perspective that is important to investors is the return that they can realize on
609 the market value of their investment. As I have measured the DCF, the simple yield
610 (D/P) plus growth (g) provides a return applicable strictly to the price (P) that an investor

⁶ The leverage adjusted cost of equity for the Combination Group is 10.56% (8.03% + 2.51% + 0.02%) beginning with the unlevered cost of equity/capital of 8.03%.

611 is willing to pay for a share of stock. The DCF formula is derived from the standard
612 valuation model: $P = D/(k-g)$, where P = price, D = dividend, k = the cost of equity, and
613 g = growth in cash flows. By rearranging the terms, we obtain the familiar DCF
614 equation: $k = D/P + g$. All of the terms in the DCF equation represent investors'
615 assessment of expected future cash flows that they will receive in relation to the value
616 that they set for a share of stock (P). The need for the leverage adjustment arises when
617 the results of the DCF model (k) are to be applied to a capital structure that is different
618 than indicated by the market price (P). From the market perspective, the financial risk of
619 the Delivery Group is accurately measured by the capital structure ratios calculated from
620 the market capitalization of a firm. If the ratesetting process utilized the market
621 capitalization ratios, then no additional analysis or adjustment would be required, and the
622 simple yield (D/P) plus growth (g) components of the DCF would satisfy the financial
623 risk associated with the market value of the equity capitalization. Since the ratesetting
624 process uses a different set of ratios calculated from the book value capitalization, then
625 further analysis is required to synchronize the financial risk of the book capitalization
626 with the required return on the book value of the equity. This adjustment is developed
627 through precise mathematical calculations, using well recognized analytical procedures
628 that are widely accepted in the financial literature. To arrive at that return, the rate of
629 return on common equity is the unleveraged cost of capital (or equity return at 100%
630 equity) plus one or more terms reflecting the increase in financial risk resulting from the
631 use of leverage in the capital structure. Multiple terms are used in the case of debt and
632 preferred stock. The resulting return is the one that is necessary for the utility to earn on
633 its book value capital structure in order to earn the return that is based on the market
634 value capital structure.

635 Q. Are there specific factors that influence market-to-book ratios that determine whether the
636 leverage adjustment should be made?

637 A. No. The leverage adjustment is not intended, nor was it designed, to address the reasons
638 that stock prices vary from book value. Hence, any observations concerning market
639 prices relative to book are not on point. The leverage adjustment deals with the issue of
640 financial risk and does not transform the DCF result to a book value return through a
641 market-to-book adjustment. Again, the leverage adjustment that I propose is based on the
642 fundamental financial precept that the cost of equity is equal to the rate of return for an
643 unleveraged firm (i.e., where the overall rate of return equates to the cost of equity with a
644 capital structure that contains 100% equity) plus the additional return required for
645 introducing debt and/or preferred stock leverage into the capital structure.

646 Further, as noted previously, the relatively high market prices of utility stocks
647 cannot be attributed solely to the notion that these companies are expected to earn a
648 return on equity that differs from their cost of equity. Stock prices above book value are
649 common for utility stocks, and indeed the stock prices of non-regulated companies
650 exceed book values by even greater margins. In this regard, according to the Barron's
651 issue of March 3, 2012, the major market indices' market-to-book ratios are well above
652 unity. The Dow Jones Utility index traded at a multiple of 1.70 times book value, which
653 is below the market multiple of other indices. For example, the S&P Industrial index was
654 at 3.07 times book value, and the Dow Jones Industrial index was at 2.97 times book
655 value. It is difficult to accept that the vast majority of all firms operating in our economy
656 are generating returns far in excess of their cost of capital. Certainly, in our free-market
657 economy, competition should contain such "excesses" if they indeed exist.

658 Finally, the leverage adjustment adds stability to the final DCF cost rate. That is

659 to say, as the market capitalization increases relative to its book value, the leverage
660 adjustment increases while the simple yield (D/P) plus growth (g) result declines. The
661 reverse is also true that when the market capitalization declines, the leverage adjustment
662 also declines as the simple yield (D/P) plus growth (g) result increases.

663 Q. Please provide the DCF return based upon your preceding discussion of dividend yield,
664 growth, and leverage.

665 A. As explained previously, I have utilized a six-month average dividend yield ("D₁ /P₀")
666 adjusted in a forward-looking manner for my DCF calculation. This dividend yield is
667 used in conjunction with the growth rate ("g") previously developed. The DCF also
668 includes the leverage modification ("lev.") required when the book value equity ratio is
669 used in determining the weighted average cost of capital in the ratesetting process rather
670 than the market value equity ratio related to the price of stock. The resulting DCF cost
671 rate is:

$$D_1/P_0 + g + lev. = k$$

Delivery Group	3.99%	+	4.50%	+	0.49%	=	8.98%
Combination Group	4.35%	+	5.50%	+	0.71%	=	10.56%

672 The DCF result shown above represents the simplified (i.e., Gordon) form of the
673 model that contains a constant growth assumption. I should reiterate, however, that the
674 DCF indicated cost rate provides an explanation of the rate of return on common stock
675 market prices without regard to the prospect of a change in the price-earnings multiple.
676 An assumption that there will be no change in the price-earnings multiple is not
677 supported by the realities of the equity market, because price-earnings multiples do not
678 remain constant. This is one of the constraints of this model that makes it important to
679 consider other model results when determining a company's cost of equity.

680 V. **RISK PREMIUM ANALYSIS**

681 Q. Please describe your use of the Risk Premium approach to determine the cost of equity.

682 A. The details of my use of the Risk Premium approach and the evidence in support of my
683 conclusions are set forth in NS Ex. 3.13E. I will summarize them here. With this
684 method, the cost of equity capital is determined by corporate bond yields plus a premium
685 to account for the fact that common equity is exposed to greater investment risk than debt
686 capital. As with other models used to determine the cost of equity, the Risk Premium
687 approach has its limitations, including potential imprecision in the assessment of the
688 future cost of corporate debt and the measurement of the risk-adjusted common equity
689 premium. While acknowledging these limitations of the model, I am also keenly aware
690 the Commission was critical of the Risk Premium method as being too subjective in
691 previous cases. But this method is no more subjective than the other models the
692 Commission has relied on to estimate cost of equity in other rate cases. All of them
693 require subjective choices by the analyst on methodology and data sources. Moreover,
694 the rates of electric delivery utilities in Illinois are now set by a statute that determines the
695 cost of equity using a risk premium approach. While that approach varies somewhat
696 from my Risk Premium model (i.e., it is based on Treasury bond yields, whereas my
697 approach is based on public utility bond yields), the Risk Premium approach is valid for
698 all types of utilities.

699 Q. What long-term public utility debt cost rate did you use in your Risk Premium analysis?

700 A. In my opinion, a 5.50% yield represents a reasonable estimate of the prospective yield on
701 long-term A-rated public utility bonds. The Moody's index provides historical data for
702 the yields on A-rated public utility bonds and Blue Chip Financial Forecasts ("Blue
703 Chip") provides data that will support forecasts of those yields.

704 Q. What historical data is shown by the Moody's data?

705 A. The historical yields for long-term public utility debt are shown graphically on page 1 of
706 NS Ex. 3.9. For the twelve months ended March 2012, the average monthly yield on
707 Moody's A-rated index of public utility bonds was 4.74%. For the six and three-month
708 periods ended March 2012, the yields were 4.38% and 4.39%, respectively. During the
709 twelve-months ended March 2012, the range of the yields on A-rated public utility bonds
710 was 4.25% to 5.55%.

711 Q. What forecasts of interest rates have you considered in your analysis?

712 A. I have determined the prospective yield on A-rated public utility debt by using the Blue
713 Chip along with the spread in the yields that I describe in Appendix F. The Blue Chip is
714 a reliable authority and contains consensus forecasts of a variety of interest rates
715 compiled from a panel of banking, brokerage, and investment advisory services. In early
716 1999, Blue Chip stopped publishing forecasts of yields on A-rated public utility bonds
717 because the Federal Reserve deleted these yields from its Statistical Release H.15. To
718 independently project a forecast of the yields on A-rated public utility bonds, I have
719 combined the forecast yields on long-term Treasury bonds published on April 1, 2012,
720 and a yield spread of 1.50%. As shown on page 5 of NS Ex. 3.9, the yields on A-rated
721 public utility bonds have exceeded those on Treasury bonds by 1.50% on a twelve-month
722 average basis, 1.61% on a six-month average basis, and 1.60% on a the three-month
723 average basis. From these averages, 1.50% represents a reasonable spread for the yield
724 on A-rated public utility bonds over Treasury bonds. For comparative purposes, I also
725 have shown the Blue Chip forecasts of Aaa-rated and Baa-rated corporate bonds. These
726 forecasts are:

		Blue Chip Financial Forecasts			A-rated Public Utility	
Year	Quarter	Corporate		30-Year	Spread	Yield
		Aaa-rated	Baa-rated	Treasury		
2012	Second	4.0%	5.3%	3.3%	1.50%	4.80%
2012	Third	4.1%	5.3%	3.4%	1.50%	4.90%
2012	Fourth	4.2%	5.4%	3.5%	1.50%	5.00%
2013	First	4.3%	5.5%	3.6%	1.50%	5.10%
2013	Second	4.4%	5.5%	3.8%	1.50%	5.30%
2013	Third	4.5%	5.6%	3.9%	1.50%	5.40%

727 Q. Are there additional forecasts of interest rates that extend beyond those shown above?

728 A. Yes. Twice yearly, Blue Chip provides long-term forecasts of interest rates. In its
729 December 1, 2010 publication, the Blue Chip published longer-term forecasts of interest
730 rates, which were reported to be:

Blue Chip Financial Forecasts			
Averages	Corporate		30-Year
	Aaa-rated	Baa-rated	Treasury
2013-17	5.7%	6.6%	5.1%
2018-22	6.1%	7.0%	5.5%

731 Given these forecasted interest rates, a 5.50% yield on A-rated public utility bonds
732 represents a reasonable expectation.

733 Q. What equity risk premium have you determined for public utilities?

734 A. NS Ex. 3.13E provides a discussion of the financial returns that I relied upon to develop
735 the appropriate equity risk premium for the S&P Public Utilities. I have calculated the
736 equity risk premium by comparing the market returns on utility stocks and the market
737 returns on utility bonds. I chose the S&P Public Utility index for the purpose of
738 measuring the market returns for utility stocks. The S&P Public Utility index is
739 reflective of the risk associated with regulated utilities, rather than some broader market
740 indexes, such as the S&P 500 Composite index. The S&P Public Utility index is a subset

741 of the overall S&P 500 Composite index. Use of the S&P Public Utility index reduces
742 the role of judgment in establishing the risk premium for public utilities. With the equity
743 risk premiums developed for the S&P Public Utilities as a base, I derived the equity risk
744 premium for the Delivery Group.

745 Q. What equity risk premium for the S&P Public Utilities have you determined for this case?

746 A. To develop an appropriate risk premium, I analyzed the results for the S&P Public
747 Utilities by averaging (i) the midpoint of the range shown by the geometric mean and
748 median and (ii) the arithmetic mean. This procedure has been employed to provide a
749 comprehensive way of measuring the central tendency of the historical returns. As
750 shown by the values set forth on page 2 of NS Ex. 3.10, the indicated risk premiums for
751 the various time periods analyzed are 5.51% (1928-2007), 6.58% (1952-2007), 6.08%
752 (1974-2007), and 6.37% (1979-2007). The selection of the shorter periods taken from the
753 entire historical series is designed to provide a risk premium that conforms more nearly to
754 present investment fundamentals, and removes some of the more distant data from the
755 analysis.

756 Q. Do you have further support for the selection of the time periods used in your equity risk
757 premium determination?

758 A. Yes. First, the terminal year of my analysis presented in NS Ex. 3.10 represents the
759 returns realized through 2007. An update to present has not been prepared because of the
760 difficulty in obtaining the return on public utility bonds from Lehman Brothers, which is
761 in bankruptcy. Due to the financial crisis, I am well aware of the large negative returns
762 on stocks that occurred after 2007, as well as the recovery following the resolution of the
763 financial crisis. Today, these returns have nearly offset. Indeed the cumulative return for

764 2008, 2009, 2010 and 2011 were just -1.6%. As another demonstration of this point, the
765 SBBI large company stock returns were 12.3% for 1926 to 2007, as compared to 11.8%
766 for 1926 to 2011. Indeed as of March 31, 2012, many of the major stock indices have
767 recovered to within 91% ($1408.47 \div 1549.38$ for the S&P 500 Composite Index) of the
768 peak level prior to financial crisis. Hence, the fall and rebound in stock prices after 2007
769 indicate that the cumulative returns up to 2007 continue to be relevant today in measuring
770 the common equity risk premium. Second, the selection of the initial year of each period
771 was based upon the financial market defining events that I note here and describe in NS
772 Ex. 3.13E. These events were fixed in history and cannot be manipulated as later
773 financial data becomes available. That is to say, using the Treasury-Federal Reserve
774 Accord as a defining event, the year 1952 is fixed as the beginning point for the
775 measurement period regardless of the financial results that subsequently occurred.
776 Likewise, 1974 represented a benchmark year because it followed the 1973 Arab Oil
777 embargo. Also, the year 1979 was chosen because it began the deregulation of the
778 financial markets. I consistently use these periods in my work, and additional data are
779 merely added to the earlier results when they become available. The periods chosen are,
780 therefore, not driven by the desired results of the study.

781 Q. What conclusions have you drawn from these data?

782 A. Using the summary values provided on page 2 of NS Ex. 3.10, the 1928-2007 period
783 provides the lowest indicated risk premium, while the 1952-2007 period provides the
784 highest risk premium for the S&P Public Utilities. Within these bounds, a common
785 equity risk premium of 6.23% ($6.08\% + 6.37\% = 12.45\% \div 2$) is derived by averaging
786 data covering the periods 1974-2007 and 1979-2007. Therefore, 6.23% represents a
787 reasonable risk premium for the S&P Public Utilities in this case.

788 As noted earlier in my fundamental risk analysis, differences in risk
789 characteristics must be taken into account when applying the results for the S&P Public
790 Utilities to the Delivery Group. I recognized these differences in the development of the
791 equity risk premium in this case. I previously enumerated various differences in
792 fundamentals between the Delivery Group and the S&P Public Utilities, including size,
793 market ratios, common equity ratio, return on book equity, operating ratios, coverage,
794 quality of earnings, internally generated funds, and betas. Based on these factors, the
795 Company's overall risk is higher than that of the Delivery Group. In my opinion, these
796 differences indicate that 5.50% represents a reasonable common equity risk premium in
797 this case. This represents approximately 88% ($5.50\% \div 6.23\% = 0.88$) of the risk
798 premium of the S&P Public Utilities, and is reflective of the risk of the Delivery Group
799 compared to the S&P Public Utilities. For the Combination Group, the Proxy Group
800 Analysis conducted earlier suggests that the group's overall risk is similar to that of the
801 Delivery Group, i.e., less risky than the S&P Public Utilities, supporting a risk premium
802 of 5.50% for this group. In this regard, while the average size of the Combination Group
803 is larger than the size of the Delivery Group, thereby suggesting lower risk and a lower
804 risk premium, there are other factors that elevate the risk of the Combination Group.
805 Those risk factors include the higher financial risk of the Combination Group as revealed
806 by its lower common equity ratio, the higher variability of its earned returns, weaker
807 interest coverage, and lower IGF to capital expenditures. Each of these factors adds to
808 the risk of the Combination Group. On balance, a 5.50% risk premium for the
809 Combination Group is reasonable when considering all of these factors.

810 Q. What common equity cost rate did you determine based on your Risk Premium analysis?

811 A. The cost of equity (i.e., "k") is represented by the sum of the prospective yield for long-

812 term public utility debt (i.e., “i”), and the equity risk premium (i.e., “RP”). The Risk
813 Premium approach provides a cost of equity of:

$$i + RP = k$$

Delivery Group	5.50%	+	5.50%	=	11.00%
Combination Group	5.50%	+	5.50%	=	11.00%

814 **VI. CAPITAL ASSET PRICING MODEL**

815 Q. Have you used the Capital Asset Pricing Model to measure the cost of equity in this case?

816 A. Yes. As with other models of the cost of equity, the CAPM contains a variety of
817 assumptions and shortcomings that I discuss in NS Ex. 3.13F. Therefore, this method
818 should be used with other methods to measure the cost of equity, as each will
819 complement the other and will provide a result that will help reduce the unavoidable
820 defects found in each method.

821 Q. What are the features of the CAPM as you have used it?

822 A. The CAPM uses the yield on a risk-free interest bearing obligation plus a rate of return
823 premium that is proportional to the systematic risk of an investment. The details of my
824 use of the CAPM and evidence in support of my conclusions are set forth in NS Ex.
825 3.13F. To compute the cost of equity with the CAPM, three components are necessary:
826 a risk-free rate of return (“Rf”), the beta measure of systematic risk (“β”), and the market
827 risk premium (“Rm-Rf”) derived from the total return on the market of equities reduced
828 by the risk-free rate of return. The CAPM specifically accounts for differences in
829 systematic risk (i.e., market risk as measured by the beta) between an individual firm or
830 group of firms and the entire market of equities. As such, to calculate the CAPM, it is
831 necessary to employ firms with traded stocks. In this regard, I performed a CAPM
832 calculation for both the Delivery Group and the Combination Group.

833 By contrast, my Risk Premium approach also considers industry- and company-
834 specific factors, because it is not limited to measuring just systematic risk. As a
835 consequence, the Risk Premium approach is more comprehensive than the CAPM. In
836 addition, the Risk Premium approach provides a better measure of the cost of equity,
837 because it is founded upon the yields on corporate bonds rather than Treasury bonds.

838 Q. What betas have you considered in the CAPM?

839 A. The financial data that I have been discussing relate primarily to company-specific risks.
840 Market risk for firms with publicly-traded stock is measured by beta coefficients. Beta
841 coefficients attempt to identify systematic risk, i.e., the risk associated with changes in
842 the overall market for common equities. Value Line publishes such a statistical measure
843 of a stock's relative historical volatility to the rest of the market. The market risk, as
844 measured by the Value Line beta, is 0.68 for the Delivery Group and 0.73 as the average
845 for the Combination Group as shown on page 1 of NS Ex. 3.11⁷.

846 Q. What betas have you used in the CAPM determined cost of equity?

847 A. The betas must be reflective of the financial risk associated with the ratesetting capital
848 structure that is measured at book value. Therefore, Value Line betas cannot be used
849 directly in the CAPM, unless those betas are applied to a capital structure measured with
850 market values. To develop a CAPM cost rate applicable to a book-value capital structure,
851 the Value Line (market value) betas have been unleveraged and releveraged for the book
852 value common equity ratios using the Hamada formula, as follows:

853
$$\beta_l = \beta_u [1 + (1 - t) D/E + P/E]$$

⁷ The procedure used to calculate the beta coefficient published by Value Line is described in NS Ex. 3.13F. A common stock that has a beta less than 1.0 is considered to have less systematic risk than the market as a whole and would be expected to rise and fall more slowly than the rest of the market. A stock with a beta above 1.0 would have more systematic risk.

854 where β_l = the leveraged beta, β_u = the unleveraged beta, t = income tax rate, D = debt
855 ratio, P = preferred stock ratio, and E = common equity ratio. The betas published by
856 Value Line have been calculated with the market price of stock and, therefore, are related
857 to the market value capitalization. By using the formula shown above and the capital
858 structure ratios measured at market value, the beta would become 0.49 for the Delivery
859 Group if it employed no leverage and was 100% equity financed. With the unleveraged
860 beta as a base, I calculated the leveraged beta of 0.76 for the book value capital structure
861 of the Delivery Group. The betas and corresponding common equity ratios are:

	<u>Market Values</u>		<u>Book Values</u>	
	<u>Beta</u>	<u>Common Equity Ratio</u>	<u>Beta</u>	<u>Common Equity Ratio</u>
Delivery Group	0.68	62.16%	0.76	53.83%
Combination Group	0.73	56.48%	0.83	48.32%

862 The book value leveraged beta that I employed in the CAPM cost of equity is 0.76 for the
863 Delivery Group and 0.83 for the Combination Group.

864 Q. What risk-free rate have you used in the CAPM?

865 A. As shown on pages 2 and 3 of NS Ex. 3.11, I provided the historical yields on Treasury
866 notes and bonds. For the twelve months ended March 2012, the average yield on 30-year
867 Treasury bonds was 3.56%, as shown on page 3 of that schedule. For the six- and three-
868 months ended March 2012, the yields on 30-year Treasury bonds were 3.09% and 3.14%,
869 respectively. During the twelve-months ended March 2012, the range of the yields on
870 30-year Treasury bonds was 2.98% to 4.50%. During the past months, there has been a
871 significant decline in the yields on Treasury obligations, which can be traced to a number
872 of factors, including: the sovereign debt crisis in the Eurozone, concern over a possible
873 double dip recession, the potential for deflation, and the Fed's maintenance of its large

874 balance sheet through the reinvestment of the proceeds from maturing mortgage-backed
875 securities, the purchase of Treasury obligations (also known as QE2), and the lengthening
876 of the maturity of the Fed's bond portfolio through the sale of short-term Treasuries and
877 the purchase of long-term Treasury bonds (known as operation twist). While Treasury
878 yields have declined for a variety of reasons, the decline in corporate (i.e., public utility)
879 bond yields has not been so pronounced or revealed by the increased spreads, that I
880 discussed previously.

881 As shown on page 4 of NS Ex. 3.11, forecasts published by Blue Chip April 1,
882 2012 indicate that the yields on long-term Treasury bonds are expected to be in the range
883 of 3.3% to 3.9% during the next six quarters. The longer term forecasts described
884 previously (see Blue Chip Financial Forecast presented earlier) show that the yields on
885 30-year Treasury bonds will average 5.1% from 2013 through 2017 and 5.5% from 2018
886 through 2022. For the reasons explained previously, forecasts of interest rates should be
887 emphasized at this time in selecting the risk-free rate of return in CAPM. Hence, I have
888 used a 4.00% risk-free rate of return for CAPM purposes, which considers not only the
889 Blue Chip forecasts, but also the recent trend in the yields on long-term Treasury bonds.

890 Q. What market premium have you used in the CAPM?

891 A. The market premium is developed by averaging historical market performance and the
892 forecasts. With regard to the forecast data, I have relied upon the Value Line forecasts of
893 capital appreciation and the dividend yield on the 1,700 stocks in the Value Line Survey.
894 According to the March 30, 2012, edition of The Value Line Investment Survey
895 Summary and Index, (see page 5 of NS Ex. 3.11) the total return on the universe of Value
896 Line equities is:

				Median		Median
		Dividend		Appreciation		Total
		Yield		Potential		Return
As of March 30, 2012		2.2%	+	12.47%	⁽⁸⁾	= 14.67%

897 The tabulation shown above provides the dividend yield and capital gains yield of the
898 companies followed by Value Line. Another measure of the total market return is
899 provided by the DCF return on the S&P 500 Composite index. The return is shown.

DCF Result for the S&P 500 Composite

D/P	(1+.5g)	+	g	=	k
2.07%	(1.05270)	+	10.54%	=	12.72%

where: Price (P) at 31-Mar-2012 = 1408.47
Dividend (D) for 4th Qtr. '12 = 7.28
Dividend (D) annualized = 29.12
Growth (g) First Call EPS = 10.54%

900 Using these indicators, the total market return is 13.70% (14.67% + 12.72% = 27.39% ÷
901 2) using both the Value Line and S&P derived returns. With the 13.70% forecast market
902 return and the 4.00% risk-free rate of return, a 9.70% (13.70% - 4.00%) market premium
903 is indicated using forecast market data.

904 I have also provided market premiums that have been widely circulated among
905 the investment and academic community, which today is published by Reuters, Inc.
906 These data are contained in the 2012 Ibbotson® Stocks, Bonds, Bills and Inflation
907 ("SBBI") Classic Yearbook. From the data provided on page 6 of NS Ex. 3.11, I
908 calculate a market premium using the historical common stock arithmetic mean returns of
909 11.8% less government bond arithmetic mean returns of 6.1%. For the period 1926-
910 2011, the market premium was 5.7% (11.8% - 6.1%). Also shown on page 6 of NS Ex.

⁸ The estimated median appreciation potential is forecast to be 60% for 3 to 5 years hence. The annual capital gains yield at the midpoint of the forecast period is 12.47% (i.e., $1.60^{25} - 1$).

911 3.11 is the long-horizon expected market premiums of 6.62% also published in the SBBI
912 Classic Yearbook. An average of the historical and expected SBBI market premium is
913 6.16% ($5.7\% + 6.62\% = 12.32\% \div 2$).

914 For the CAPM, a market premium of 7.93% ($6.16\% + 9.70\% = 15.86\% \div 2$)
915 would be reasonable which is the average of the 6.16% SBBI data and the 9.70% Value
916 Line and S&P 500 data.

917 Q. Are there adjustments to the CAPM results that are necessary to fully reflect the rate of
918 return on common equity?

919 A. Yes. The finance literature supports an adjustment relating to the size of the company or
920 portfolio for which the calculation is performed. As the size of a firm decreases, its risk
921 and, hence, its required return increases. Moreover, in his discussion of the cost of
922 capital, Professor Brigham has indicated that smaller firms have higher capital costs than
923 otherwise similar larger firms (see *Fundamentals of Financial Management*, 5th Edition,
924 page 623). Also, the Fama/French study (see "The Cross-Section of Expected Stock
925 Returns," *The Journal of Finance*, June 1992) established that size of a firm helps explain
926 stock returns. In an October 15, 1995 article in *Public Utility Fortnightly*, entitled
927 "Equity and the Small-Stock Effect," it was demonstrated that the CAPM could
928 understate the cost of equity significantly according to a utility's size. Indeed, it was
929 demonstrated in the SBBI Yearbook that the returns for stocks in lower deciles (i.e.,
930 smaller stocks) had returns in excess of those shown by the simple CAPM. The Ibbotson
931 data confirm this phenomenon for electric and gas companies, where small-cap
932 companies have outperformed large-cap companies by over 300 basis points over the last

933 80 years.⁹ Further, the article by Dr. Thomas Zepp presented research on water utilities
934 that support a small firm effect in the utility industry.¹⁰

935 In this regard, the Delivery Group has an average market capitalization of its
936 equity of \$3.788 million, which would make it a midcap portfolio. The Combination
937 Group has an average market capitalization of \$5.609 million, which also makes it a
938 midcap portfolio. The midcap market capitalization would indicate a size premium of
939 1.14%¹¹. Absent such an adjustment, the CAPM would understate the required return.

940 Q. What CAPM result have you determined using the CAPM?

941 A. Using the 4.00% risk-free rate of return, the leverage adjusted beta of 0.76 for the
942 Delivery Group and 0.83 for the Combination Group, the 7.93% market premium, and
943 the size adjustment, the following result is indicated.

$$R_f + \beta \times (R_m - R_f) + size = k$$

Gas Group	4.00%	+ 0.76	x (7.93%)	+ 1.14%	= 11.17%
Combination Group	4.00%	+ 0.83	x (7.93%)	+ 1.14%	= 11.72%

944 As compared to the DCF model, the results of the CAPM are more broadly based and
945 consider specific risk factors, such as those related to small size.

946 VII. COMPARABLE EARNINGS APPROACH

947 Q. How have you applied the Comparable Earnings approach in this case?

948 A. The technical aspects of the Comparable Earnings approach are set forth in NS Ex.
949 3.13G. Because regulation is a substitute for competitively-determined prices, the returns
950 realized by non-regulated firms with comparable risks to a public utility provide useful

⁹ R. Morin, NEW REGULATORY FINANCE 181-182 (2006).

¹⁰ Zepp (2002), "Utility stocks and the size effect: revisited", Economics and Finance Quarterly, 43, 578-582

¹¹ Ibbotson@ Stocks, Bonds, Bills and Inflation ("SBBI") 2011 Classic Yearbook (Reuters): p. 101

951 insight into a fair rate of return. In order to identify the appropriate return, it is necessary
952 to analyze returns earned (or realized) by other firms within the context of the
953 Comparable Earnings standard. The firms selected for the Comparable Earnings
954 approach should be companies whose prices are not subject to cost-based price ceilings
955 (i.e., non-regulated firms) so that circularity is avoided. There are two avenues available
956 to implement the Comparable Earnings approach. One method would involve the
957 selection of another industry (or industries) with comparable risks to the public utility in
958 question, and the results for all companies within that industry would serve as a
959 benchmark. The second approach requires the selection of parameters that represent
960 similar risk traits for the public utility and the comparable risk companies. Using this
961 approach, the business lines of the comparable companies become unimportant. The
962 latter approach is preferable with the further qualification that the comparable risk
963 companies exclude rate regulated firms in order to avoid the circular reasoning implicit in
964 the use of the achieved earnings/book ratios of other regulated firms. The United States
965 Supreme Court has held that:

966 A public utility is entitled to such rates as will permit it to earn
967 a return on the value of the property which it employs for the
968 convenience of the public equal to that generally being made at
969 the same time and in the same general part of the country on
970 investments in other business undertakings which are attended
971 by corresponding risks and uncertainties.... The return should
972 be reasonably sufficient to assure confidence in the financial
973 soundness of the utility and should be adequate, under efficient
974 and economical management, to maintain and support its credit
975 and enable it to raise the money necessary for the proper
976 discharge of its public duties. Bluefield Water Works vs.
977 Public Service Commission, 262 U.S. 668 (1923).

978
979 Therefore, it is important to identify the returns earned by firms that compete for
980 capital with a public utility. This can be accomplished by analyzing the returns of non-
981 regulated firms that are subject to the competitive forces of the marketplace.

982 Q. How have you implemented the Comparable Earnings approach?

983 A. In order to implement the Comparable Earnings approach, non-regulated companies were
984 selected from the Value Line Investment Survey for Windows that have six categories
985 (see NS Ex. 3.13G for definitions) of comparability designed to reflect the risk of the
986 Delivery Group. These screening criteria were based upon the range as defined by the
987 rankings of the companies in the Delivery Group. The items considered were:
988 Timeliness Rank, Safety Rank, Financial Strength, Price Stability, Value Line betas, and
989 Technical Rank. The identities of the companies comprising the Comparable Earnings
990 group and its associated rankings within the ranges are identified on page 1 of NS Ex.
991 3.12.

992 I relied on Value Line data because they provide a comprehensive basis for
993 evaluating the risks of the comparable firms. As to the returns calculated by Value Line
994 for these companies, there is some downward bias in the figures shown on page 2 of NS
995 Ex. 3.12 because Value Line computes the returns on year-end rather than average book
996 value. If average book values had been employed, the rates of return would have been
997 slightly higher. Nevertheless, these are the returns considered by investors when taking
998 positions in these stocks. Because many of the comparability factors, as well as the
999 published returns, are used by investors for selecting stocks, and to the extent that
1000 investors rely on the Value Line service to gauge its returns, it is, therefore, an
1001 appropriate database for measuring comparable return opportunities.

1002 Q. What data have you used in your Comparable Earnings analysis?

1003 A. I have used both historical realized returns and forecasted returns for non-utility
1004 companies. As noted previously, I have not used returns for utility companies in order to
1005 avoid the circularity that arises from using regulatory-influenced returns to determine a

1006 regulated return. It is appropriate to consider a relatively long measurement period in the
1007 Comparable Earnings approach in order to cover conditions over an entire business cycle.
1008 A ten-year period (5 historical years and 5 projected years) is sufficient to cover an
1009 average business cycle. Unlike the DCF and CAPM, the results of the Comparable
1010 Earnings method can be applied directly to the book value capitalization because, the
1011 nature of the analysis relates to book value. Hence, Comparable Earnings does not
1012 present, as the other models do, the potential misapplication of results when the market
1013 capitalization and book value capitalization diverge significantly. The average historical
1014 rate of return on book common equity was 11.4% using only the returns that were less
1015 than 20% as shown on page 2 of NS Ex. 3.12. The average forecast rate of return as
1016 published by Value Line is 12.2% also using values less than 20%, as provided on page 2
1017 of NS Ex. 3.12.

1018 Q. What rate of return on common equity have you determined in this case using the
1019 Comparable Earnings approach?

1020 A. The average of the historical and forecast median rates of return is:

	<u>Historical</u>	<u>Forecast</u>	<u>Average</u>
Comparable Earnings Group	11.4%	12.2%	11.80%

1021 As noted previously, I have used the results from the Comparable Earnings
1022 method to confirm the results of the market based models.

1023 **VIII. CONCLUSION ON COST OF EQUITY**

1024 Q. What is your conclusion concerning the Company's cost of common equity?

1025 A. The indicated costs of equity from each of the models that I employed are shown in the
1026 following table:

	<u>Delivery Group</u>	<u>Combination Group</u>
DCF	8.98%	10.56%
RP	11.00%	11.00%
CAPM	11.17%	11.72%

1027 In reaching my conclusion, I included the DCF model for the Delivery Group even
1028 though I believe it is far too low to represent a reasonable cost of equity for the Company.
1029 The DCF return for the Delivery Group is inconsistent with the Risk Premium and
1030 CAPM results, and is currently understating the Company's return. This is confirmed
1031 when the model results for the Delivery Group are compared to those of the Combination
1032 Group, which shows that the DCF result for the Delivery Group is much lower than all of
1033 the results for the Combination Group, including the DCF result. For these reasons, my
1034 recommended return on equity is conservatively low because the DCF result for the
1035 Delivery Group received similar weight as other models. If I exclude that result, the
1036 average model result is 11.09%. To be conservative, I included that result in my
1037 averaging, which yielded a return of 10.74%. On this basis, I concluded that 10.75% is a
1038 reasonable cost of equity for the Company under current market conditions.

1039 Q. Does this conclude your direct testimony?

1040 A. Yes, it does.