

ILLINOIS COMMERCE COMMISSION

DOCKET Nos. 11-0279, 11-0282 (Cons.)

SURREBUTTAL TESTIMONY

OF

KAREN R. ALTHOFF

SUBMITTED ON BEHALF

OF

AMEREN ILLINOIS COMPANY

d/b/a Ameren Illinois

September 1, 2011

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	Page No.
I. INTRODUCTION.....	1
II. PURPOSE OF TESTIMONY	1
III. RESPONSE TO STAFF WITNESS, MR. RUKOSUEV	2
A. Cost of Service	2
B. Rate Design	4
IV. RESPONSE TO AG/CUB WITNESS, MR. RUBIN	6
V. RESPONSE TO GFA WITNESS, MR. ADKISSON	12
VI. CONCLUSION	16

1 **ILLINOIS COMMERCE COMMISSION**

2 **DOCKET Nos. 11-0279, 11-0282 (Cons.)**

3 **SURREBUTTAL TESTIMONY OF**

4 **KAREN R. ALTHOFF**

5 **Submitted on Behalf Of**

6 **Ameren Illinois**

7 **I. INTRODUCTION**

8 **Q. Please state your name and business address.**

9 **A. My name is Karen R. Althoff. My business address is 370 S. Main Street, Decatur,**
10 **Illinois 62523.**

11 **Q. Are you the same Karen R. Althoff who provided direct testimony, supplemental**
12 **direct testimony and rebuttal testimony in this proceeding?**

13 **A. Yes, I am.**

14 **II. PURPOSE OF TESTIMONY**

15 **Q. What is the purpose of your surrebuttal testimony in this proceeding?**

16 **A. The purpose of my surrebuttal testimony is to respond to the rebuttal testimonies of the**
17 **Illinois Commerce Commission (Commission) Staff witness, Mr. Philip Rukosuev; the People of**
18 **the State of Illinois and The Citizens Utility Board (jointly AG/CUB) witness, Mr. Scott J.**
19 **Rubin; and Grain and Feed Association of Illinois (GFA) witness, Mr. Jeffrey Adkisson.**

20 **Q. Are you sponsoring any exhibits with your surrebuttal testimony?**

21 **A. No, I'm not.**

22 **III. RESPONSE TO STAFF WITNESS, MR. RUKOSUEV**

23 **A. Cost of Service**

24 **Q. Mr. Rukosuev finds AIC's COS revisions presented in its rebuttal testimony an**
25 **improvement and that the revisions address the concerns over the deficiency versions.**

26 **How do you respond?**

27 **A.** I agree. Mr. Rukosuev now agrees on lines 104 and 105 of his rebuttal testimony that the
28 difference between the individual Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) account
29 amounts in AIC's last rate filing (ICC Docket Nos. 09-0306 et al. (Cons.)) and the current cases'
30 test year FERC account amounts are relatively immaterial. Based on this comment, I believe
31 that AIC has addressed his concern.

32 **Q. Mr. Rukosuev finds problematic the length of time it took AIC to provide a viable**
33 **cost of service foundation for ratemaking in this case. Do you agree with Mr. Rukosuev's**
34 **assertion that the revised gas embedded cost of service studies are untimely and the**
35 **"significant delay" in producing the studies makes it difficult to determine whether the**
36 **studies provide a reasonable foundation for ratemaking in this case?**

37 **A.** No. Staff witness, Mr. Peter Lazare raises the same concerns with respect to the electric
38 embedded cost of service studies (ECOSS). AIC witness Mr. Jones responds to Mr. Lazare. As
39 Mr. Jones explains, the only difference between the Rate Zone ECOSS provided in rebuttal
40 testimony and those provided in response to the deficiency letter is the additional granularity of
41 functional level costs, as discussed by Company witness, Mr. Ronald D. Stafford in his rebuttal
42 testimony. The cost allocation differences between the deficiency filing ECOSS and the rebuttal
43 testimony ECOSS are minor and relatively few. As stated above, Mr. Rukosuev finds the FERC

44 account amount differences relatively immaterial and the “Rate Zone ECOSSs are an
45 improvement from the ECOSS provided in the Company’s initial filing and the gas Rate Zone
46 ECOSSs it provided in response to the ALJs’ deficiency letter”.

47 **Q. Mr. Rukosuev, on page 6 of his rebuttal testimony, stated that AIC did not provide**
48 **supporting testimony in response to the ALJs’ deficiency letter, and this inhibited the**
49 **review of the ECOSS. Please comment on his statement.**

50 **A.** As explained by Mr. Jones in response to the same concern regarding the electric
51 ECOSS, the deficiency ECOSS by rate zone were filed March 24, more than 5 months ago and 3
52 months before Staff filed its direct case, allowing ample time for review. Providing additional
53 testimony was unnecessary and would not have changed the results of the initial ECOSS. AIC
54 has responded to applicable data requests and has revised its ECOSS to address Staff’s concerns.
55 It is not uncommon that changes are made throughout the course of a rate proceeding for class
56 cost allocations given different recommendations in direct and rebuttal testimonies offered by
57 Staff and other intervening parties. Therefore, I do not agree that any lack of testimony inhibited
58 Staff’s review.

59 **Q. How do you respond to Mr. Rukosuev’s statement that he can not conclude that the**
60 **gas ECOSS provides a reasonable foundation for ratemaking in this case?**

61 **A.** I find this statement somewhat confusing given Mr. Rukosuev’s statements in his direct
62 testimony beginning on line 248 that the cost allocations in this case and AIC’s last case are
63 consistent and that he finds “Ameren’s choice of allocators for its gas ECOSSs to be acceptable
64 for ratemaking in this case”. He then continues on line 259 that the accuracy of the ECOSS is
65 based not only on the choice of allocators but also the accuracy of the costs that are to be

66 allocated among rate classes. Based on his acknowledgement in rebuttal as stated above, he
67 agrees that the FERC accounts' cost variations are immaterial. Given that Mr. Rukosuev's
68 concerns appear to be addressed, I disagree with the conclusion that he cannot "conclude that
69 these studies provide a reasonable foundation for ratemaking in this case". To the contrary, the
70 revised ECOSS do provide a reasonable basis for ratemaking.

71 **Q. Mr. Rukosuev states beginning on line 145 that you "essentially acknowledge that**
72 **ratemaking should be based on three ECOSS's rather than one". Please comment.**

73 A. The rate design that I presented in rebuttal was done based on Mr. Rukosuev's concern
74 that rates should be cost-based; as such, I designed the Rate Zones' rates to address this concern.

75 **B. Rate Design**

76 **Q. What is Mr. Rukosuev's rebuttal position regarding gas rate design?**

77 A. His recommendation is that the Commission accept the proposed rate design in his direct
78 testimony, moving half the distance from equal percentage, across-the-board increases to full
79 cost-based revenue allocations for AIC's Rate Zones. Mr. Rukosuev also recommends the
80 Commission accept AIC's proposal to move individual rate classes toward cost based rates
81 subject to a constraint that no class exceeds an increase of 1.50 times the overall average increase
82 allocated to the respective rate zone. On page 12, line 268, Mr. Rukosuev states, "The 1.50
83 times the system average increase will help mitigate potential undue bill impacts to customers
84 compared to moving to full cost of service immediately. At the same time, application of the
85 constraint may result in slower progress towards achieving eventual rate uniformity." On the top
86 of page 13, he then recommends approval of AIC's proposed second step revenue constraint; i.e.,
87 the 1.50 times the overall average increase, to lessen customer bill impacts.

88 **Q. How do you respond?**

89 **A.** His recommended rate design is the same as the rate design I proposed in my rebuttal
90 testimony. I agree with his recommendations. As I indicated in rebuttal, the 1.50 times the
91 system average increase helps mitigate potential undue bill impacts to customers, compared to
92 moving to full cost of service immediately, while still allowing prices to increase by an amount
93 greater than average and gradually move toward rate uniformity among the Rate Zones.

94 **Q. Does Mr. Rukosuev support continuing movement towards uniform rates?**

95 **A.** Yes. On page 9, line 211 of Mr. Rukosuev's testimony, he states, "I do not oppose
96 movement toward uniform rates, where it is deemed under the circumstance necessary and
97 appropriate."

98 **Q. What is Mr. Rukosuev's recommendation on the Company's proposal to conform**
99 **the GDS-2 Customer Charge rate structure for Rate Zone III to that of Rate Zones I and**
100 **II?**

101 **A.** He recommends accepting it. On page 16, line 365 of Mr. Rukosuev's rebuttal
102 testimony, he states, "I believe that the Company's rate design proposal... to conform the GDS-2
103 Customer charge rate structure for Rate Zone III to that of Rate Zones I and II, is in the best
104 interests of its customers and therefore, I do not object to its implementation." I agree with his
105 recommendation.

106 **Q. What is Mr. Rukosuev's recommendation on AIC's proposal to move Rate Zones I,**
107 **II, and III GDS-4 toward price uniformity?**

108 **A.** On page 21, line 489 of Mr. Rukosuev's rebuttal testimony, he states, "I believe that the
109 Company's rate design proposal for the GDS-4 customer class is in the best interests of its

110 customers and therefore, I do not object to its implementation.” Specifically, he recommends
111 that the Commission accept AIC’s approach to the development of rate design for GDS-4 to
112 achieve rate structure uniformity along with pricing uniformity over time. I agree with his
113 recommendation.

114 **Q. How do you respond to Mr. Rukosuev’s conclusion that, in light of the revised**
115 **ECOSS, he now recommends the Commission accept, subject to various modifications as**
116 **discussed by Staff witness, Mr. David Sackett, Rider TBS - Transportation Bank Service?**

117 **A.** I agree with his recommendation as it regards to cost of service. However, as discussed
118 by Company witness, Mr. Timothy L. Eggers, Mr. Sackett’s proposed modification to Rider TBS
119 should be rejected.

120 **Q. Do you agree with Mr. Rukosuev’s recommendation that the Commission reject**
121 **GFA’s proposal to add an additional tier to GDS-5 across all rate zones?**

122 **A.** Yes.

123 **IV. RESPONSE TO AG/CUB WITNESS, MR. RUBIN**

124 **Q. Mr. Rubin testifies that you did not provide any new information relevant to the**
125 **concerns he raised in his direct testimony. How do you respond?**

126 **A.** I disagree with Mr. Rubin’s comment. Mr. Rubin raised two points in rebuttal testimony
127 regarding gas distribution rate design for GDS-1 and GDS-2, where AIC proposes to recover
128 80% of the class revenue requirement in the Customer Charges. First, Mr. Rubin states in his
129 direct testimony, lines 377 through 380, that this “method of pricing is simply a method of
130 transferring wealth (or consumer surplus) from one group of customers to another. There is no
131 discernible increase in overall societal welfare and no improvement in the efficiency of use of

132 the utility's service." Second, he states that only 45% of AIC's cost of service is fixed. Both of
133 these points were addressed in my rebuttal testimony.

134 **Q. Mr. Rubin states he never claimed low-income customers used less gas than higher-**
135 **income customers; rather he testified regarding rate discrimination and social welfare in a**
136 **solely economic sense. How do you respond?**

137 **A.** Mr. Rubin did not make this clarification in his direct testimony, and in my view the
138 implication of his testimony on direct was that there was a social benefit to avoiding the alleged
139 shift of costs from high volume to low volume users. In other words, he appears to believe that
140 low volume customers are harmed by recovery of fixed costs through the customer charge.

141 While Mr. Rubin did not specifically mention a relationship between low usage and low-income
142 customers' utilization of governmental welfare funds in his direct testimony, the main theme of
143 his discussion was that higher customer charges inappropriately shift costs from high usage
144 customers to low usage customers. However, now that he has clarified his social welfare
145 concern as a purely economic question, I do not see a basis, from an economic standpoint, for his
146 assertion that his alleged cost shift (if any) does not do anything to improve the "efficiency" of
147 service. In other words, Mr. Rubin has not explained why his alleged cost shift is a concern.

148 One could just as easily argue that the concern is recovery of costs through a higher volumetric
149 charge results in an economically inefficient subsidy of low volume customers by high volume
150 customers. As I discuss below, it is more efficient to send the proper price signals to customers
151 by having fixed costs recovered through fixed charges.

152 **Q. How do you respond to Mr. Rubin’s statement that his rebuttal testimony was**
153 **regarding low-use customers and that he never claimed there was a correlation between**
154 **gas usage and income?**

155 **A.** Mr. Rubin appears to agree that there is no connection between usage and income. If
156 anything, he states that low income customers may be high volume users when he acknowledges,
157 “This is particularly the case for gas customers who receive Low Income Home Energy
158 Assistance Program (LIHEAP) assistance, since those customers—by definition—must use gas
159 for space heating. I would expect most low-use gas customers to be non-heating customers.”
160 Nevertheless, as I discuss above, Mr. Rubin has failed to explain why his alleged shift of cost
161 from high volume to low volume users poses a concern. To the contrary, if high volume users
162 are LIHEAP customers, Mr. Rubin’s position would penalize those customers because they are
163 paying more than their appropriate share of fixed costs.

164 **Q. On page 10, line 189, Mr. Rubin states, “The Company’s pricing proposal ...**
165 **simply shifts cost from high-use customers to low-use customers, but it does nothing to**
166 **improve the overall efficiency of service.” Do you agree?**

167 **A.** No. To begin with, AIC has been recovering 80% of its residential class revenue
168 requirement through the customer charge since 2008 (following the Docket 07-0585 Order).
169 Thus, AIC’s current proposal does not “shift” any costs as compared to previous pricing
170 structures, as AIC is using the 80% pricing structure used since 2008. Mr. Rubin’s assertion is
171 that AIC’s proposal could lead to inefficient consumption decisions because customers would
172 not receive a price signal reflecting the true cost of meeting customers’ demands for energy
173 service. The opposite is true. Because AIC’s gas distribution costs are primarily fixed, the cost

174 of providing gas distribution service to low usage customers differs little from the cost of
175 providing gas distribution service to high usage customers. As discussed above and in my
176 rebuttal testimony, AIC's proposal sets the proper price signal for customers by setting fixed
177 prices for these fixed costs. Additionally, the distribution charges of a residential customer's bill
178 are only a portion of their bill—the majority of the total bill amounts are the gas commodity
179 charge. The customer receives usage related price signals from the cost of their gas consumption
180 through AIC's Purchased Gas Adjustment (PGA). For example, in looking at Ameren Exhibit
181 13.11G for the residential customers at 785 annual therms, Present PGA Gas Costs compared to
182 Present Annual Total Bill for Rate Zones I, II and III are 66%, 69% and 64%, respectively. As
183 such, this significant portion of the residential customer's bill which is tied to therm usage would
184 send a price signal to consumers regarding their consumption.

185 **Q. Mr. Rubin disagrees with the classification of storage field costs as “fixed”. How do**
186 **you respond?**

187 **A.** As I explained in my rebuttal, AIC's “fixed” costs should be recovered in a fixed
188 recovery mechanism and it appears that Mr. Rubin agrees with that, given that his primary
189 concern now appears to be what constitutes a “fixed” cost of AIC. Further, Mr. Rubin's
190 introduction of storage field costs as not being “fixed” is contradictory to his direct testimony.
191 Specifically, in reviewing Mr. Rubin's suggested 45% “fixed” cost calculation pertaining to
192 residential customers, he had included the storage costs in the fixed amount. The 45% was
193 determined by dividing line 5, column 2 of Ameren Exhibit 13.2G totaling \$107,174,000 divided
194 by line 31, column 2 totaling \$234,967,300. In looking at the components comprising the
195 numerator, it in fact includes storage field costs of \$32,752,000. Regardless of this shift in Mr.

196 Rubin's testimonies, however, I disagree with Mr. Rubin's conclusion that underground gas
197 storage fields are not "fixed". The cost of service for underground storage fields consist of
198 physical assets including land and land rights, structures and improvements, wells, non-
199 recoverable natural gas (necessary for the fields to operate), lines, and storage equipment along
200 with the associated operation and maintenance expenses to support the operation of these
201 facilities. And even assuming that storage fields were not fixed costs, accepting Mr. Rubin's
202 reduction in fixed costs for storage fields of 7% would not change AIC's proposed customer
203 charge, as I discuss below.

204 **Q. Mr. Rubin also claims treatment of storage field costs as fixed costs directly**
205 **contradicts the approach of other major gas utilities. He cites the current Peoples Gas rate**
206 **case, ICC Docket No. 11-0280/0281 (cons.), and the utility's proposal therein to create a**
207 **separate rider to recover storage field costs on a per-therm basis. What is your response?**

208 **A.** The operation of the proposed rider Mr. Rubin references does not necessarily
209 demonstrate that storage costs are not fixed. There is not necessarily a relationship between the
210 classification of a cost in an ECOSS and the pricing method to recover that cost. Mr. Rubin
211 focuses on the fact that this recovery is based on a per-therm basis to support his theory that
212 underground gas storage assets are variable costs. For the residential class, Peoples Gas and
213 North Shores Gas propose to recover such costs on a per-therm basis; however, they propose to
214 recover the transportation storage costs on a capacity basis, not usage. Further, it is my
215 understanding that the utilities have addressed the unbundled storage costs due to their 2009 Rate
216 Case Order, where the Commission ordered Peoples Gas to work collaboratively with the
217 Commission Staff and other stakeholders to develop an unbundling proposal. Additionally,

218 recovery of such costs could have been developed on a per-therm basis for ease of billing
219 purposes. To connect the per-therm charge to variable cost is speculative. Mr. Rubin
220 nevertheless concludes that the Peoples / North Shore's proposal recognizes that storage costs
221 are directly associated with gas demands. However, his conclusion that Peoples used a per-
222 therm allocator of storage costs because storage costs are variable is conclusory - he does not
223 demonstrate that Peoples Gas' proposal was in fact made for that reason.

224 **Q. Do you agree with Mr. Rubin that since storage field capacity can be sold to other**
225 **entities who store natural gas that it is a variable cost?**

226 **A.** No. The classification of a cost doesn't change from fixed to variable simply because it
227 can be sold as a separate service. Clearly, renting or selling a portion of the storage field simply
228 reduces the capacity (fixed amount) available for the utility's customers.

229 **Q. Mr. Rubin states that since storage costs are a significant part of the AIC's "so-**
230 **called" fixed costs, if storage costs are removed from fixed costs and the Commission**
231 **continues to set GDS-1 customer charge to recover 80% of fixed costs, that customer**
232 **charge should not exceed \$19.33. What is your response?**

233 **A.** Mr. Rubin has calculated on page 11, beginning on line 219 what he considers are the
234 residential customers' portion of underground gas storage costs which he believes is 7.3% of the
235 total residential cost of service. As I state above, I do not agree that underground gas storage
236 field costs are variable. However, AIC's proposal is to recover 80% of the residential class
237 revenue requirement through the customer charge given the prior Commission Order. Mr. Rubin
238 inappropriately uses the 80% recovery of fixed cost as his starting point to reflect the reduction
239 of underground gas storage, not the class revenue requirement. The fixed cost percentage of

240 AIC's gas distribution operations is 97%, as I stated in my rebuttal testimony. Even if the
241 Commission would agree with Mr. Rubin's point, the 7.3% adjustment would lower AIC's fixed
242 costs to about 90%. This percentage is still far above the 80% fixed cost recovery granted by the
243 Commission's Order in ICC Docket Nos. 07-0585 through 07-0590 (Cons.) - and on which AIC
244 bases its customer charge in this case. One additional point to note is that Mr. Rubin's
245 calculation of the residential Customer Charge after his underground gas storage adjustment is
246 \$19.33 which is actually above AIC's proposed rebuttal residential Customer Charge (\$18.24)
247 for Rate Zone II.

248 **V. RESPONSE TO GFA WITNESS, MR. ADKISSON**

249 **Q. What is Mr. Adkisson's rebuttal position?**

250 **A.** He continues to make the recommendations he made on direct. He believes (page 2, line
251 32 of Mr. Adkisson's testimony), "[a] typical small to intermediate size grain dryer would never
252 be expected to utilize the GDS-5 rate because of the proposed high monthly fixed charges and
253 may opt to use propane instead." Therefore (on page 2, line 38), Mr. Adkisson states, "I propose
254 to broaden the range of customer charges that are equal to the AIC proposed customer charges
255 for GDS-3 rates in the respective rate zones."

256 **Q. What is your general response?**

257 **A.** His recommendation should be rejected. AIC must properly assess charges to recover the
258 costs that are necessary to provide service to customers. If AIC does not appropriately recover
259 the costs caused by customer groups, then the remaining customer groups subsidize these costs
260 and that is unfair to these remaining groups. The fact is that GDS-5 grain drying customers do
261 utilize significant amounts of gas when drying their crops and the equipment needed to meet

262 demands at such levels must be sized appropriately along with providing data to administer the
263 requirements of the tariff. This equipment is much more costly, and these costs should be
264 recovered from GDS-5 users. Such recovery would not happen under Mr. Adkisson's proposal,
265 as I explained in rebuttal. Therefore, Mr. Adkisson's recommendations should be rejected (as
266 Staff agrees).

267 **Q. On page 3, line 51, Mr. Adkisson states, "Ms. Althoff's rebuttal testimony (Ameren**
268 **Ex. 33.0) was that the proposal should be rejected primarily because of the cost differential**
269 **of a GDS-3 meter versus a demand meter necessary to provide service under GDS-5 is**
270 **substantial." Is this a correct characterization?**

271 **A.** Not entirely. A meter is only one element of the Customer Charge that Mr. Adkisson is
272 concerned about. The Customer Components of the Embedded Cost of Service Study includes
273 the cost of the meter plus its installation cost along with the regulator, services, meter reading,
274 and customer records and collection expenses. Regulators serve to reduce the pressure of gas so
275 that delivery is safe; as such, there is a cost difference in regulators that provide service to small
276 and large demand customers. Likewise, meter reading and billing is more complex for a grain
277 drying customer versus a small or intermediate general use customer, as general use customers'
278 metering and billing are less complex so the amount of time required to process is less. The
279 GDS-5 customers do have more complex metering and billing given the design of this tariff,
280 which offers a price break for their non-seasonal usage.

281 **Q. On page 3, line 65, Mr. Adkisson states, "with the lower gas flow of GDS-3 customer**
282 **on the GDS-5 rate, the cost of a complete installation of a regulator, meter with demand**

283 **recording capability with temperature and pressure compensation and data storage**
284 **electronics would cost less than \$5,000 installed.” How do you respond?**

285 A. AIC’s average installed cost of \$5,400, as stated in my rebuttal testimony on page 28,
286 relates to the current installation costs of meters that provide service to our existing GDS-3
287 customers. Likewise, AIC’s average installed cost of \$10,800 in my rebuttal testimony relates to
288 the current installation costs of meters that provide service to our existing GDS-5 customers.
289 The costs do not include regulators or interval metering equipment (necessary for GDS-5 but not
290 GDS-3) which are a part of the meter set; as such, the total asset costs installed for each customer
291 groups would, in fact, be higher. Mr. Adkisson does not take all this into account. Further, as
292 stated in my direct testimony, engineers utilize three planning criteria when evaluating service
293 adequacy -- a customer’s Maximum Daily Quantity (MDQ), peak hourly demand, and operating
294 pressure. Mr. Adkisson is focusing only on the amount of therm usage; as such, his analysis is
295 incomplete in assessing the required equipment for the GDS-3 type customer.

296 Further, GFA Exhibits 2.01G and 2.02G provide suggested equipment for “GDS-2 or
297 GDS-3 size customer hourly flow taking service under optional GDS-5,” which includes a
298 2M175 rotary meter that our engineers believe would not be capable of metering the gas usage of
299 most of the grain drying customer installations served by AIC. The regulator cost also appears
300 too low for the volumes of gas most grain dryers use, which requires a much larger and more
301 expensive regulator. The GFA exhibits also reflect identification of what appears to be some
302 piping fittings and meter set costs (flanges and “Y” strainer); however, this is only a small
303 portion of a gas meter set. Installations for these types of meter sets are much more significant in
304 size and complexity; as such, the labor cost component in GFA’s exhibit is also low. Meter sets

305 are engineered and fabricated to the individual customer's requirements, and AIC believes the
306 required installation time would be more than stated on GFA Exhibit 2.01G.

307 **Q. On page 4, line 81, Mr. Adkisson refers to an Ameren Missouri tariff as a "gas tariff**
308 **which demonstrates that the cost for a smaller-use customer meter is less than that of a**
309 **larger-use customer even if both require interval/demand meters." How do you respond?**

310 A. The Ameren Missouri tariff he references is not comparable. Mr. Adkisson, on line 86 of
311 his rebuttal testimony, is comparing the Ameren Missouri Tariff Sheet 10 Standard
312 Transportation Customer Charge of \$28.72 plus the Electronic Metering Administrative Charge
313 of \$43.45, and EGM Meter Equipment Charge of \$21.00 per month for a total of \$93.17. First,
314 this cost development reflects the cost of service, net of accumulated depreciation, of the average
315 cost of the equipment in Ameren Missouri's plant records versus the costs of GFA Exhibits
316 2.01G and 2.02G, which are current costs. Additionally, the cost estimates that I provided in my
317 rebuttal are based on current costs as well. AIC utilizes the current costs of the installed meters
318 set by GDS customer groups to allocate the recorded plant costs of these assets. In other words,
319 the \$5,400 or \$10,800 installed meter costs for GDS-3 and GDS-5 customers are used to allocate
320 the historical plant dollars of the meter assets. You cannot compare these costs, or the costs on
321 GFA Exhibits 2.01 and 2.02G, to the Ameren Missouri charges.

322 **Q. Your rebuttal testimony provided concern over revenue stability if Mr. Adkisson's**
323 **additional Customer Charge tier was added. What does Mr. Rukosuev state in his rebuttal**
324 **testimony about this issue?**

325 A. Mr. Rukosuev is in agreement with my concern stating “[t]he GFA’s proposal would add
326 ambiguity for rate administration, which would result in financial uncertainty for the recovery of
327 Ameren’s approved revenue requirement”.

328 **VI. CONCLUSION**

329 **Q. Does this conclude your surrebuttal testimony?**

330 **A.** Yes, it does.