STATE OF ILLINOIS
ILLINOIS COMMERCE COMMISSION

ILLINOIS COMMERCE COMMISSION	:	
On Its Own Motion	:	
	:	
Investigation of Rider CPP of Commonwealth Edison	:	
Company, and Rider MV of Central Illinois Light	:	No. 06-0800
Company d/b/a AmerenCILCO, of Central Illinois	:	
Public Service Company d/b/a AmerenCIPS, and of	:	
Illinois Power Company d/b/a AmerenIP, pursuant to	:	
Commission Orders regarding the Illinois Auction	:	

REPLY BRIEF OF THE ILLINOIS INDUSTRIAL ENERGY CONSUMERS

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REPLY BRIEF OF THE ILLINOIS INDUSTRIAL ENERGY CONSUMERS

There is consensus on the vast majority of issues of concern to the Illinois Industrial Energy Consumers ("IIEC") in this proceeding. The Illinois Commerce Commission Staff ("Staff"), Illinois Power Company d/b/a AmerenIP, Central Illinois Public Service Company, d/b/a AmerenCIPS and Central Illinois Light Company d/b/a AmerenCILCO (collectively "Ameren"), Commonwealth Edison Company ("ComEd"), and IIEC are in substantial agreement on the following issues:

1. continued use of alternative procurement methods for the hourly price product in lieu of further hourly auctions;
2. shortening the primary enrollment period/enrollment window for large customers;
3. creating an option for customers to select a seven-day enrollment window in lieu of a longer enrollment window; and
4. segmentation of customers on the basis of the enrollment window selected and offering each customer segment a distinct fixed price auction product, based on their selection, reflecting the differentiated risks of that segment.

The Staff, Ameren and IIEC are also in apparent agreement that:

1. Ameren's 400 kW to 1 MW customers should not be combined with its larger customers for auction purposes;
2. Ameren's pre-qualification procedure should be retained and modified to require that customers certify that they are "eligible" to take the fixed price product; and

3. Ameren's tariffs should be modified to change its current "opt-out" policy for large customers taking Ameren fixed price supply to an "opt-in" policy.

The Alternative Retail Electric Suppliers ("ARES") in this case, namely the Coalition of Energy Suppliers ("CES") and the Retail Energy Supply Association ("RESA"), oppose any shortening of the enrollment window and the creation of an option for large customers to select an enrollment window shorter than the primary enrollment window. That position is contrary to the recommendations of IIEC and all other parties addressing the issue in this proceeding.

Finally, while the Commission has been updated on the steps taken to implement a common deliverability test for MISO and PJM, IIEC noted an apparent misunderstanding of the nature of the relief that ComEd should pursue through PJM. The Commission should clarify its common deliverability test directive to ComEd.

At this point in the proceeding, IIEC will discuss only briefly the points of agreement among Staff, ComEd, Ameren and IIEC. It will reply in more detail to certain arguments made and positions taken by the ARES with regard to the enrollment window. And, it will briefly discuss its concerns about ComEd's efforts to have a common deliverability test implemented by PJM and MISO.

II.

UNCONTESTED ISSUES

A. Use of Auction

1. Continued Use of the Alternative Procurement Methods for the Hourly Price Section

The Staff proposes in its Initial Brief that the Illinois Commerce Commission ("Commission") end Ameren's and ComEd's use of the Illinois Auction as the mechanism for procuring electric power and energy to serve their hourly priced retail customers. (Staff Br. at 5). Staff recommends that the Commission order Ameren and ComEd to modify their respective tariffs to exclude the hourly price section from the Illinois Auction, until otherwise ordered by the Commission. Staff recommends that instead Ameren and ComEd "continue to use their best efforts to prudently acquire the resources needed to provide hourly price services without the Illinois Auction. . . ." (Staff Br. at 5). Ameren supports the Staff's recommendation that Ameren secure its BGS-LRTP product outside the auction until such time as alternatives can be fully explored. (Ameren Br. at 13). ComEd requests it be allowed to continue to procure supply for its hourly priced retail load from PJM, rather than in the auction. (ComEd Br. at 3).

IIEC does not object to the approach ComEd was using to acquire products needed to provide hourly service outside the context of the auction. (IIEC Br. at 6). Further, IIEC announced that its concerns about the approach that Ameren was using have been resolved by the Commission's approval of Ameren's tariff filings in Dockets 07-0204, 07-0205, and 07-0206. (*Id)*.[1] Therefore, IIEC has no objection to the adoption of the Staff recommendation set out above.

2. Changes to Hourly Price Product for the Ameren Utilities

In its Initial Brief, Staff describes three changes that Ameren proposed to improve the hourly price segment of the Illinois Auction. (Staff Br at 5-6). However, both Staff and Ameren agree that those three changes to the Hourly Auction would not fully satisfy the Commission's concerns about that auction segment. Ameren acknowledges that the proposed changes are unlikely to increase the level of interest in the Hourly Auction to levels adequate to address the Commission's concerns about the Hourly Auction. (Ameren Br. at 12-13). Staff further asserts that if the Commission allows ComEd and Ameren to continue to use their best efforts to prudently acquire resources needed for hourly services, without the Illinois Auction, the proposed changes would be moot. (Staff Br. at 6).

IIEC agrees with Staff that to the extent the Commission directs Ameren and ComEd to continue to purchase the resources necessary to provide hourly price service on a best efforts basis, the Ameren's Hourly Auction modifications would be moot. IIEC also agrees with Staff and Ameren that the proposed changes would not satisfy the Commission's concerns about the hourly auction. Since the parties addressing this issue agree that Ameren's proposed changes to the Hourly

[1] IIEC notes that Ameren has described in detail its approach to securing products and services needed to furnish the hourly priced product. (*See*, Ameren Br. at 9-12). IIEC assumes for the purpose of its position on this issue, this is the approach Ameren will use going forward, as part of its "best efforts" to acquire resources needed for hourly priced service.

Auction are not likely to address the Commission's concerns, even if implemented, and may be moot, those changes need not be adopted in this case.

III.

CONTESTED ISSUES

A. Use of Auction

2. Pre-commitment or A Shortened Enrollment Window For Larger Non-Residential Customers

a. Support for Shortened Enrollment Window

IIEC, Staff, ComEd and Ameren support shortening the enrollment window for larger non-residential customers. (IIEC Br. at 8-10; Staff Br. at 48; Ameren Br. at 43-51; ComEd Br. at 47). Specifically, Staff, Ameren, and ComEd originally proposed a twenty-day enrollment window for larger customers. (Staff Br. at 46; ComEd Br. at 47; Ameren Br. at 43; Nelson, Ameren Ex. 1.0 at 8:168-169). IIEC has stated it has no objection to the twenty-day enrollment window. (IIEC Br. at 4-8).

IIEC proposed, in addition, that large customers be given a choice of an even shorter enrollment window and their enrollment window selections be used to define separate auction products for them. (IIEC Br. at 12-14). Ameren and ComEd recommend modifications to the IIEC proposal. (Ameren Br. at 54-55; ComEd Br. at 55). In response to the IIEC recommendation, the utilities proposed that large customers be given the option of a seven-day enrollment window or a twenty-day enrollment window.

The Staff has recommended adoption of the IIEC recommendation, as modified by the utilities. (Staff Br. at 48).[2] IIEC has no objection to adoption of its proposal as modified.

b. Opposition to Shortened Enrollment Window

CES and RESA oppose a shortened enrollment window of any kind in this proceeding.

(i) Response to CES

CES asserts that (i) the record evidence does not support a reduction in the enrollment window; (ii) the shorter enrollment window cannot be implemented in a timely fashion, and (iii) the shorter enrollment window limits customer freedom. CES is incorrect on all counts.

(i) The record clearly supports a reduction in the enrollment window. The evidence shows that the auction prices for larger customers (CPP-A and BGS-LFP) were substantially higher than the auction prices for the small to medium customers (CPP-B and BGS-FP). (*See*, Auction Manager Ex. 1.2 at 2; Kennedy/Zuraski, Staff Ex. 1.0 at 11:223-224). The record also shows that these higher auction prices were not a function of any fundamental difference in the expected cost of power needed to supply large customers in comparison to the expected cost of power needed to supply small to medium customers. Rather, the differences in price reflected differences in the perceived risk of the load to be served. (Kennedy/Zuraski, Staff Ex. 1.0 at 11:228-235).

The record shows that larger customers are more prone to switch from utility service to third party supply. (*Id* at 11:237-239). The record also shows that retail suppliers must be prepared to serve the Illinois eligible load of the large non-residential customers, whether 100% or 1% of that

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[2] These proposals are discussed further in Section III.F.3 below.

load ultimately takes supply service from the utility. (*Id* at 11:240-242). Finally, the record shows that suppliers must hold their prices open over the entire period of the enrollment window. Suppliers winning tranches in the auction would anticipate losing load if market prices went down during the enrollment period and gaining load if market prices went up during the enrollment window. Staff believes that these considerations were reflected in the bid prices for large customer auction products. (Kennedy/Zuraski, Staff Ex. 1.0 at 12:245-250).

Ameren has presented evidence in support of a shortened enrollment window as well. Ameren's evidence confirms that suppliers in the auction face uncertain load obligations until the enrollment window closes. (Nelson, Ameren Ex. 1.0 at 3:59-67). That evidence also established that a shorter period between the end of the auction and the close of the enrollment window reduces the risk those suppliers face. The greater the risk faced by suppliers, the larger the premium included in the auction bid price. Therefore, Ameren recommended a shorter enrollment window to mitigate that risk, reduce the risk premium, and thus reduce the bid price for the auction product. (*Id*).

Ameren presented evidence that the load shape of the larger customer load (BG-LFP) was <u>better</u> than the load shape for medium and smaller customer load (BGS-FP), and that the supplier forward contracts (SFC) were the same for both all auction segments. Therefore, Ameren concluded, the primary reason for the significant difference in the auction prices for the larger customers and the small to medium customers was the load uncertainty associated with the large customer load, not cost of service differences. (*See*, Ameren Br at 43-44; Nelson, Ameren Ex. 1.0

at 4:79-83). Reducing this uncertainty by adopting a shorter enrollment window should lead to a reduction in the auction prices for larger customers.

ComEd too presented evidence in support of a shorter enrollment window. Specifically, in the direct testimony of Mr. McNeil, ComEd presented a quantative analysis of the effect of the enrollment period's length on auction prices. (McNeil, ComEd Ex. 1.0 at 15-23:326-442). This analysis demonstrated that shortening the enrollment window could reduce suppliers' bids for the large customer loads (CPP-A). Mr. McNeil's testimony also demonstrated that price volatility has a major impact on the risk assumed by suppliers, and that volatility is greater over longer periods of time. (ComEd Br. at 48). Shortening the enrollment window reduces the period of price volatility and the risk suppliers face. These reductions, in turn, lower the risk premiums built into bids and thus reduce bid prices.

Even CES witnesses Domagalski and Papadimitriu did not contend that the length of the enrollment window had no effect on the bids made by suppliers. (Tr. 722-724). In fact, they appear to agree that a reduction in the enrollment window can in theory reduce prices. (*See*, Tr. 728). They did not perform any analysis themselves to quantify the effect of shortened enrollment windows on auction prices. (Tr. 728). They presented only their interpretation of the Supplier Survey performed by the Auction Manager to support their contention that shorter enrollment windows would not affect supplier bids. (Domagalski and Papadimitriu CES Ex. 1.0 at 7:156-157). However, the Survey merely assessed the relative riskiness of the annual fixed priced product and the blended product offered to residential and small commercial customers -- not how a supplier perceives the risk of a particular product. (Tr. 722, 724). Thus, the Survey did not address or provide any insight on whether the length of the enrollment window affects the bid price for the annual fixed price product offered to larger customers.

The evidence of record shows that the length of the period of uncertainty faced by bidders does affect risk, and prices. CES' suggestion that it does not is simply incorrect. As a result, there is ample support in the record for the conclusion that shortening the enrollment window would have a favorable impact on the auction price of the fixed price product for large customers. Shorter enrollment windows have the potential to yield economically viable fixed price products for larger customers, unlike in the first auction.

(ii) Next, CES argues that the proposal to give customers an option to choose a twenty-day or a seven-day enrollment window cannot be implemented in a timely fashion. In support of this general proposition, CES identifies certain steps that customers must take in order to secure supply. These steps include gathering usage and billing information, internal review of service needs and options, investigation of available supply options, analysis of service alternatives, dissemination of request for proposals, analysis of proposals received, approval of proposals, and finalization and execution of contracts. (CES Br. at 11-12).

CES' argument ignores the fact that many of these steps can be accomplished before the auction is even conducted. The gathering and use of billing information, internal review of service needs and desired service options, investigation of the types of supply options available, dissemination of requests for RFPs, the compiling and analysis of responses to same, and even the conditional approval of corporate executives to proceed, need not await the auction. CES also lists a series of steps that must be taken to educate customers about the option of the twenty-day/seven-day enrollment window. (CES Br. at 18-19). However, CES conveniently ignores the fact that to the extent the Commission makes any changes to the auction process in this proceeding, an education process will have to be conducted with respect to those changes as well, not just changes to the enrollment window. Taken to its logical extreme, the CES position suggests that the Commission should make no changes to the auction process because of the potential for confusion from the customer education process. The enrollment window change is just one change of many that have been proposed and are likely to be adopted in this proceeding. All adopted changes will become the subject of utility education efforts. There is no basis for CES' suggestion that giving customers the choice of a seven-day or twenty-day enrollment period is the one change that will so overwhelm the utilities and customers that they will be incapable of properly implementing and exercising the option.

Further, Staff witness Dr. Kennedy testified that the seven-day/twenty-day proposal simply gives customers the option to choose a seven-day enrollment window and he did not believe it to be a "tough" choice for those customers to make. (Tr. 666). Nor did he believe that it would be a "significant" choice for them to make. (Tr. 666-667). Specifically, he testified:

> I think they should be in a position to decide whether they would rather have seven days or 20 days. And if they don't think they can do it in seven days, offering another choice doesn't limit the customers at all. (Tr. 667).

Staff witness Zuraski testified:

> . . . if there are customers that believe that the length of that enrollment period is significant to the determination of the auction prices for those products; . . . they may think that there is a lot to be gained by selecting the shorter enrollment period versus the longer enrollment period. (Tr. 668).

Staff witnesses confirmed on cross-examination that granting the customers such an option would be a workable proposition from the perspective of the Auction Manager. (Tr. 669). In response to questions from CES attorneys that suggested there was substantial complexity and difficulty in implementing the seven/twenty-day proposal, the Staff witnesses indicated they had hoped to hear -- and, in fact, had heard -- from the utilities, the Auction Manager, and customers on this issue. (Tr. 680-681). Those parties responsible for implementing the proposal, while acknowledging certain challenges, indicated in their testimony that the proposal can be implemented. (Auction Manager, Tr. 486-488; Ameren Tr. 342; ComEd Tr. 581-582). IIEC witness Stephens indicated that a window of as few as five business days was workable from the customer point of view. (Stephens, IIEC Ex. 1.0 at 9-10:193-201). The Staff witnesses believe that customers would not necessarily be confused by being given the option. (Tr. 683-684). Indeed, the Staff witnesses testified that they believe customers are better off being given the choice of enrollment windows, even if not all of them have time to do it. (Tr. 681).

Furthermore, CES ignores the fact that customers have already had substantial experience in acquiring power in the market and are now more familiar with the process. An unsupported assumption that they still require as much as 45 days to make a decision is no longer valid. It is unlikely that customers incapable of making quicker decisions will chose the seven-day enrollment period. For customers not comfortable with the shorter window, the twenty-day enrollment period is an adequate alternative.[3]

Thus, there is ample evidence in the record to indicate that CES has overstated the complexity and difficulties of implementing this twenty-day/seven-day enrollment window approach.

(iii) Finally, CES' argument that a shorter enrollment window would somehow limit customer options ignores the evidence of record to the contrary. First, the enrollment window options give customers an additional choice in how they participate in the market. The shorter enrollment window has the potential to produce distinct and more economic auction prices that effectively give customers viable options for utility default service. Second, it ignores the fact that customers failing to select an alternative supplier or utility fixed cost supply will default to the hourly product, where they retain the right to leave utility service at any time. Thus, the enrollment window options do not automatically lead to less customer choice, or to less customer switching. In fact, shortening the enrollment window in the manner IIEC proposes increases options for customers; it does not decrease them. As Staff noted, the approach would allow ". . . customers themselves to take responsibility for deciding what enrollment period is best for them." (Kennedy/Zuraski, Staff Ex. 4.0 at 10:221-222).

[3]Also, CES overlooks that the simple change contemplated here pales in comparison to the changes customers had to adapt to in going from a bundled rate world to unbundled market based rate requirements between last January 24, 2006 and September 2007 when the first auction was conducted. (*See*, Commonwealth Edison Company, ICC Dkt. No. 05-0159 proposal to implement a competitive procurement process by establishing Rider CPP, Rider PPO-MVM, Rider JS-CPP, and Revising Rider PPO-MV, Final Order, January 24, 2006).

In sum, contrary to CES' arguments, the seven/twenty-day enrollment approach is not a limit on customer options, but provides an additional option that also should have beneficial effects on the pricing of their default option from the utility.

(ii) Response to RESA

RESA also suggests there is insufficient evidence to support the proposition that reducing the enrollment windows will result in lower prices for power. (RESA Br. at 4). However, as IIEC has demonstrated above (in response to similar arguments made by CES), there is more than sufficient evidence to support such a finding. RESA did not present any testimony or evidence to contradict the record-supported conclusion of the Staff, Ameren, ComEd, and IIEC that shortening the enrollment window will likely have a beneficial effect on the auction price of the default product for larger customers.

RESA also suggests that shortening the enrollment window will make it more difficult for customers to switch to third party supply. But, the enrollment window itself does not affect the ability of the customers to switch to third party supply, even after the enrollment window has expired. Indeed, as previously noted, customers who do not choose third party supply or the utility fixed price product will default to the hourly product and have the ability to leave that service at any time. If modifications to customers' rights to leave the ComEd fixed priced offering are adopted, it would be those modifications, not the length of the enrollment window, that may affect customers' ability to select third party supply.

RESA reasons that those parties supporting the shorter enrollment period believe it will result in lower auction prices for large customers, because it reduces the time based risk premium, which causes the prices to be higher than customers are willing to accept. (RESA Br. at 2).[4] RESA argues, however, that the "driving force" behind these auction prices is the supply risk associated with committing to supply power over longer periods of time, not time based risk. (*Id*). RESA states: "[t]hus, three year contracts resulted in prices higher than two year contracts and the two year contracts were higher than one year contracts." (RESA Br at 2-3). This argument overlooks certain fundamental, undisputed facts. First, the auction product price of concern here is for the fixed price annual product, which is based on one-year contracts. Second, the auction price for the annual fixed price product was significantly above the price associated with the blended auction product, which is based on one, two and three year contracts. Therefore, it is difficult to accept the validity of the RESA argument that the increased supply costs for the annual product were driven, not by time based risk, but by the risk associated with committing supply and power over periods of two or three years.

For all these reasons, RESA's objections to the shorter enrollment window should be rejected.

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[4]IIEC believes, as do the Staff, ComEd and Ameren, that shortening the enrollment window would, in fact, reduce auction prices for large customers.

3. Customers' Rights to Leave Fixed Price Electricity Service Outside of the Enrollment Window.

IIEC proposed that Ameren's current "opt-out" policy for customers taking supply service from Ameren under BGS-LFP be changed to an "opt-in" policy. IIEC believes this modification will provide greater consumer production. (*See*, IIEC Br. at 10-11). Ameren agrees with IIEC's assessment. (Ameren Br. at 51). According to Ameren, an "opt-in" requirement also would ensure that customers are aware of the one-year commitment to such a product, as opposed to being defaulted into a year-long commitment. No other party addressed this issue in their Initial Briefs. Given IIEC's and Ameren's agreement on this issue, the IIEC recommendation should be adopted.

F. Customer Supply Group Definitions

1. Combining Ameren 400 kW to 1 MW Customers with Larger Customers.

IIEC opposed combining Ameren 400 kW to 1 MW customers with larger customers. Staff has concluded that 400 kW to 1 MW customers have more to lose than to gain by being grouped with larger customers. Therefore, Staff no longer believes that this customer group should be combined with the 1 MW and over customer group in the Ameren service territory. (Staff Br. at 54). Ameren does not specifically address this issue, but recommends creation of a customer group consisting of customers from 150 kW to 1000 kW. (Ameren Br. at 53-54). No other party appears to have addressed this issue. Therefore, the 400 kW to 1 MW customers in the Ameren service territory should not be combined with the 1 MW and over customer group in this case.

3. Separate Auction Products Depending on Choice of Enrollment Window

IIEC recommended that customers be allowed to segment themselves into separate auction product groups based on their choice of enrollment window. (IIEC Br. at 12-14). Ameren and ComEd proposed modifications to IIEC's recommendation. (ComEd Br. at 53-55; Ameren Br. at 54-55). The Staff supports the modified proposal. (Staff Br. at 58).

Ameren and ComEd recommended that IIEC's proposal be modified so as to provide the Auction Manager with the flexibility, in conjunction with the utilities and the Staff, to determine whether there is sufficient load for the seven-day window enrollment group and the twenty-day enrollment window group, to make it viable to offer separate products to each of these groups.

Specifically, Ameren recommends that a pre-qualification form be completed for all customers with peak demands greater than 1 MW on its system. Each customer would be asked to check one of two boxes on the form. The first box would indicate that the customer wished to have its load included in the seven-day enrollment window product. The second box would indicate that the customer wished to have its load included in the twenty-day enrollment window product. The survey would be completed at least one week prior to the date the final tranche size is announced. The Auction Manager, the utility and Staff would analyze the results of the survey and determine if there was sufficient load (at least 50 MW) in each of the two products to divide the customers into those products. (Ameren Br. at 55).

The ARES do not specifically address the segmentation of customers into separate auction products based upon enrollment window choices, though they did oppose the shortened enrollment windows endorsed by the utilities, the Staff and IIEC. Under the circumstances, if the IIEC recommendation to allow customers to choose a seven-day enrollment window is adopted, the recommendation to have customers separate themselves into product groups based on enrollment window choices (as modified by the utilities) should be adopted as well.

M. Time Line

1. Eliminate Prequalification of LFP Load from Ameren Tariffs

IIEC proposed that as part of the qualification process, large customers in the Ameren service territory be required to certify their eligibility to take the Ameren fixed price product. (IIEC Br. at 14-16). Ameren supports this recommendation because it will help to reduce load uncertainty for suppliers. (Ameren Br. at 5, Ameren addresses this issue in Section III.C.4 of its Initial Brief). To the best of IIEC's knowledge, no other party addressed this issue. Therefore, this recommendation that customers be required to certify their eligibility (i.e., prequality their load) should be adopted. The prequalification requirement should be retained.

P. Other

1. Utility Efforts to Work With Their Respective RTOs Toward Implementing a "Common Deliverability Test" to the "Extent Such Efforts Are Within Its Control"

IIEC initially requested that the utilities update the Commission on their efforts to have a Common Deliverability Test implemented by MISO and PJM. Staff, in its Initial Brief, summarizes the evidence in the record on this issue and suggests that because no party made a specific recommendation, the Commission take no further action in this case. (Staff Br. at 68-70). ComEd reports that it has complied with the Commission's directive to pursue a Common Deliverability

Test in PJM and MISO. (ComEd Br. at 78-79). However, as IIEC pointed out in its Initial Brief, there appears to be some confusion about whether PJM and MISO should be implementing a Common Deliverability Test or a Joint Deliverability Standard. The former is simply an administrative test, which would be common to both RTOs, used to determine whether a particular generating unit in one RTO was deliverable to load in the other RTO. It does not require all generaton to be so deliverable. The record here demonstrates that 95% of the generation identified as capacity resource generation, within the common footprint of the two RTOs, is deliverable to load in each RTO. Thus a Common Deliverability Test has the potential to increase generation available to serve load in the ComEd (PJM) and Ameren (MISO) service territories and to be bid, directly or indirectly, into the auctions, thereby increasing the competitiveness of the auction.

On the other hand, the Joint Deliverability Standard, which appears to be the objective that ComEd is pursuing before PJM and MISO, would require transmission upgrades needed to allow 100% of the generation in the combined footprint of the two RTOs to be deliverable to load in each RTO. ComEd suggests that if as little as 5% of the generation is not deliverable under that standard, because of existing transmission constraints, then a Joint Deliverability Standard cannot be implemented. IIEC recommends that ComEd be directed to pursue the implementation of a Common Deliverability Test, not a Joint Deliverability Standard. The Commission should favorably consider this recommendation.

IV.

CONCLUSION

As indicated above, there appears to be substantial agreement on most recommendations made by IIEC. These recommendations should be adopted. Furthermore, while there is not universal acceptance of the twenty-day/seven-day enrollment window proposal, the Staff, the utilities, and IIEC find that this proposal, as modified by the utilities, should be implemented. Therefore, all of the recommendations of IIEC in this proceeding should be adopted by the Commission, with the modifications made by the utilities and accepted by the Staff.

DATED this 7th day of June, 2007.

Respectfully submitted,

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