

REBUTTAL TESTIMONY

of

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Illinois Commerce Commission

Central Illinois Light Company, d/b/a AmerenCILCO,

Central Illinois Public Service Company, d/b/a AmerenCIPS

and

Illinois Power Company, d/b/a AmerenIP

Proposed General Increase in Electric Rates  
and  
Proposed General Increase in Gas Rates

Docket Nos. 07-0585 – 07-0590 (Cons.)

May 14, 2008

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1 **WITNESS IDENTIFICATION**

2 **Q. Please state your name, employer and business address.**

3 A. My name is Rochelle Phipps. I am employed by the Illinois Commerce  
4 Commission (“Commission”), 527 East Capitol Avenue, Springfield, Illinois  
5 62701.

6 **Q. Are you the same Rochelle Phipps who previously submitted direct**  
7 **testimony in this proceeding?**

8 A. Yes, I am.

9 **INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS**

10 **Q. What is the purpose of your rebuttal testimony in this proceeding?**

11 A. I will respond to the rebuttal testimony of Mr. Michael G. O’Bryan, who testified  
12 on behalf of Central Illinois Light Company (“CILCO”), Central Illinois Public  
13 Service Company (“CIPS”) and Illinois Power Company (“IP”)<sup>1</sup> on capital  
14 structure and the cost of debt. I will also present the cost of capital for CILCO  
15 Electric, which incorporates Staff witness Janis Freetly’s 10.68% cost of equity  
16 recommendation for CILCO’s electric delivery services (ICC Staff Exhibit 17.0).

17 **Q. Please summarize your conclusions and recommendations.**

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<sup>1</sup> CILCO, CIPS and IP are collectively referred to as the “Companies” or “Ameren utilities”. Individually, CILCO, CIPS and IP are each referred to as the “Company”.

18 A. Mr. O’Bryan’s rebuttal testimony (Ameren Ex. 23.0) did nothing to change my  
19 opinion regarding the overall cost of capital for the Companies’ gas and electric  
20 delivery services. His proposals serve only to inflate the cost of capital estimates  
21 for the Ameren utilities and should be rejected. I continue to recommend the  
22 overall cost of capital as presented in ICC Staff Exhibit 4.0, Schedules 4.01  
23 CILCO (gas delivery services only), 4.01 CIPS and 4.01 IP. As shown on  
24 Schedule 16.01, the overall cost of capital for CILCO’s electric delivery services  
25 equals 7.93%.

26 **BALANCE OF SHORT-TERM DEBT FOR AMEREN UTILITIES**

27 **Q. Please summarize Mr. O’Bryan’s criticisms of the measurement period you**  
28 **used to calculate short-term debt balances for the Ameren utilities.**

29 A. Both Mr. O’Bryan and I use a 12-month measurement period to calculate the  
30 Ameren utilities’ short-term debt balances, but we use different measurement  
31 periods. Mr. O’Bryan’s measurement period ends on the measurement date for  
32 long-term debt and equity; in contrast, I use a measurement period that is  
33 centered on the date I measured long-term capital component balances. Mr.  
34 O’Bryan argues that my measurement period, which includes six months of data  
35 beyond the measurement date for long-term capital components, results in a

36 measurement mismatch between balances of short-term debt and the other  
37 capital structure components.<sup>2</sup>

38 Mr. O'Bryan argues that my calculation results in a "measurement mismatch"  
39 because balances of short- and long-term capital components "tend to be  
40 inversely related in such cases as issuances, accumulation, repurchases,  
41 redemptions or maturities of equity or debt".<sup>3</sup> However, Mr. O'Bryan's argument  
42 is not pertinent in this case because there were no issuances, redemptions or  
43 maturities of equity or debt during those six months beyond the Ameren utilities'  
44 long-term capital measurement dates,<sup>4</sup> which would be included in my  
45 measurement period but not Mr. O'Bryan's.<sup>5</sup> Moreover, as I explained in Direct  
46 Testimony (ICC Staff Ex. 4.0),<sup>6</sup> aligning the midpoint of a twelve-month average  
47 balance with the measurement date of the long-term capital structure  
48 components *minimizes* the total number of months of misalignment (*i.e.*, 42  
49 months using the midpoint vis-à-vis 78 months using the endpoint).<sup>7</sup> Since the  
50 number of months of misalignment in his calculation is greater than my

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<sup>2</sup> Ameren Ex. 23.0, p. 7.

<sup>3</sup> Ameren Ex. 23.0, p. 7.

<sup>4</sup> January 2007 to June 2007 for IP and July 2007 to December 2007 for CIPS and CILCO.

<sup>5</sup> *Ameren Corporation December 31, 2007 Form 10-K*, pp. 55-56.

<sup>6</sup> ICC Staff Ex. 4.0, pp. 6-8 explains in detail why aligning the midpoint of a twelve-month average balance of short-term debt with the measurement date of the long-term capital structure components is superior to aligning the endpoint of a twelve-month average balance with the measurement date of the long-term capitals structure components.

<sup>7</sup> ICC Staff Ex. 4.0, lines 108-133.

51 calculation, then any measurement mismatch affects his capital structure more  
52 than it would mine.

53 **Q. Mr. O’Bryan argues that short-term debt balances are the result of costs**  
54 **during the test year / measurement period.<sup>8</sup> Is he correct?**

55 A. No. Mr. O’Bryan’s argument against my short-term debt measurement period is  
56 based on the faulty premise that the terms “test year” and “measurement period”  
57 are synonymous, which they are not. 83 Illinois Administrative Code 285.115  
58 states:

59 “Capital Structure Measurement Period” refers to the period or point  
60 in time in which all long-term components of the capital structure  
61 are measured. This may differ from the “test year”.<sup>9</sup>

62 Indeed, Ameren chose June 30, 2007 to measure the balances of long-term  
63 debt, preferred stock and common equity for CILCO and CIPS, which is six  
64 months after the end of the 2006 test year.

65 **Q. How does using Mr. O’Bryan’s short-term debt measurement period affect**  
66 **CILCO’s, CIPS’ and IP’s cost of capital?**

67 A. All else equal, using Mr. O’Bryan’s proposed short-term debt measurement  
68 period in my cost of capital calculation for CILCO, CIPS and IP would cause the

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<sup>8</sup> Ameren Ex. 23.0, p. 7.

<sup>9</sup> Order, Docket No. 02-0509 (7/9/2003).

69 Companies' overall cost of capital to increase by 54 basis points, 20 basis points  
70 and 8 basis points, respectively.<sup>10</sup>

71 **Q. Please summarize Mr. O'Bryan's argument in favor of subtracting cash**  
72 **from the balance of short-term debt.**

73 A. Mr. O'Bryan opposes my short-term debt calculation because I did not subtract  
74 cash from the Companies' short-term debt balances, which he alleges  
75 mismatches the cost of funds supporting assets and the returns those assets  
76 earn.<sup>11</sup> Mr. O'Bryan's position is based on the invalid assumption that it is  
77 possible to trace short-term debt to specific assets. He recognized such a task is  
78 impossible in the following response to an ICC Staff data request:

79 The proceeds from the Companies' short-term debt borrowings are  
80 generally used for ongoing working capital needs and for other  
81 corporate purposes that are associated with day to day operations  
82 of the utilities. Given the fungible nature of cash and the  
83 Companies' many sources of and uses for cash, attempting to tie  
84 specific uses to short-term borrowings would be impossible. The  
85 requested information does not exist...<sup>12</sup>

86 **Q. Is Mr. O'Bryan correct when he asserts that Staff assumes "cash is**  
87 **supported by a mix of capital equal to that supporting assets in rate base.**

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<sup>10</sup> Using the Companies' proposed measurement period reduces the short-term debt balances for CILCO and CIPS to \$25 million each and IP's balance to approximately \$48 million. Those calculations do not net cash out of short-term debt balances. Moreover, using the Companies' proposed measurement period would require applying an AFUDC formula based adjustment to the long-term capital components.

<sup>11</sup> Ameren Ex. 23.0, pp. 4-6.

<sup>12</sup> Companies' response to ICC Staff data request RP 5.06, which asked the Companies to specify the purpose of all short-term indebtedness during the January 2006 – June 2007 measurement period.

88           **This means, in turn, that Staff believes the Ameren Illinois Utilities would**  
89           **raise cash at a cost of roughly 8% and invest it in money market accounts**  
90           **earnings roughly 3%”?**<sup>13</sup>

91    A.    No, To the contrary, Mr. O’Bryan’s statement implies the cost of capital remains  
92           constant regardless of the riskiness of the assets it supports. In reality, the costs  
93           of the various sources of financing are a function of (1) the riskiness of the assets  
94           being financed; and (2) the amount of debt used to finance the assets.<sup>14</sup> Mr.  
95           O’Bryan’s faulty rationale suggests that holding capital structure constant, a  
96           company’s cost of capital would be the same whether its assets wholly  
97           comprised U.S. Treasury bills, electric distribution plant, or oil drilling equipment.  
98           If that were true, which it is not, then the Ameren utilities would not use short-  
99           term debt to finance cash since the cost of short-term debt is greater than the  
100          return on cash.

101          Furthermore, if Mr. O’Bryan’s argument had any merit, which it does not, the  
102          Ameren utilities would not have any cash on their balance sheet unless they also  
103          had short-term debt outstanding because it would perforce be financed with “high  
104          cost” long-term debt and equity. That is not true for the Ameren utilities. During  
105          2006, from January through November, CIPS’ month-end short-term debt

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<sup>13</sup> Ameren Ex. 23.0, p. 5.

<sup>14</sup> Ehrhardt, Michael C., *The Search for Value: Measuring the Company’s Cost of Capital*, Harvard Business School Press (1994), p. 6.

106 balances were zero;<sup>15</sup> yet, during the same period, CIPS' month-end cash  
107 balances ranged from \$0.5 million to \$62.5 million.<sup>16</sup> Likewise, on May 31, 2007,  
108 CIPS had no short-term debt outstanding and a \$44 million cash balance.<sup>17</sup>

109 **Q. Mr. O'Bryan asserts that, "[t]he Ameren utilities are holding relatively high**  
110 **cash balances due to their credit standing in the aftermath of the legislative**  
111 **crisis involving the 2007 retail electric rate changes."<sup>18</sup> Do you agree?**

112 A. No. Each of the Ameren utilities held substantial cash balances prior to March  
113 2007,<sup>19</sup> which is when their issuer credit ratings were downgraded to below  
114 investment grade due to the Illinois Senate approving rate freeze legislation for  
115 the Ameren utilities.<sup>20</sup> On March 31, 2007, CILCO's cash balance equaled  
116 \$200,000, and CIPS' cash balance equaled \$47 million. In comparison, during

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<sup>15</sup> Company responses to ICC Staff data requests RP 1.08a and RP 11.04; the Ameren utilities' Confidential Money Pool Reports, provided pursuant to 83 Ill. Adm. Code 340.60.

<sup>16</sup> Company responses to ICC Staff data requests RP 8.02 and RP 11.04; the Ameren utilities' Confidential Money Pool Reports, provided pursuant to 83 Ill. Adm. Code 340.60.

<sup>17</sup> Company responses to ICC Staff data requests RP 1.08a and RP 11.04; the Ameren utilities' Confidential Money Pool Reports, provided pursuant to 83 Ill. Adm. Code 340.60.

<sup>18</sup> Ameren Ex. 23.0, p. 4.

<sup>19</sup> Company response to ICC Staff data request RP 8.02.

<sup>20</sup> On March 12, 2007, Moody's Investors Service downgraded the Ameren utilities' issuer ratings to Ba1; CIPS's and IP's senior secured ratings to Baa3; and CILCO's senior secured rating to Baa2. On April 23, 2007, Standard & Poor's downgraded the Ameren utilities' issuer ratings to BB and senior secured ratings to BBB-.

117 2006, CILCO held cash balances as high as \$22 million and CIPS' held cash  
118 balances as high as \$63 million.<sup>21</sup>

119 **Q. Mr. O'Bryan alleges that cash must be netted out of short-term debt**  
120 **balances because “[n]o utility would do what Staff is assuming. The utility**  
121 **would take the cash and pay down the short-term debt if they could”.<sup>22</sup> Is**  
122 **this statement accurate?**

123 A. No. The Ameren utilities' own actions demonstrate that Mr. O'Bryan's allegation  
124 is false. Foremost, the utilities maintain cash balances even when they have  
125 outstanding short-term debt balances. On December 31, 2007, CILCO's short-  
126 term debt balance equaled \$115 million and its cash balance equaled \$6 million;  
127 CIPS' short-term debt balance equaled \$125 million and its cash balance  
128 equaled \$26 million; and IP's short-term debt balance equaled \$175 million and  
129 its cash balance equaled \$6 million.<sup>23</sup> Moreover, two of the utilities paid common  
130 stock dividends to Ameren Corporation rather than paying down short-term debt  
131 during 2007. Specifically, CIPS and IP paid Ameren Corporation common  
132 dividends totaling \$40 million and \$61 million, respectively.<sup>24</sup> Further, the utilities  
133 have borrowed from the credit facility to loan moneys to each other, moneys that

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<sup>21</sup> Those cash balances do not include loans to utility affiliates through the money pool. Company responses to ICC Staff data requests RP 8.02 and 11.04; the Ameren utilities' Confidential Money Pool Reports, provided pursuant to 83 Ill. Adm. Code 340.60.

<sup>22</sup> Ameren Ex. 23.0, p. 6.

<sup>23</sup> Ameren Corporation December 31, 2007 Form 10-K, pp. 86, 102 and 120.

<sup>24</sup> Companies' responses to ICC Staff data requests RP 4.13 and RP 4.15, respectively.

134 I have already removed from their short-term debt balances. That is, contrary to  
135 Mr. O'Bryan's allegation, the Ameren utilities have used cash for purposes other  
136 than paying down short-term debt during the short-term debt measurement  
137 period.

138 **Q. Please respond to Mr. O'Bryan's argument that failure to net cash against**  
139 **short-term debt implies that cash should be part of rate base.<sup>25</sup>**

140 A. Mr. O'Bryan is wrong. Cash does not need to be included in rate base because  
141 temporary cash investments already earn a return commensurate with their risk.

142 **Q. Are there any other problems with Mr. O'Bryan's proposal to net cash out**  
143 **of the Ameren utilities' short-term debt balances?**

144 A. Yes. Mr. O'Bryan's adjustment includes the Ameren utilities' contributions to the  
145 money pool that are used to make loans to affiliates.<sup>26</sup> As explained in my direct  
146 testimony, my short-term debt calculation removes those money pool  
147 contributions from each of the Ameren utilities' short-term debt balances. That is,  
148 I have already removed from the Ameren utilities' capital structure any short-term  
149 debt borrowings that are not financing the lender's utility operations.

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<sup>25</sup> Ameren Ex. 23.0, p. 4.

<sup>26</sup> Company responses to ICC Staff data requests RP 8.02 and 11.04; Schedule D-2 work paper, provided in the Companies' Part 285 filings on November 2, 2007.

150 **CENTRAL ILLINOIS PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY'S BALANCE AND EMBEDDED**  
151 **COST OF LONG-TERM DEBT**

152 **Q. Please summarize Mr. O'Bryan's testimony regarding CIPS' cost of long-**  
153 **term debt.**

154 A. Mr. O'Bryan opposes my adjustment to remove from CIPS' embedded cost of  
155 long-term debt the incremental cost due to refinancing a 4.7% intercompany note  
156 with 6.7% senior secured notes. He argues the refinancing benefited CIPS by  
157 extending the maturity from 2010 to 2036 and eliminating the obligation to fund  
158 \$6 million annual amortization payments. He argues it is erroneous to assume  
159 that if CIPS had a similar transaction with an unaffiliated counterparty (rather  
160 than Union Electric Co., or "UE") CIPS would require compensation to  
161 repurchase debt bearing a below-market interest rate.<sup>27</sup>

162 **Q. Please respond to Mr. O'Bryan's allegation that your argument that CIPS**  
163 **should have received a discount on the repurchase price of the promissory**  
164 **note due to rising interest rates is erroneous.**<sup>28</sup>

165 A. Mr. O'Bryan argues:

166 I am not aware of any financial instrument in either the capital or  
167 credit markets which can be redeemed prior to final maturity at a

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<sup>27</sup> Ameren Ex. 23.0, pp. 8-9.

<sup>28</sup> Ameren Ex. 23.0, pp. 8-9.

168 discount. Make whole provisions for early redemptions always  
169 have a floor price no less than principal amount. Ms. Phipps is  
170 expecting the original intercompany note to have terms which do  
171 not exist anywhere in the financial markets and which never could  
172 have been made available to AmerenCIPS...<sup>29</sup>

173 Mr. O'Bryan's argument is wrong on two levels. First, it misses the point. An  
174 inverse relationship exists between interest rates and bond prices such that as  
175 interest rates rise, bond prices fall. Thus, the value of a loan to the investor (*i.e.*,  
176 lender) falls below face value whenever interest rates rise on loans with similar  
177 terms and risks. As such, in an arms length transaction, a borrower would not  
178 have to pay full principal amount to prepay a loan carrying a below market  
179 interest rate unless the original loan agreement required the borrower to do so.

180 Second, "make whole" provisions are designed to protect lenders' gains in  
181 market value in the event the borrower wants to refinance its debt should interest  
182 rates fall.<sup>30</sup> That is, "make whole" provisions require borrowers who want to  
183 refinance debt that bears above-market interest rates to pay in *excess of* the  
184 principal amount. Undoubtedly, lenders would negotiate a similar provision to  
185 protect their losses in market value whenever interest rates rise if they thought  
186 such a provision desirable. Of course, why an investor would want to protect a

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<sup>29</sup> Ameren Ex. 23.0, p. 9.

<sup>30</sup> Since a gain on a bond is the excess of its market value over principal amount outstanding, to protect that gain, the redemption price on the indebtedness must be no less than face value of the principal amount outstanding.

187 loss is difficult to conceive.<sup>31</sup> Therefore, it is not surprising that Mr. O'Bryan is  
188 unaware of any financial instrument that would require a borrower to pay market  
189 value for debt it desires to redeem when interest rates fall.

190 Further, if an investor desired to receive at least the principal amount outstanding  
191 in the event that interest rates rose, it would have to offer the borrower a lower  
192 interest rate. Such a provision was not included in the intercompany note; thus, it  
193 follows that UE's principal amount was not protected from such a loss and should  
194 not have been granted it after-the-fact.

195 Mr. O'Bryan's allegation of CIPS' inability to pay less than principal amount for  
196 below market rate debt is inconsistent with IP's experience. During January  
197 2000, IP redeemed \$32 million of its 7.50% First Mortgage Bonds maturing in  
198 2025. By January 2000, long-term Baa-rated utility bond yields had risen to  
199 8.40%.<sup>32</sup> As shown on IP's long-term debt schedule, the Company realized a  
200 gain on that redemption due to higher long-term interest rates on the redemption  
201 date vis-à-vis the prevailing interest rate on the issuance date.<sup>33</sup>

202 **Q. Based on Mr. O'Bryan's Rebuttal Testimony (Ameren Ex. 23.0), have you**  
203 **revised long-term debt schedule for CIPS?**

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<sup>31</sup> Protecting (*i.e.*, locking in) a loss should not be confused with protecting (or insulating) an investor *from* a loss. Investors seeking the latter type of protection can invest in shorter-term or adjustable rate debt further protecting any position.

<sup>32</sup> *Mergent Bond Record Monthly Update*, June 2004 Vol. 71, No. 6, p. 15.

<sup>33</sup> ICC Staff Ex. 4.0, Sch. 4.03 IP.

204 A. No. My recommended cost of long-term debt for CIPS is presented on ICC Staff  
205 Ex. 4.0, Sch. 4.03 CIPS.

206 **ILLINOIS POWER COMPANY’S EMBEDDED COST OF TRANSITIONAL FUNDING**  
207 **TRUST NOTES (“TFTN”)**

208 **Q. Did you make any adjustments to your calculation of the embedded cost of**  
209 **TFTNs for IP based on Mr. O’Bryan’s Rebuttal Testimony?**

210 A. No. As of December 31, 2006, IP’s balance of TFTNs equals \$171,533,494; the  
211 embedded cost of its TFTNs equals 4.92%.<sup>34</sup>

212 **Q. Mr. O’Bryan argues that your calculation of the embedded cost of TFTNs,**  
213 **which annualizes the monthly discount rate used in the internal rate of**  
214 **return (“IRR”) calculation rather than compounding it, understates the true**  
215 **cost to the Company because AmerenIP remits funds to the TFTN trustee**  
216 **on a daily basis. Is Mr. O’Bryan correct?**

217 A. No. Using monthly compounding in the IRR calculation, as Mr. O’Bryan does,  
218 overstates the embedded cost of TFTNs and should be rejected.<sup>35</sup> The payment  
219 timing difference of TFTNs vis-à-vis a traditional fixed income security is more  
220 properly accounted for using a working capital adjustment than a cost of capital

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<sup>34</sup> ICC Staff Ex. 4.0, Sch. 4.05 IP.

<sup>35</sup> ICC Staff Ex. 4.0, lines 461-477.

221 adjustment. Working capital for IP, as proposed by Staff witness Kahle (ICC  
222 Staff Ex. 15.0), includes this adjustment to reflect the timing difference between  
223 IP's TFTNs and its other long-term indebtedness.

224 Towards that end, in IP's prior electric delivery service rate case (Docket Nos.  
225 06-0070/0071/0072 Cons.), Staff's proposed working capital allowance included  
226 a 91.5-day lead for conventional debt and a 2-day lead for TFTNs.<sup>36</sup> The  
227 Commission accepted this adjustment, and stated the following in its Order:

228 The Commission has reviewed the record on this issue and  
229 concludes that Staff's method for calculating the embedded cost of  
230 TFTNs is correct. The cost of long-term debt, including TFTNs, is  
231 known with relative certainty and should be calculated on an annual  
232 basis. Multiplying the stated monthly rate by 12 produces an  
233 annualized embedded cost that is consistent with the entire test  
234 year revenue requirement calculation. Additionally, Ameren's  
235 concern about the economic impact of frequent remittance by IP to  
236 the trustee is recognized in the CWC allowance adopted in this  
237 order. The Commission finds that Staff's method for calculating the  
238 interest rate for IP's TFTNs when combined with the appropriate  
239 CWC calculation properly reflects IP's cost of providing service.<sup>37</sup>

240 Thus, Mr. O'Bryan's claim that the TFTN IRR calculation requires monthly  
241 compounding to adjust for IP's relatively frequent remittance of TFTN  
242 funds to the Trust is incorrect and should be rejected in the instant case as  
243 it was in IP's 2006 electric delivery services rate case.

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<sup>36</sup> Staff Initial Brief, Docket Nos. 06-0070/0071/0072 Cons. (3/23/07), pp. 88-89, and App A, Sch. 9 (IPC).

<sup>37</sup> Order, Docket Nos. 06-0070/0071/0072 Cons. (11/21/06), p. 111, and Appendix C, pp. 6 and 9.

244 **Q. Please explain why Mr. O’Bryan’s statement that 2006 cash flows “must be**  
245 **included in the IRR analysis, as they make up the test year cost**  
246 **calculations” is incorrect.**<sup>38</sup>

247 A. Mr. O’Bryan objects to my IRR analysis, which begins on the capital structure  
248 measurement date, or December 31, 2006. Specifically, he argues:

249 Unlike the balance of TFTNs, which is a capital structure  
250 component and must be measured as of the end of the test  
251 year, the IRR calculates the true cost of the TFTNs and must  
252 incorporate the full test year cash flows.<sup>39</sup>

253 Calculating the embedded cost of the TFTNs using data from January 1, 2006,  
254 through December 31, 2008 (*i.e.*, the TFTN maturity date) overstates the cost of  
255 debt due to the twelve months of additional cash flows (*i.e.*, the present value of  
256 the TFTN collection amounts during 2006). Using my IRR analysis, and  
257 changing only the measurement period to include one additional year of cash  
258 flows, increases the TFTN IRR by approximately one percentage point (1.0%).<sup>40</sup>

259 Just as the embedded cost of long-term debt is calculated using unamortized  
260 balances of debt premiums, discounts and expenses as of the capital structure  
261 measurement date, it is appropriate to calculate the TFTN cost as of the capital

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<sup>38</sup> Ameren Ex. 23.0, p. 10.

<sup>39</sup> Ameren Ex. 23.0, p. 10.

<sup>40</sup> This changes the result of the IRR analysis to 5.43% (vs. 4.50%), which equals a 5.86% embedded cost for IP’s TFTNs (vs. 4.92%). This change alone increases the cost of capital for IP’s gas and electric operations to 8.78% and 8.75%, respectively (vs. 8.70% and 8.68% as provided in ICC Staff Ex. 4.0, Sch. 4.01 IP).

262 structure measurement date. Furthermore, Mr. O'Bryan's assertion that the 2006  
263 cash flows must be included in the TFTN IRR analysis because those cash flows  
264 "make up the test year cost calculations" is incorrect. If Mr. O'Bryan's argument  
265 had merit, and it does not, then the cost of long-term debt should also be  
266 measured from the beginning of the test year. After all, long-term debt interest  
267 expense is part of the Companies' test-year cash working capital requirement.  
268 As I explained previously, pursuant to 83 Illinois Administrative Code 285.115,  
269 the measurement date for long-term capital structure components may differ from  
270 the test year. Importantly, calculating the IRR for the TFTNs from the beginning  
271 of the test year (January 1, 2006) results in a mismatch between the starting  
272 TFTN balance for the IRR calculation (\$259,200,000) and the balance of TFTNs  
273 as of the December 31, 2006 measurement date for the long-term components of  
274 the capital structure (\$172,800,000). Mr. O'Bryan chose the higher January 1,  
275 2006 IRR rather than the lower December 31, 2006 IRR and combined it with the  
276 lower December 31, 2006 balance of TFTNs rather than the higher January 1,  
277 2006 balance of TFTNs.

278 Finally, Mr. O'Bryan's IRR calculation violates the present value principle on  
279 which it rests: an asset equals the cumulative value of its future discounted cash  
280 flows.<sup>41</sup> Rather than restrict his analysis to future cash flows (as of the TFTN

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<sup>41</sup> "Future cash flow" refers to those cash flows that occur subsequent to the measurement date of the outstanding obligation (*i.e.*, December 31, 2006).

281 balance measurement date), Mr. O’Bryan included cash flows from the twelve  
282 months that precede that measurement date.

283 **Q. Please explain why it is necessary to add \$100,000 to the “Net Proceeds**  
284 **Used to Retire Principal” in the TFTN IRR analysis.**

285 A. Mr. O’Bryan’s rebuttal testimony states:

286 ...Ms. Phipps adjusted the amount of “Net Proceeds Used to Retire  
287 Principal” to reflect a \$100,000 subtraction to the capital  
288 subaccount, stating that I incorrectly did not include this in my  
289 calculations. Conversely, I did include this subtraction in the last  
290 line of the “Collection Amount” column in my IRR spreadsheet.  
291 Therefore, this amount is embedded in my IRR calculation.<sup>42</sup>

292 Subtracting \$100,000 from the “Collection Amount” is correct;<sup>43</sup> in fact, my IRR  
293 analysis also includes a \$100,000 reduction in the “Collection Amount”. Mr.  
294 O’Bryan misses the point of my adjustment, which is necessary because Mr.  
295 O’Bryan performed only half of the required adjustment. That is, in addition to  
296 subtracting \$100,000 from the Collection Amount in his IRR analysis, Mr.  
297 O’Bryan also should have added \$100,000 to the amount of Net Proceeds Used  
298 to Retire Principal.

299 Although Mr. O’Bryan correctly modeled that \$4,220,000 from the capital  
300 subaccount (along with \$4,320,000 from the overcollateralization subaccount) will

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<sup>42</sup> Ameren Ex. 23.0, p. 10.

<sup>43</sup> “Collection Amount” refers to the expected revenues reserved for repaying principal and interest on IP’s TFTNs.

301 be returned to IP in December 2008, he incorrectly modeled that \$4,320,000 of  
302 the TFTN proceeds were deposited in the capital subaccount in December 1998.  
303 Pursuant to the terms of the *\$864,000,000 Illinois Power Special Purpose Trust*  
304 *Transitional Funding Trust Notes, Series 1998-1, Prospectus Supplement (“TFTN*  
305 *Prospectus”)*, the TFTN Trust will retain proceeds in amount at least equal to  
306 \$4,220,000, not \$4,320,000, as Mr. O’Bryan modeled, which will be held in the  
307 Capital Subaccount.<sup>44</sup> In other words, Mr. O’Bryan’s approach understates the  
308 net proceeds from the TFTN issuance available to IP by \$100,000. As such, to  
309 avoid overstating the embedded cost of the TFTNs, the IRR analysis must also  
310 subtract \$4,220,000 from the amount of “Net Proceeds Used to Retire Principal”  
311 rather than \$4,320,000 because the former is the amount deposited into the  
312 Capital Subaccount. Thus, my adjustment to include an additional \$100,000 in  
313 the amount of proceeds for retiring TFTN principal more accurately estimates the  
314 TFTN cost because it reflects the full amount of cash flows available to retire the  
315 TFTNs upon maturity. Failing to make that adjustment, would result in an  
316 artificially low amount of cash available to retire the TFTNs, thereby inflating the  
317 results of the TFTN IRR analysis.

318 **ILLINOIS POWER COMPANY’S POLLUTION CONTROL BONDS**

319 **Q. What is your estimate of the balance and embedded cost of long-term debt**  
320 **for IP?**

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<sup>44</sup> *\$864,000,000 Illinois Power Special Purpose Trust Transitional Funding Trust Notes, Series 1998-1, Prospectus Supplement*, pp. S-17, S-18, 103 and 104.

321 A. As Schedule 4.03 IP shows, as of December 31, 2006, IP's balance of long-term  
322 debt equals \$709,096,036; the embedded cost of long-term debt equals 7.34%.

323 **Q. Please describe Mr. O'Bryan's update to IP's long-term debt schedule**  
324 **(Ameren Ex. 23.5) and its effect on IP's embedded cost of long-term debt.**

325 A. Mr. O'Bryan updated IP's long-term debt schedule to reflect the April 2008  
326 refinancing of IP's auction rate Pollution Control Bonds ("PCBs") by including (1)  
327 \$337 million of 6.25% Senior Secured Notes; and (2) unamortized losses and  
328 annual amortization expense for the PCBs. This update effectively increases the  
329 embedded cost of the PCB-related indebtedness by approximately 2 percentage  
330 points (to 6.5% from 4.6%) and increases the embedded cost of debt for IP to  
331 7.98% from 7.14%.<sup>45</sup>

332 **Q. Please describe why Mr. O'Bryan's updated long-term debt schedule for IP**  
333 **is problematic.**

334 A. Foremost, Mr. O'Bryan's long-term debt schedule for IP mismatches  
335 measurement periods by reflecting March 31, 2008 balances of unamortized loss  
336 for the reacquired PCBs only, which is fifteen months beyond the December 31,  
337 2006 balances for every other long-term debt issue.

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<sup>45</sup> Per AmerenIP Ex. 8.2, the embedded cost of the PCBs equals 4.63% (i.e. \$15,346,155 of annual interest expense (including amortization of debt expense), divided by \$331,429,020 carrying value). Per Ameren Ex. 23.5, the embedded cost of the Senior Secured Notes, including the loss on reacquiring the PCBs, equals 6.47% (i.e. \$21,146,535 annual interest expense (including amortization of debt discount and expense and losses on reacquired debt), divided by \$326,915,905 carrying value).

338 Not only does Mr. O'Bryan selectively update his long-term debt schedule for the  
339 new indebtedness, but his sole update to IP's long-term debt schedule increases  
340 IP's cost of capital while ignoring updates to costs and balances of the other  
341 capital structure components. Some of the changes to IP's embedded cost of  
342 long-term debt that have occurred since December 31, 2006, but which Mr.  
343 O'Bryan notably excluded from his selective update, include IP's November 2007  
344 \$250 million long-term debt issuance;<sup>46</sup> the March 31, 2008 TFTN balance and  
345 reduction of its embedded cost rate; and the approximately \$8.6 million reduction  
346 in unamortized debt discount, premium and expense on long-term debt  
347 outstanding from December 31, 2006 to March 31, 2008. Furthermore, IP's  
348 March 31, 2008 common equity balance is \$52 million lower than its December  
349 31, 2006 balance;<sup>47</sup> and Staff's cost of common equity for the Ameren utilities'  
350 electric delivery services operations as measured in April 2008 is lower than  
351 Staff's original recommendation (measured in February 2008) whereas Staff's  
352 cost of common equity for the Ameren utilities' gas delivery services as  
353 measured in April 2008 is one basis point higher than Staff's original  
354 recommendation (measured in February 2008). Clearly, the Company's  
355 selective update to IP's long-term debt schedule provides neither an accurate nor  
356 complete view of IP's cost of capital on either December 31, 2006, or during April  
357 2008.

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<sup>46</sup> Ameren Corporation December 31, 2007 Form 10-K, p. 129.

<sup>47</sup> Ameren Corporation December 31, 2006 Form 10-K, p. 105; Ameren Corporation March 31, 2008 Form 10-Q, p. 28.

358 Furthermore, during April 2008, CILCO and CIPS redeemed \$19 million and \$35  
359 million of Series 2004 auction rate PCBs. Unlike IP, CILCO and CIPS have not  
360 issued senior secured notes to replace the auction-rate bonds.<sup>48</sup> Notably, the  
361 Ameren utilities did not update either CILCO's or CIPS' capital structures to  
362 reflect the incremental increase in short-term debt when those utilities redeemed  
363 their auction rate PCBs. Thus, Mr. O'Bryan's proposed update to IP's cost of  
364 long-term debt should be rejected.

365 **Q. What is your recommendation if the Commission decides that IP's cost of**  
366 **capital needs to be updated because IP has refinanced its auction rate**  
367 **PCBs?**

368 A. Although I recommend against allowing selective updates to the Ameren utilities'  
369 cost of capital for the reasons described previously, should the Commission  
370 determine it would be appropriate to update IP's cost of capital to reflect the  
371 6.25% interest rate senior secured notes IP issued to redeem its auction rate  
372 PCBs, I recommend the Commission limit any updates to the costs of variable  
373 rate debt issues (short and long-term) and the cost of common equity, leaving the  
374 capital structure balances unchanged. Further, since CILCO and CIPS also  
375 refinanced PCBs during April 2008, their variable rate debt and common equity  
376 cost should be updated as well.

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<sup>48</sup> Ameren Corporation March 31, 2008 Form 10-Q, p. 38.

377 **Q. What are the updated costs of short-term debt, variable rate long-term debt,**  
378 **and common equity?**

379 A. The updated cost of short-term debt for CILCO, CIPS and IP are 3.95%, 3.92%  
380 and 3.74%, respectively. I calculated those costs beginning with the 2.80% one-  
381 month LIBOR rate on April 30, 2008.<sup>49</sup> For each utility, I added to LIBOR (1) the  
382 applicable Eurodollar margin; (2) a dollar-weighted usage fee; and (3) the  
383 applicable facility fee, using the same methodology and weighting factors  
384 described in my Direct Testimony, which Mr. O'Bryan did not oppose.<sup>50</sup> For IP  
385 only, the cost of short-term debt also includes a weighted money pool rate.<sup>51</sup>

386 The updated cost of long-term debt for CILCO, CIPS and IP are 6.63%, 6.24%  
387 and 7.94%, respectively. For CILCO and CIPS, I updated the interest rate for  
388 auction rate PCBs to equal their respective updated short-term debt cost. For IP,  
389 I updated the interest rate for auction rate PCBs to 6.25%, which is the interest  
390 rate for the Senior Secured Notes that IP issued in April 2008 to replace auction  
391 rate PCBs.

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<sup>49</sup> *The Wall Street Journal*, "Markets Data Center," April 30, 2008 ([www.wsj.com](http://www.wsj.com)).

<sup>50</sup> ICC Staff Ex. 4.0, pp. 9-13, 17-18, 20-21, 24-25; Ameren Ex. 23.0, p. 3.

<sup>51</sup> On April 30, 2008, IP's dollar-weighted bank loan rate equaled 4.09%. For IP only, the internal money pool rate equaled the AA Non-Financial commercial paper rate on April 30, 2008, or 2.07%; the external money pool rate equaled the average of CILCO's and CIPS' updated cost of short-term bank loans, or 3.94%. I used the following dollar weighted proportions for internal money pool loans, external money pool loans and bank loans, respectively: 16.8%; 5.3% and 77.9%. See ICC Staff Ex. 4.0, lines 409-431.

392 As of April 30, 2008, Staff witness Freetly's cost of equity recommendation for  
393 the Ameren utilities' gas operations equals 10.73% and the cost of equity for the  
394 Ameren utilities' electric operations equals 10.32%.

395 **Q. Why do you advise against updating the balances of the capital structure**  
396 **components?**

397 A. I advise against updating the balances of the capital structure components  
398 because the short-term debt balances beyond March 31, 2008 are not  
399 available.<sup>52</sup> Consequently, average short-term debt balances centered in time at  
400 April 30, 2008 (i.e., October 31, 2007 to October 31, 2008) cannot be calculated.

401 **Q. What would the costs of capital be for the Companies if their costs of**  
402 **short-term debt, variable rate long-term debt and common equity were**  
403 **updated to April 30, 2008?**

404 A. Should the Commission determine it is necessary to update the Ameren utilities'  
405 cost of capital estimates due to recent financing activity in connection with  
406 redeeming and refinancing auction rate PCBs, then the cost of capital for  
407 CILCO's, CIPS' and IP's gas delivery services operations would be 7.94%,  
408 8.14%, and 8.90%, respectively. Those cost of capital recommendations reflect  
409 Staff witness Freetly's updated 10.73% cost of equity estimate for the utilities'  
410 gas delivery services operations.

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<sup>52</sup> Further, total CWIP, CWIP accruing AFUDC, and utility loans and borrowings from the money pool are needed to calculate net balances of short-term debt.

411 The cost of capital for CILCO's, CIPS' and IP's electric delivery services  
412 operations would be 7.75%, 7.94%, and 8.69%, respectively. Those cost of  
413 capital recommendations reflect Staff witness Freetly's updated 10.32% cost of  
414 equity estimate for the utilities' electric gas delivery services

415 **Q. Has the Commission rejected selective updates to cost of capital**  
416 **components previously?**

417 A. Yes. In the Ameren utilities' 2006 electric delivery services rate case, the  
418 Commission noted the risks inherent in selective updates to capital structure  
419 components, rejected the Ameren utilities' proposed selective updates to interest  
420 rates and endorsed measuring all the costs of capital at or over the same period.  
421 Specifically, the Commission's Order states:

422 ...the Commission favors measuring all of the costs of capital at or  
423 over the same period. Such an approach contributes to a test year  
424 revenue requirement that matches the cost of providing services  
425 and, in the Commission's view is fair to both consumers and the  
426 utility investors. The Commission becomes wary when a party  
427 proposes updates to certain components of the cost of capital  
428 without providing updates to all components. Allowing selective  
429 updates could serve to encourage utilities to only provide updates if  
430 the cost of components increased. Absent sufficient justification,  
431 this would be unfair to ratepayers...

432 Ameren proposed to revise its variable rate and short-term interest  
433 rates... Ameren did not provide any updates for other components  
434 of its cost of capital. The Commission finds this to be problematic.  
435 First, the Commission favors a consistent period for measuring  
436 costs of capital... Second, Ameren only provided updates for one  
437 component of its cost of capital and only did so because the cost  
438 increased. Allowing Ameren to include its selective update here  
439 would be unfair to ratepayers. Finally, Ameren provided these

440 updates during the responsive phase of the proceeding, giving  
441 other parties little time to evaluate the proposal...<sup>53</sup>

442 **RATE OF RETURN ON RATE BASE**

443 **Q. What is the rate of return on rate base you recommend for CILCO?**

444 A. I continue to recommend a 7.95% rate of return on rate base for CILCO's gas  
445 delivery services. I recommend a 7.93% rate of return on rate base for CILCO's  
446 electric delivery services, as shown on Schedule 16.01. My recommendations  
447 incorporate the rates of return on common equity Ms. Freetly recommends for  
448 CILCO's gas and electric delivery services. Those rates of return do not  
449 incorporate the April 2008 updates to the costs of variable rate debt and common  
450 equity I described previously.

451 **Q. What is the rate of return on rate base you recommend for CIPS?**

452 A. I continue to recommend an 8.15% rate of return on rate base for CIPS' gas  
453 delivery services and an 8.13% rate of return on rate base for CIPS' electric  
454 delivery services. My recommendations incorporate Ms. Freetly's rates of return  
455 on common equity recommendation for CIPS' gas and electric delivery services.  
456 Those rates of return do not incorporate the April 2008 updates to the costs of  
457 variable rate debt and common equity I described previously.

458 **Q. What is the rate of return on rate base you recommend for IP?**

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<sup>53</sup> Order, Docket Nos. 06-0070/0071/0072 Cons. (11/21/06), pp. 109-110.

459 A. I continue to recommend an 8.70% rate of return on rate base for IP's gas  
460 delivery services and an 8.68% rate of return on rate base for IP's electric  
461 delivery services. My recommendations incorporate Ms. Freetly's rate of return  
462 on common equity recommendation for IP's gas and electric delivery services.  
463 Those rates of return do not incorporate the April 2008 updates to the costs of  
464 variable rate debt and common equity I described previously.

465 **Q. Does this question conclude your prepared rebuttal testimony?**

466 A. Yes, it does.

**CENTRAL ILLINOIS LIGHT COMPANY**

**JUNE 30, 2007 COST OF CAPITAL SUMMARY**

**STAFF PROPOSAL FOR CILCO ELECTRIC**

Capital Component	Balance	Percent of Total Capitalization	Cost	Weighted Cost
Short-Term Debt	\$82,500,351	17.29%	4.04%	0.70%
Long-Term Debt	141,064,706	29.54%	6.65%	1.96%
Preferred Stock	36,450,058	7.63%	5.34%	0.41%
Common Equity	217,459,214	45.54%	10.68%	4.86%
Total	\$477,474,329	100.00%		<b>7.93%</b>