

BEFORE THE ILLINOIS COMMERCE COMMISSION

Docket No. 06-0027

**Rebuttal Testimony Supporting Joint Proposal of W. Karl Wardin
On Behalf of AT&T Illinois**

AT&T Illinois Exhibit 1.5

PUBLIC

CORRECTED

May 31, 2006

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1 **REBUTTAL TESTIMONY SUPPORTING JOINT PROPOSAL OF**
2 **W. KARL WARDIN ON BEHALF OF AT&T ILLINOIS**

3
4 **I. INTRODUCTION AND PURPOSE OF TESTIMONY**

5 **Q. Please state your name and business address.**

6 A. My name is W. Karl Wardin. My address is 225 West Randolph Street, Floor 27C,
7 Chicago, Illinois 60606.

8
9 **Q. Are you the same W. Karl Wardin who previously submitted testimony in this**
10 **proceeding?**

11 A. Yes, I am.

12
13 **Q. What is the purpose of your Rebuttal Testimony supporting Joint Proposal?**

14 A. In this testimony, I will respond to the Testimony Regarding Joint Proposal of Staff
15 witness Dr. James Zolnierек, the Supplemental Rebuttal Testimony of Data Net Systems
16 witness Joseph Gillan and the Supplemental Testimony of Illinois Attorney General
17 witness Dr. Lee L. Selwyn.

18
19 **II. RESPONSE TO STAFF**

20 **Q. Please summarize Staff’s assessment of the Joint Proposal.**

21 A. Staff’s assessment of the Joint Proposal is positive and that it is “worthy of
22 consideration.” (Staff Ex. 9.0, lines 564-566). Dr. Zolnierек concludes that the Joint

23 Proposal advances many of the same objectives as Staff's own proposal in this
24 proceeding – and will likely do so more quickly and efficiently from a market perspective
25 and in a manner that provides more certainty that the outcome will reflect competitive
26 market rates. Specifically, Staff finds that:

- 27 • Competitive reclassification of AT&T Illinois' residence services in MSA-1 will
28 likely promote competition and benefit customers more over the long run than a
29 continuation of current regulatory policies. (Staff Ex. 9.0, lines 112-141, 557-
30 587).
- 31 • Both service packages and stand-alone measured service rate plans can be
32 reclassified. (Staff Ex. 9.0, lines 58-105).
- 33 • The rate caps and safe harbor provisions in the Joint Proposal will likely benefit a
34 significant number of customers. (Staff Ex. 9.0, lines 162-267).
- 35 • The rate caps and safe harbor provisions in the Joint Proposal will likely benefit a
36 significant number of customers. (Staff Ex. 9.0, lines 162-267).
- 37 • The Joint Proposal should be considered a worthy alternative to Staff's own
38 proposal, because it accomplishes the same objectives, but sooner and with more
39 certainty. (Staff Ex. 9.0, lines 557-587).
- 40 • The Joint Proposal should be considered a worthy alternative to Staff's own
41 proposal, because it accomplishes the same objectives, but sooner and with more
42 certainty. (Staff Ex. 9.0, lines 557-587).

42 **Q. Does AT&T Illinois agree with Staff's assessment?**

43 A. Yes. If anything, Staff has understated the advantages of the Joint Proposal over its own
44 plan.

45
46 **Q. Will the Joint Proposal promote competition?**

47 A. Definitely. All of the economists testifying in this proceeding – with the sole exception
48 of Dr. Selwyn – agree that AT&T Illinois' stand-alone measured service rates are low
49 and that stand-alone customers who make few calls and are not interested in central office
50 features are not particularly attractive to competitors. As Mr. Panfil previously pointed
51 out, competitors have made clear that, at existing rate levels, they have little interest in
52 providing measured service rate plans. If the rates for these services are brought to a

53 competitive market level, the residence marketplace will be more attractive to
54 competitors overall and lower use customers will likely have more alternatives. In
55 contrast, if stand-alone services remain under AT&T Illinois' Alternative Regulation Plan
56 – which requires year-over-year rate decreases as long as inflation levels remain low –
57 this situation will worsen, not improve.

58

59 **Q. Dr. Zolnierek suggests that stand-alone measured service can be reclassified as**
60 **competitive even if competitors do not, today, offer similar rate plans. (Staff Ex. 9.0,**
61 **lines 58-105). Do you agree?**

62 A. Yes. Since the outset of this proceeding, AT&T Illinois has taken the position that the
63 kind of rate-plan-by-rate-plan approach taken by some of the parties is not required by
64 Section 13-502 and is not consistent with economic theory. As Dr. Zolnierek concludes,
65 the fact that competitors might not be offering prices comparable to AT&T Illinois'
66 measured service offerings does not mean that competitors are not providing local
67 exchange services at competitive rates. The evidence is clear that they are. Dr.
68 Zolnierek's view that rates need only be comparable at "competitive market levels" is
69 entirely appropriate, especially when coupled with the pro-competitive impact of the
70 Joint Proposal. Otherwise, Section 13-502 is circular: competitors do not offer stand-
71 alone rate plans today because AT&T Illinois' rates are too low, which, Dr. Selwyn
72 contends, requires their reclassification as noncompetitive services. However, as
73 noncompetitive services, these rates may not be restructured and cannot be made more
74 competition-friendly without significant changes to the Alternative Regulation Plan –
75 changes which Dr. Selwyn would undoubtedly oppose.

76

77 **Q. Does AT&T Illinois support Dr. Zolnierek's assessment of the potential benefits of**
78 **the Joint Proposal?**

79 A. Yes. The safe harbor components of the Joint Proposal were intended to provide
80 alternatives for those customers who find modest increases in their basic service rates
81 problematical. Dr. Zolnierek primarily (and properly) evaluates the value of these rate
82 commitments from a forward-looking perspective, assuming that AT&T Illinois
83 implements the rate changes allowed under the Joint Proposal. As Dr. Zolnierek
84 acknowledges, the mere fact of rate increases is not contrary to the public interest, given
85 the fact that they are pro-competitive. Notably, network access line and local usage rates
86 have not increased since 1990 (and, in fact, local usage rates have declined substantially
87 under the Alternative Regulation Plan). Therefore, a maximum annual \$1.00 NAL rate
88 increase and an annual \$.005 increase in the per-call local usage rate starting in 2007 over
89 three years is hardly an unreasonable rate adjustment plan.

90

91 **Q. Dr. Zolnierek suggests that the Joint Proposal may produce competitive market**
92 **prices more efficiently than Staff's rate-rebalancing proposal. (Staff Ex. 9.0, lines**
93 **557-587). Do you agree?**

94 A. Yes. In fact, in this instance, Staff is understating the benefits of the Joint Proposal.
95 Under Staff's proposal, the Commission would reopen the Alternative Regulation Plan
96 and adopt a multi-year transition plan that would increase stand-alone network access line
97 rates and decrease local usage and feature rates on a revenue-neutral basis. Staff is
98 correct that it would likely take at least a year for the Commission to develop such a plan

99 (and several years to implement). (Staff Ex. 9.0, lines 581-584). However, Dr. Zolnierek
100 does not focus on the rate neutrality aspect of Staff's proposal. As Mr. Panfil previously
101 demonstrated, because all rate increases are offset by rate decreases, there is
102 fundamentally no greater revenue opportunity for CLECs in this marketplace after the
103 transition than there is today. Thus, this aspect of Staff's plan significantly reduces the
104 likelihood that competition would increase during the transition period as compared to
105 the Joint Proposal.

106

107 **Q. Dr. Zolnierek reiterates Staff's position on imputation requirements, but concludes**
108 **that the Joint Proposal will likely resolve the existing imputation problem more**
109 **quickly than Staff's approach. (Staff Ex. 9.0, lines 497-531). Is this a significant**
110 **issue?**

111 A. Not in AT&T Illinois' view. Dr. Zolnierek seems to agree that the Joint Proposal
112 accomplishes the policy objective of imputation when he states that it "... offers a
113 reasonable alternative that likely favors speed over precision when resolving imputation
114 concerns." (Staff Ex. 9.0, lines 527-531). Moreover, as Mr. Panfil and CUB previously
115 explained, Staff's approach to imputation in this proceeding is not required by either the
116 statute or the Commission's prior decision in Docket No. 04-0461. AT&T Illinois will
117 discuss the legal issues at greater length in its brief. The Company believes that the
118 Commission can and should resolve the imputation issues consistent with the
119 recommendations of AT&T Illinois and CUB, which would eliminate any obstacles to
120 approval of the Joint Proposal that might otherwise be presented by Section 13-505.1.

121

122 **Q. Please summarize Staff's assessment of the portions of the Stipulation and Joint**
123 **Proposal for which no Commission approval is being sought (i.e., paragraphs 11-**
124 **16).**

125 A. Dr. Zolnierek only addresses two aspects of the Stipulation, paragraph 13 dealing with
126 consumer education and paragraph 12 dealing with broadband deployment.

127

128 **Q. Does AT&T Illinois support Dr. Zolnierek's opinion on consumer education (Staff**
129 **Ex. 9.0, lines 457-486)?**

130 A. Yes. Dr. Zolnierek correctly concludes that this portion of the Stipulation is not within
131 the scope of the criteria that the Commission is required to consider under Section 13-502
132 and should not take this matter into consideration when making its competitive
133 classification determination. He notes, however, that the Commission's Consumer
134 Services Division will continue its own consumer education initiatives. With respect to
135 the Stipulation's consumer education funding, Dr. Zolnierek also concludes that,
136 although difficult to quantify, the benefits of an effective consumer education program
137 outweigh its costs.

138

139 **Q. What is Dr. Zolnierek's position regarding the broadband provisions in the**
140 **Stipulation (Staff Ex. 9.0, lines 535-553)?**

141 A. Dr. Zolnierek's understanding of the broadband commitment is accurate. If the Joint
142 Proposal is approved, AT&T Illinois will install high speed digital subscriber line (DSL)
143 Internet service to 99% of the wire centers in AT&T Illinois' Chicago LATA service area
144 and upgrade its loop plant to make DSL available to 90% of customer living units in that

145 area. Dr. Zolnierek correctly concludes that this additional commitment to increase
146 broadband investment is in the public interest.

147

148 **III. RESPONSE TO GILLAN**

149 **Q. Mr. Gillan asserts that “local competition for residential customers in the Chicago**
150 **LATA is in broad retreat.” (Data Net Ex. 5.0, lines 67-71). Do you agree?**

151 **A.** No. In my Rebuttal Testimony, I presented an analysis of residential access lines served
152 by CLECs in the Chicago LATA as of December 31, 2005. That analysis was shown in
153 Schedules WKW-R1 and WKW-R2.

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167 **Q. In support of his assertion that “local competition for residential services in the**
168 **Chicago LATA is in broad retreat,” Mr. Gillan cites certain cross exhibits which he**
169 **attached to his supplemental rebuttal testimony. Do those exhibits support Mr.**
170 **Gillan’s assertion?**

171 A. No. Mr. Gillan has presumably attached the cross-exhibits because they show that the
172 number of CLEC-served residential access lines in the Chicago LATA decreased from
173 December 31, 2004 to December 31, 2005.

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176
177 Moreover, the change in the number of CLEC lines during the year 2005 does not
178 indicate that overall “local competition for residential customers in the Chicago LATA”
179 is in “retreat.” To the contrary, the data in Mr. Gillan’s exhibits shows that, during 2005,
180 the number of residential customers served by *all* wireline providers, including AT&T
181 Illinois and the pre-merger AT&T CLEC, as well as other CLECs, declined. These line
182 losses are a reflection of increased competition for local services from wireless and VoIP
183 providers.

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215 **IV. RESPONSE TO DR. SELWYN**

216 **A. OVERALL ASSESSMENT OF THE JOINT PROPOSAL**

217 **Q. Dr. Selwyn contends that the Joint Proposal is not in the public interest. (AG Ex.**
218 **1.2, pp. 4-9). Do you agree?**

219 A. No. Dr. Selwyn fundamentally misperceives the purpose of this settlement. Dr. Selwyn
220 primarily criticizes it on the following grounds:

- 221 • The mere existence of the Joint Proposal demonstrates that reclassification is not
222 appropriate.
223
- 224 • Customers currently subscribing to the “safe harbor” services will be the principal
225 beneficiaries of the rate commitments and they represent a small percentage of AT&T
226 Illinois’ customer base.
227

228 **Q. Does the mere fact of the Joint Proposal demonstrate that these services are not**
229 **competitive?**

230 A. No. AT&T Illinois has consistently stated that all of the its residence services in MSA-1
231 are competitive and that no transition mechanisms are required. However, *other parties*
232 expressed concerns about the competitive alternatives available to stand-alone measured
233 service customers who make little or no use of the network. AT&T Illinois entered into
234 this Joint Proposal with CUB in an effort to reduce the contested issues in the proceeding.
235 Thus, the Joint Proposal *in no way* constitutes a change in AT&T Illinois’ position that all
236 of its residence services in MSA-1 satisfy the criteria in Section 13-502(b) and (c)(1)-(4)
237 without regard to rate commitments or service “safe harbors.” These simply represent

238 additional benefits to consumers that the Commission may consider as “other factors”
239 that affect competition and the public interest pursuant to Section 13-502(c)(5). .
240

241 **Q. Are the benefits as limited as Dr. Selwyn suggests?**

242 A. No. Dr. Selwyn erroneously focuses on the rate reductions that accompany the “safe
243 harbor” services. The purpose of the safe harbor commitments is to provide customers
244 who want to take advantage of price protection with alternatives in the event that stand-
245 alone network access line rates increase. The Joint Proposal is fundamentally *not* a rate
246 reduction plan. At the time of AT&T Illinois’ tariff filing in November 2005, most of
247 AT&T Illinois’ basic residence services were subject to the Alternative Regulation Plan
248 and no rate reductions are required to make them “just and reasonable.” AT&T Illinois
249 agreed to reductions in the safe harbor services’ rates as part of a comprehensive
250 settlement with CUB and for no other reason. Dr. Zolnierek and Ms. McKibbin provide
251 more realistic and appropriate analyses of the benefits of the Joint Proposal.
252

253 **B. COMPETITION FOR RESIDENTIAL SERVICES**

254 **Q. Dr. Selwyn criticizes the Joint Proposal on the grounds that it does not “offer price
255 protection” to customers who purchase packages of services other than the three
256 “safe harbor” packages. (AG Ex. 1.2, p. 21). Is Dr. Selwyn’s criticism justified?**

257 A. No. In support of his criticism, Dr. Selwyn asserts that there would be no “regulatory or
258 market constraint on IBT’s prices for the package services” if the Joint Proposal is
259 approved. This assertion is without merit. The evidence that has been presented by
260 AT&T Illinois and the Commission Staff demonstrates that residential service packages

261 that have been reclassified as competitive are reasonably available from numerous
262 alternative providers throughout the Chicago LATA, including CLECs, wireless carriers
263 and VoIP providers. The availability of services from these alternative providers does, in
264 fact, constrain AT&T Illinois' ability to increase the prices of its residential local
265 exchange services, including packages.

266

267 **Q. Do you have additional evidence that refutes Dr. Selwyn's claim that there are no**
268 **"price constraining competitive alternatives" to AT&T Illinois for the provision of**
269 **residential local exchange service in the Chicago LATA? (AG Ex. 1.2, p. 25).**

270 A. Yes. The evidence that I have presented above in response to Mr. Gillan directly refutes
271 Dr. Selwyn's claim. Moreover, my Direct Testimony included several tables, which I
272 have updated, which further demonstrate that consumers are continuing to choose
273 competitive alternatives to AT&T Illinois for residential local exchange service. Table 1,
274 below, details changes to AT&T Illinois' residential access lines since 2000. It shows
275 that over the past five years AT&T Illinois has lost about 1.4 million residential access
276 lines. This represents a 32% reduction since 2001 and is equivalent to about 46% of
277 AT&T Illinois' residential access lines as of December 2005.

Table 1

AT&T Illinois Residential Access Line Changes (2000 – 2005)					
End of Year	Total Residential Access Lines	Annual Change	Cumulative Change	Annual % Change	Cumulative % Change
2000	4,288,582				
2001	3,871,354	-417,228	-417,228	-9.7%	-9.7%
2002	3,376,547	-494,807	-912,035	-12.8%	-21.3%
2003	3,104,394	-272,153	-1,184,188	-8.1%	-27.6%
2004	2,960,631	-143,763	-1,327,951	-4.6%	-31.0%
2005	2,927,988	-32,643	-1,360,594	-1.1%	-31.7%

278

279 Source: 2001 to 2005, ARMIS Report 43-08, TABLE III - ACCESS LINES IN
 280 SERVICE BY CUSTOMER.

281

282 Table 2, below, details the wireless growth since year end 1999. The 118% growth in
 283 wireless service is in stark contrast to the 32% decline in AT&T Illinois residential lines.
 284 To put the number of wireless phones in perspective, there are more wireless subscribers
 285 than wireline subscribers. For example, at the end of June 2005, there were 8,530,462
 286 wireless subscribers in Illinois as compared to 7,815,880 wireline subscribers in Illinois.

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Table 2

Illinois Wireless Telephone Subscribers (1999 – 2005)					
Year End	Illinois Wireless Users	Annual Change	Cumulative Change	Annual % Change	Cumulative % Change
1999	3,922,482				
2000	5,143,767	1,221,285	1,221,285	31.1%	31.1%
2001	5,631,172	487,405	1,708,690	9.5%	43.6%
2002	6,476,683	845,511	2,554,201	15.0%	65.1%
2003	7,183,989	707,306	3,261,507	10.9%	83.1%
2004	8,075,938	891,949	4,153,456	12.4%	105.9%
June '05	8,530,462	454,524	4,607,980	11.3%	117.5%

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Source: FCC, Local Telephone Competition: Status as of June 30, 2005, released April 2006. The June 2005 line represents ½ year and therefore the annual change percent figure is doubled.

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Tables 3 and 3A depict wireless revenues and their growth as compared to AT&T

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Illinois' local service revenues and their decline. Since 2000, AT&T Illinois' basic local

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service revenues¹ have declined by 47% and nationally wireless service revenues have

296

increased by over 150%. These Tables also show that since 2000 AT&T Illinois' local

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service revenues have declined by about \$1.3 billion, while at the same time wireless

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carriers in Illinois have increased their revenue by \$2.9 billion.^{2 3}

¹ ARMIS defines basic local revenues as the sum of Accounts 5001, 5040, and 5060, and are defined under the FCC's C.F.R. Part 32 and the ICC's Part 710 (see §32.5001, § 32.5040, §32.5060).

² The Illinois wireless number was derived by taking Illinois wireless growth (4,607,980) and dividing it by wireless growth from Dec '99 to Jun '05 (108,432,361) and multiplying that result by the change in revenue since 2000 (68,242,671).

³ For the year 2005 CTIA's survey reports \$113.5 billion in wireless service revenues. The combined RBOCs reported \$96.6 billion in regulated and nonregulated landline revenues. See ARMIS Report 43-01 Table I.

Table 3

AT&T Illinois BASIC Local Service Revenues (2000 - 2005)					
Year End	Amount	Annual Change	Cumulative Change	Annual % Change	Cumulative % Change
2000	2,735,937				
2001	2,428,897	-307,040	-307,040	-11.2%	-11.2%
2002	1,973,738	-455,159	-762,199	-18.7%	-27.9%
2003	1,736,401	-237,337	-999,536	-12.0%	-36.5%
2004	1,516,213	-220,188	-1,219,724	-12.7%	-44.6%
2005	1,446,837	-69,376	-1,289,100	-4.6%	-47.1%

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Source: Illinois Bell Annual Alternative Regulation Monitoring Report Filed with the ICC.

Table 3A

Wireless Industry Total Service revenues (6/1999 - 12/2005)					
July 1 to June 30	Industry Wireless Revenues	Annual Change	Cumulative Change	Annual % Change	Cumulative % Change
2000	45,295,550				
2001	58,726,376	13,430,826	13,430,826	29.7%	29.7%
2002	71,117,599	12,391,223	25,822,049	21.1%	57.0%
2003	81,185,272	10,067,673	35,889,722	14.2%	79.2%
2004	95,515,593	14,330,321	50,220,043	17.7%	110.9%
2005	108,534,727	13,019,134	63,239,177	13.6%	139.6%
Dec '05	113,538,221	5,003,494	68,242,671	9.2%	150.7%

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Source: CTIA Semi-Annual Wireless Industry Survey, Annualized Wireless Industry Survey Results – June 1985 to June 2005. The June 2005 line represents ½ year and therefore the annual change percent figure is doubled.

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Q. You mentioned the decline in AT&T Illinois' residential access lines from 2000 through 2005. Do you have evidence that this trend is continuing in the Chicago LATA?

311
 312

A. Yes. Tables 4 and 4A below show that AT&T Illinois has not only lost residential access lines in the Chicago LATA, it is continuing to lose residential primary access lines at an

313 increasing pace. Since 2000, AT&T Illinois has, through the first quarter of 2006, lost
 314 over one million residential access lines in the Chicago LATA, or approximately 30% of
 315 all such lines. During the same time period, AT&T Illinois has lost almost 700,000
 316 primary residential access lines in the Chicago LATA or approximately 26% of such
 317 lines.

Table 4

AT&T Illinois Chicago LATA Residential Access Line Changes (Dec 2000 - 1st Quarter 2006)					
Year End	Total Chicago LATA Residential Access Lines	Annual Change	Cumulative Change	Annual % Change	Cumulative % Change
2000	3,372,979				
2001	3,048,504	-324,475	-324,475	-9.6%	-9.6%
2002	2,721,082	-327,422	-651,897	-10.7%	-19.3%
2003	2,535,531	-185,551	-837,448	-6.8%	-24.8%
2004	2,422,559	-112,972	-950,420	-4.5%	-28.2%
2005	2,383,477	-39,082	-989,502	-1.6%	-29.3%
1Qtr '06	2,365,318	-18,159	-1,007,661	-3.0%	-29.9%

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Table 4A

AT&T Illinois Chicago LATA Residential Primary Access Line Changes (Dec 2000 - 1st Quarter 2006)					
Year End	Total Chicago LATA Residential Access Lines	Annual Change	Cumulative Change	Annual % Change	Cumulative % Change
2000					
2001					
2002					
2003					
2004					
2005					
1Qtr '06					

320

*****END CONFIDENTIAL AND PROPRIETARY*****

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322 **Q. In support of his assertion regarding the lack of competitive alternatives, Dr. Selwyn**
 323 **asserts that, in her March 6, 2006 testimony, CUB witness McKibbin “presented**
 324 **evidence that, for many areas – even in portions of the Chicago exchange – the most**
 325 **often-cited competitors, the cable companies, do not provide local service.” (AG Ex.**
 326 **1.2, p. 22). Do you have any comments in response to this assertion?**

327 **A.** Yes. The testimony of Ms. McKibbin cited by Dr. Selwyn addresses only three of the
 328 over 70 CLECs which provide residential local exchange service throughout the Chicago
 329 LATA. The fact that not every one of these CLECs provides service in every single
 330 exchange does not mean that reasonably available alternatives do not exist throughout the
 331 Chicago LATA. In fact, they do, as I demonstrated in my direct and rebuttal testimony.
 332 In the Chicago exchange itself, 71 CLECs, including Comcast and RCN, the two cable
 333 companies referenced by Dr. Selwyn, served *****BEGIN CONFIDENTIAL AND**

334 **PROPRIETARY*****END CONFIDENTIAL AND PROPRIETARY*****

335 residential access lines as of March 31, 2006, as shown in Schedule WKW- JPR1.

336

337 **Q. Dr. Selwyn asserts the number of Digital Phone lines in the City of Chicago, as**
338 **reported by Comcast in response to the Commission's information request in**
339 **Docket No. 06-0028, "confirms that Comcast's Digital Phone service is not**
340 **widespread." (AG Ex. 1.2, p. 28). Do you have a response to Dr. Selwyn's**
341 **assertion?**

342 A. Yes. Comcast responded to Staff that it has *****BEGIN CONFIDENTIAL AND**
343 **PROPRIETARY*****END CONFIDENTIAL AND PROPRIETARY*****

344 Digital Phone customers in the Chicago LATA. This is a substantial number of
345 customers. Moreover, as Dr. Selwyn acknowledges, Comcast is transitioning from its
346 Digital Phone, circuit switched service to its Digital Voice, VoIP-based service.

347

348 **Q. Is Comcast's Digital Voice Service currently available to customers in the Chicago**
349 **Exchange?**

350 A. Yes, it is. Comcast's website allows one to check for the availability of its services by
351 address and zip code. In May 2006, I inputted zip codes that correspond to all five of the
352 Chicago Cable Zones. A map of the Cable Zones is contained in AT&T Illinois Exhibit
353 11.0, a copy of which is attached. The website showed that Digital Voice Service is
354 currently available in four of the five cable zones (all but Chicago Cable Zone 2). To
355 verify the accuracy of the information on the website, I also called Comcast service
356 representatives four times to inquire about the availability of Digital Voice Service in zip

357 codes 60618, 60630, 60646, and 60643, four of the Chicago zip codes for which the
358 website indicated availability. The Comcast service representatives confirmed that
359 Digital Voice Service is currently available to customers residing in each of those zip
360 codes.

361

362 **Q. Dr. Selwyn asserts that Comcast does not represent a price constraining alternative**
363 **to AT&T Illinois' local service packages. (AG Ex. 1.2, pp. 28-29). Is Dr. Selwyn**
364 **correct?**

365 A. Absolutely not. Comcast is competing heavily and effectively with AT&T Illinois for the
366 provision of local and long distance service packages. Currently, Comcast is engaged in
367 an intense direct mail advertising campaign to convince customers of AT&T Illinois to
368 switch to Comcast for home phone service, Comcast Digital Voice. Examples of
369 Comcast's direct mail pieces, which have been received by employees of AT&T Illinois
370 at their homes in recent weeks, are contained in Schedule WKW-JPR3. These mailings
371 have been received in locations throughout the Chicago LATA, including Chicago,
372 Lombard, Grayslake, Algonquin, Crystal Lake, Dundee, Woodridge, Cary, Deerfield,
373 Bolingbrook, Woodstock, Elmhurst, Brookfield, Bensenville, Elgin, Oak Park, Roselle,
374 Berwyn, Lake Zurich, Schaumburg, Rolling Meadows, Wheaton, and Wilmette.
375 Comcast's advertising is not limited to direct mail. Comcast also uses other media, such
376 as the full page ad they ran in the Chicago Sun-Times on Friday, May 26, 2006, for
377 Digital Voice, Internet and cable TV. A copy of that ad is included in Schedule WKW-
378 JPR3-Part 6.

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380 Comcast's marketing has been very effective. Based on data obtained from the E9-1-1
381 database, as of March 31, 2006, Comcast had *****BEGIN CONFIDENTIAL AND**
382 **PROPRIETARY*****END CONFIDENTIAL AND PROPRIETARY *****
383 access lines, as shown in Schedule WKW- JPR1, an increase of *****BEGIN**
384 **CONFIDENTIAL AND PROPRIETARY ***** ***END CONFIDENTIAL**
385 **AND PROPRIETARY ***** since December 31, 2005. In each month from December
386 2005 through March 2006, AT&T Illinois has lost more lines to Comcast than to any
387 other competitor. Competition from Comcast was a significant factor driving AT&T
388 Illinois' net loss of 18,159 access lines during the first quarter of 2006.

389

390 **Q. Dr. Selwyn asserts that “at prices starting at \$54.95, Comcast Digital Voice will not**
391 **discourage IBT from raising the prices of its local packages.” (AG Ex. 1.2, p. 29). Is**
392 **Dr. Selwyn’s assertion accurate?**

393 A. No. First, Dr. Selwyn has failed to fully explain Comcast's prices. Comcast offers a
394 Digital Voice package that includes unlimited local and long distance calling, 12 calling
395 features plus Voice Mail, and one-line voice mail access and account detail. For
396 customers who subscribe to both Comcast's cable and high speed Internet services, the
397 price for the Digital Voice (CDV) package is \$39.95.⁴ For customers who subscribe to
398 Comcast's cable or high speed Internet service, but not both, the price of the CDV
399 package is \$44.95. The \$54.95 price mentioned by Dr. Selwyn is the price of the CDV
400 package for customers who do not subscribe to either Comcast's cable or high speed

⁴ The Comcast Service representative at 866-594-1234 indicated that there is a special price for the Triple Play (basic cable, High Speed Internet, and CDV) of \$99 per month for the first 6 months.

401 Internet service. On May 30, 2006, I spoke to a Comcast service representative who
402 indicated that Comcast would be willing to offer me a \$33 rate for six months for stand-
403 alone CDV. Since many customers in the Chicago LATA subscribe to Comcast's cable
404 service, high speed Internet service or both, it is the lower prices available to such
405 customers, not the \$54.95 price cited by Dr. Selwyn, which is relevant to the question of
406 whether Comcast's Digital Voice offer constrains AT&T Illinois' ability to increase the
407 prices of its offerings.

408
409 Second, it is not credible to assert that Comcast does not represent a price constraining
410 alternative to AT&T Illinois' local service packages or is actively marketing its CDV at
411 \$54.95. Comcast emphasizes in its direct mail advertising that the price of its Digital
412 Voice package is \$39.95, if purchased with cable and cable modem service, and claims
413 that this price "could save more than 16% over the phone company." This Comcast claim
414 is based on a comparison to AT&T Illinois' \$48.95 All Distance plan⁵, which includes an
415 access line, Caller ID with name, Line-Backer, Voice Mail, two selectable calling
416 features and unlimited long distance. Comcast's advertising further notes that while
417 AT&T Illinois also charges a \$4.50 End User Common Line Charge, such a charge is not
418 assessed for Digital Voice. Given Comcast's success in competing with AT&T Illinois,
419 it is absurd to suggest that Comcast's offerings impose no constraints on AT&T Illinois'
420 ability to raise its prices for packages.

421

⁵ The price for AT&T Illinois' All Distance Plan is \$49.95, not \$48.95, as described by Comcast.

422 **Q. You have discussed Comcast’s advertising. Are other CLECs and VoIP providers**
423 **actively marketing their services to residential local exchange customers in the**
424 **Chicago LATA?**

425 A. Yes, they are. In her Direct Testimony, AT&T Illinois witness Sandy Moore presented
426 numerous examples of such advertising. More recent examples of direct mail
427 advertising, all from this year (2006), are attached in Schedule WKW- JPR4 for Sage,
428 RCN, Sun Rocket, WOW!⁶, Vonage and Earthlink.

429
430 **Q. Dr. Selwyn asserts that the “prices quoted by McLeod on its website are only**
431 **available to customers in certain locations where switching can be provided by a**
432 **McLeod switch in conjunction with an IBT UNE-loop.” (AG Ex. 1.2, p. 24). Do you**
433 **have any comments in response to this assertion?**

434 A. Yes. According to its tariff, McLeod currently provides residential basic local exchange
435 service using its own switch in 51 Chicago LATA exchanges, including the Chicago
436 Exchange. These 51 exchanges encompass 83% of AT&T Illinois’ residential network
437 access lines in the Chicago LATA. Accordingly, based on Dr. Selwyn’s representation of
438 the information he obtained from McLeod, its service is available to the vast majority of
439 residential customers in the Chicago LATA at prices that do not include the alleged
440 “additional \$15-20 fee element added to the base rate for local service.”⁷

⁶ WOW! Provides bundled voice service in Chicago Cable Area 5 to zip codes such as 60643.

⁷ McLeodUSA’s Illinois tariff, (Illinois C.C. Tariff No. 4 revised sheet No. 82 and Sheets No. 132 to 145), make it clear that the Local Line Price Adjustment surcharge of \$0 for Access Area A, \$15 for Access Area B and \$13 for Access Area C applies only to lines established prior to January 19, 2006 and it does not apply to lines provisioned after that date. This was confirmed by talking to a McLeodUSA service representative on May 31, 2006. However, as stated above, most of the residential lines in the Chicago LATA can be served by a

441
442 **Q. Dr. Selwyn asserts that MCI has “run for the exits” and is no longer competing for**
443 **residential local exchange customers in Illinois. (AG Ex. 1.2, p. 30). Is Dr. Selwyn**
444 **correct?**

445 A. No. As I explained in my Rebuttal Testimony, there is no evidence that MCI has
446 “exited” the residential market in Illinois. *****BEGIN CONFIDENTIAL AND**
447 **PROPRIETARY*******
448 *********
449 *********
450 *****END CONFIDENTIAL AND PROPRIETARY *****

451
452 **C. EFFECT OF JOINT PROPOSAL ON PRICES**

453 **Q. Dr. Selwyn contends that one of the “. . . fundamental goals of a competitive**
454 **telecommunications policy is to bring telecom prices *down*, not up.” (AG Ex. 1.2, p.**
455 **29). Is he correct?**

456 A. No. I am not an economist, but I understood the purpose of a competitive
457 telecommunications policy is to bring telecom prices to *competitive market levels*. Those
458 prices may be higher or lower than what regulators have prescribed. As Dr. Taylor
459 explained, where the regulatory process has kept prices low, then it is entirely predictable
460 that a competitive marketplace could result in higher prices. Conversely, where

McLeodUSA switch. For example, to a consumer who lives in the Chicago Exchange, with a 60643 zip-code, McLeodUSA (one of four facility-based wireline providers in that area) offers five packages with unlimited local service starting at \$20.95. Its Preferred Advantage Unlimited package is \$39.95 and includes unlimited local and long distance calling, up to 13 features including voice-mail. The \$39.95 price of the package includes the EUCL and LNP surcharges.

461 regulators have kept prices high to provide support to other services, those prices may
462 decline. The end result cannot be known until the marketplace has had a chance to
463 function on a competitive basis.

464

465 **Q. Dr. Selwyn asserts that if the Joint Proposal is approved, it is likely to result in rate**
466 **increases producing “cumulative additional revenues over the period through 2010,**
467 **of approximately \$296.5 million.” (AG Ex. 1.2, p. 27). Is there any basis for the**
468 **AG’s assertion?**

469 A. No. Dr. Selwyn’s assertion is based on a number of erroneous and unsupported
470 assumptions.

471

472 First, Dr. Selwyn asserts that if AT&T Illinois were to increase its stand-alone network
473 access line and usage rate to the full extent allowed by the Joint Proposal, those rate
474 increase would affect all of the existing 830,000 local measured service lines in the
475 Chicago LATA, providing cumulative additional revenues through 2010 of
476 approximately \$116 million. This assertion assumes that not one of the existing 830,000
477 local measured service customers will take advantage of the “safe harbor” packages
478 which were designed with the express purpose of providing local measured customers
479 who make few calls or use two or fewer features with a means of avoiding the impact of
480 potential increases in stand-alone network access line and usage rates. This assumption is
481 baseless. As I discussed in my Direct Testimony Supporting Joint Proposal, AT&T
482 Illinois estimates that even at the current network access line and usage rates, 64%
483 (528,654 or 830,236) of residential local measured rate customers can potentially benefit

484 from switching to one of the “safe harbor” packages. As indicated by AT&T Illinois’
485 response to Staff Data Request GS 3.02, if AT&T Illinois were to increase the network
486 access line and usage rates by the minimum amount allowed under the Joint Proposal, the
487 number of stand-alone customers who could potentially benefit from switching to one of
488 the “safe harbor” packages would increase to 817,613 by the year 2008.

489
490 Second, Dr. Selwyn assumes that AT&T Illinois will increase rates to customers who
491 purchase packages other than the “safe harbor” packages, producing “as much as \$32.94
492 million in additional revenue each year through 2009.” (AG Ex. 1.2, p. 27). This
493 overstates cumulative additional revenues through 2010 by approximately \$164 million,
494 or 55% of Mr. Selwyn’s \$296.5 million estimate. This flawed assumption, however, is
495 based on the erroneous assertion that there is no price constraining competition for
496 packages. As I have previously discussed, there is no basis for this assertion.

497
498 Third, Dr. Selwyn includes in his calculation of the cumulative potential revenue
499 resulting from the Joint Proposal an assumption that the pre-merger AT&T CLEC will
500 increase rates to all of its customers. (AG Ex. 1.2, p. 26). The services provided by that
501 entity are, however, already competitive. The Joint Proposal has no bearing whatsoever
502 on the prices charges by the pre-merger AT&T CLEC. This overstates the cumulative
503 additional revenues by another \$16.2 million.

504
505 Removing these two overstatements decreases the \$296.5 million figure, as calculated by
506 Dr. Selwyn, to about \$116 million. Additionally, this \$116 million figure is overstated

507 since it erroneously assumes that not a single residential customer purchasing stand-alone
508 services would move to a “safe harbor” package. This \$116 million cumulative figure
509 would be equivalent to an increase in annual revenues of about \$38.7 million.

510

511 **Q. How does the \$38.7 million increase compare with the reduction in AT&T Illinois’**
512 **annual local service revenues since 2000?**

513 A. The \$38.7 million annual increase is equivalent to about 3% of the \$1.3 billion reduction
514 in AT&T Illinois’ annual basic local service revenues (see Table 3 above) since 2000.

515

516 **Q. Dr. Selwyn asserts that AT&T Illinois’ ability to impose an additional \$1.00 charge**
517 **on the prices for packages of local services will be “protected” by increases in the**
518 **base LWC monthly rates of \$1.00 per year for 2006 and 2007, and by the annual**
519 **increase in the urban Consumer Price Index thereafter. (AG Ex. 1.2, p. 27). Do you**
520 **agree with this assertion?**

521 A. No. Assuming that the Joint Proposal is approved, the prices that AT&T Illinois will be
522 able to charge for packages of local services will be established by the market for retail
523 residential service and will not be a function of wholesale rates paid by LWC carriers.

524 AT&T Illinois’ ability to increase its prices for all services, including packages, will be
525 constrained by the retail prices charged by competing service providers, which include
526 not only LWC carriers but also facilities-based CLECs such as Comcast, UNE-L carriers
527 such as McLeod, independent VoIP providers and wireless providers. In this regard, I
528 would note that, as of March 31, 2006, the number of Chicago LATA residential access
529 lines served by facilities-based CLECs (including UNE-L providers) is 315,670, more

530 than twice times the number of residential access lines served by LWC-based CLECs
531 (151,479), as shown on Schedule WKW- JPR1.

532

533 **D. CONSUMER EDUCATION FUNDING**

534 **Q. Dr. Selwyn disparages the \$2.5 million for consumer education that AT&T Illinois**
535 **will provide to CUB as being no match for AT&T Illinois' marketing budget. (AG**
536 **Ex. 1.2, pp. 10-11). Is he correct?**

537 A. No. Dr. Selwyn compares the \$2.5 million to the \$182 million which AT&T Illinois
538 spent on "marketing-related activities" in 2005. (*Id.*, p. 11). This is the wrong
539 comparison. The \$182 million includes product management, *i.e.*, the development of
540 new service offerings and the monitoring of AT&T Illinois' existing offerings in the
541 marketplace, both "backroom" functions that customers do not see. The \$182 million
542 also includes "sales," which encompasses the Company's business offices which process
543 service orders and handle a myriad of interactions with customers, including bill inquiries
544 and bill disputes.

545

546 The appropriate comparison would be to AT&T Illinois' product advertising – *i.e.*, the
547 amounts spent on print, radio, television and direct mail used to promote AT&T Illinois'
548 products (Account 6613). AT&T Illinois spent \$6.8 million in 2005 to promote all of its
549 retail products, both residence and business and on a state-wide basis. The amount spent
550 on promoting residence packages in 2005 was only *****BEGIN CONFIDENTIAL AND**
551 **PROPRIETARY*****END CONFIDENTIAL AND PROPRIETARY*****

552 million. Again, this is a state-wide number. The \$2.5 million in funding that AT&T

553 Illinois is providing to CUB is significant relative to its product advertising budget for
554 residence services.

555

556 **Q. Dr. Selwyn implies that AT&T Illinois will engage in counter-marketing when CUB**
557 **advises customers of their options under the Joint Proposal. (AG Ex. 1.2, p. 11). Is**
558 **this correct?**

559 A. No. AT&T Illinois has no intention of engaging in counter-marketing.

560

561 **Q. Dr. Selwyn contends that AT&T Illinois' website is difficult to use and that**
562 **information about the three "safe harbor" services is not easily accessed. (AG Ex.**
563 **1.2, pp. 11-12). Do you agree?**

564 A. No. AT&T Illinois' website is easily accessible. AT&T Illinois is committed to
565 providing as "consumer-friendly" an Internet experience as possible. Internet purchases
566 are becoming a way of life today for many customers. Moreover, AT&T Illinois' costs
567 of processing a service order placed online are much lower than taking the order through
568 the business office, which requires the involvement of service representatives. Therefore,
569 it is very much in AT&T Illinois' interest to offer a website that is easy to navigate and
570 attractive to customers. However, the Company offers a wide range of services and rate
571 plans today. This fact necessarily results in a much more complex website than would
572 otherwise be the case. AT&T Illinois continually reviews its website to determine
573 whether improvements can be made.

574

575 With respect to the three safe harbor services in particular, they have not been of much
576 interest to customers to date – as Dr. Selwyn himself recognizes. (AG Ex. 1.2, pp. 6-7).
577 Therefore, they have been a low priority from the standpoint of web design. However, as
578 part of implementing the Joint Proposal, AT&T Illinois will review its business office
579 practices and its webpage relative to these products, given their increased importance to
580 customers. Likewise, Paragraph 11 of the Joint Proposal requires AT&T Illinois to take
581 the necessary steps to reflect the new names of these three safe harbor services in
582 appropriate internal methods and procedures, service representative material, Internet
583 webpage listings and billing information.

584

585 **Q. Ms. Zolot states that the AT&T Illinois website was “not working” twice when she**
586 **attempted to use it. (AG Ex. 3.0, lines 57 and 85-89). Is this a common problem?**

587 A. No. Whatever “not working” means, AT&T Illinois’ website and online ordering tools
588 are rarely down. For example, since January 2006, the web ordering tool was up 99.34%
589 of the time and the web “shopping cart” was up 99.94% of the time. Ms. Zolot’s
590 experience seems to be highly atypical.

591

592 **Q. Dr. Selwyn cites to an investigation of Pacific Bell by the California PUC which led**
593 **to a 2001 marketing practices order. (AG Ex. 1.2, pp. 12-14). Is this decision**
594 **relevant to this proceeding?**

595 A. No. This proceeding is examining whether AT&T Illinois’ residence services are
596 competitive under Section 13-502 of the Act – not marketing practices.

597

598 **Q. Have any of the other AT&T states had a similar order entered by their PUC?**

599 A. Not to my knowledge. The California order appears to be unique to California.

600

601 **Q. Do consumers in Illinois appear to have concerns about the marketing practices of**
602 **the telecommunications carriers in this state?**

603 A. Not to my knowledge. The best source available to assess this issue is the Annual Report
604 issued by the Consumer Services Division of the Commission. The most recent report is
605 for calendar year 2004 (the 2005 Annual Report should be released shortly). In that
606 Report, the Consumer Services Division identifies the complaints they receive each year
607 against regulated companies by industry, by number and by category of complaint. The
608 top ten categories of complaints lodged with the Commission against telecommunications
609 carriers were as follows:

REASON FOR CONTACT (detail problem codes)	NUMBER
Questions Responsibility for Account	760
Other- Wholesale Rates	749
Dispute Rate Class or Plan	742
Usage- Consumption	464
Schedule for Repair	439
Accuracy of Bill	436
Installation of New Service	399
Reconnection or Disconnection	394
Termination- Seeking Reconnection	341
Protest Rates	340

610

611 Based on conversations with the Consumer Services Division, AT&T Illinois understands
612 that the “Dispute Rate Class or Plan” category primarily involves contentions that the
613 customer was placed on a different plan than the customer thought he/she had selected.
614 The “Protest Rates” category typically involves generalized customer complaints that

615 rates are “too high.” Neither of these two categories involve the kind of marketing issues
616 raised by Dr. Selwyn. None of the other categories appear to have any relevance to
617 marketing practices at all. Since AT&T Illinois is the largest provider of local exchange
618 services in Illinois, it accounts for the largest number of complaints. Therefore, these
619 data are likely to be representative for it individually, as well as for the industry as a
620 whole.

621

622 **Q. Dr. Selwyn suggests that customers currently subscribing to unlimited usage**
623 **packages do not have sufficient information to decide whether they are on the right**
624 **plan, because their monthly bills may not provide “any calling details, such as the**
625 **total number of calls, total number of minutes or any itemization of individual**
626 **calls.” (AG Ex. 1.2, pp. 30-31). Is that true?**

627 A. No. As demonstrated by the bills submitted by Ms. Zolot, AT&T Illinois’ bills display
628 the total number of local calls made each month by the customer and itemize every long
629 distance call by time of day and total number of minutes. This is sufficient information
630 to compare package prices to per-call rate plans. AT&T Illinois bills all local calls on a
631 per-call basis, so that the local call total shown on the bill would simply be multiplied by
632 \$.03 per call to gauge the likely total local usage charges under a measured service plan
633 (although there are also volume discounts that would be more difficult for customers to
634 estimate, the simple \$.03 times the number of local calls calculation provides a good
635 proxy for local calling charges under measured service). Many long distance carriers
636 (including AT&T Long Distance) have a per-minute plan. To determine total charges
637 under this kind of rate plan, the per-minute rate for the long distance calls would be

638 multiplied by the total number of minutes on the bill to determine the total long distance
639 charges under a per-minute rate structure. These are not particularly complex
640 calculations.

641
642 I appreciate that comparing rate plans can be confusing for some customers – Ms. Zolot
643 apparently is one of them. AT&T Illinois regrets the fact that she felt that its service
644 representatives were not as helpful as they could have been. However, this was simply
645 one customer’s experience. In any event, it is my understanding that CUB’s consumer
646 information campaign will be directed at customers like Ms. Zolot who have difficulty
647 making rate plan comparisons for themselves.

648

649 **Q. Dr. Selwyn suggests that the Commission would lose regulatory authority over**
650 **AT&T Illinois’ marketing practices if these services were declared competitive.**
651 **(AG Ex. 1.2, pp. 36-37). Is this true?**

652 A. No. A competitive classification does not constitute deregulation. The Commission
653 retains jurisdiction over the reasonableness of AT&T Illinois’ rate levels and business
654 practices. However, any inquiry into these issues would properly be directed at AT&T
655 Illinois and its competitors collectively to ensure even-handed treatment of all
656 competitive providers in the marketplace.

657

658 E. FINANCIAL DATA

659 Q. Dr. Selwyn discusses certain financial results as reported in ARMIS and asserts that
660 “these results, standing alone, provide compelling evidence of IBT’s monopoly
661 power.” (AG Ex. 1.2, p. 39). Is Dr. Selwyn’s assertion justified?

662 A. No. A complete financial picture demonstrates significant revenue loss consistent with a
663 competitive marketplace. Dr. Selwyn, however, cherry-picked selected financial results,
664 as reported in ARMIS, which he erroneously claims supports his assertion. Dr. Selwyn’s
665 discussion of those results is highly misleading. Moreover, Dr. Selwyn completely
666 ignored, and omitted from his Table 2, financial results which demonstrate the enormous
667 impact that competition in the market for local exchange service is having on AT&T
668 Illinois. To present a complete picture, I have revised Dr. Selwyn’s Table 2 to include
669 such results, as shown in Table 5, below. The financial results which Dr. Selwyn
670 excluded from his Table 2 are shaded.

671

Table 5 Illinois Bell Telephone Company Financial Results as Reported in FCC ARMIS (Note 1) December 31, 2001 through December 31, 2005 (000's)								
	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	TOTALS	CHANGE	2001 - 2005 Percentage
Total Stockholders' Equity	2,523,200	2,580,161	2,008,332	1,840,220	1,586,596		(936,604)	-37.1%
Total Switched Access Lines	6,230,181	5,969,763	5,479,186	5,217,259	5,150,602		(1,079,579)	-17.3%
Residential Access Lines	3,871,354	3,376,547	3,104,394	2,960,631	2,927,988		(943,366)	-24.4%
Local Services Revenues	2,428,897	1,973,739	1,736,401	1,516,212	1,446,837		(982,060)	-40.4%
Total Operating Revenues	4,147,646	3,764,102	3,739,032	3,728,323	3,730,451		(417,195)	-10.1%
Total Operating Expenses	2,593,330	2,910,029	3,020,268	3,048,556	2,957,084		363,754	14.0%
Net Income	653,176	279,726	199,586	260,769	333,884	1,073,965	(319,292)	-48.9%
Dividends Declared	642,834	532,088	771,416	428,881	587,508	2,319,893	(55,326)	-8.6%
Total Plant (Note 2)	12,441,237	12,941,163	13,088,293	13,250,278	13,479,390		1,038,153	8.3%
Telecom Plant in Service, Begin Bal.	11,346,357	12,267,508	12,731,792	12,982,810	13,169,786		1,823,429	16.1%
Plant Additions	1,085,425	800,433	499,692	456,530	451,758	3,293,838		Note 3
Plant Retirements	160,669	272,217	225,439	247,399	218,059	1,123,783		35.7%
Transfers Adjustments	(3,605)	23,558	(23,235)	(22,155)	(8,255)	(33,692)		129.0%
Telecom Plant in Service, End Bal.	12,267,508	12,819,282	12,982,810	13,169,786	13,395,230		1,127,722	9.2%
Accumulated Depreciation	6,681,547	7,239,940	7,880,293	8,509,832	9,199,572		2,518,025	37.7%
Net Plant	5,585,961	5,579,342	5,102,517	4,659,954	4,195,658		(1,390,303)	-24.9%
Return on Stockholders' Equity	25.90%	10.84%	9.94%	14.17%	21.04%			-18.8%
Intrastate Rate of Return (Note 4)	18.96%	10.27%	9.96%	8.66%	8.98%		(-52.70%)	-52.6%
Total Depreciation and Amortization	6,736,681	7,330,060	7,883,093	8,510,510	9,200,480		2,463,799	36.6%
Net Plant	5,704,556	5,611,103	5,205,200	4,739,768	4,278,910		(1,425,646)	-25.0%
Illinois Bell Employment	15,768	13,888	12,979	12,287	11,187		(4,581)	-29.1%
Employment Total in Illinois including the Service Company and Affiliates (Note 5)	23,696	22,160	21,047	20,098	19,271		(4,425)	-18.7%

Note 1: Source is ARMIS unless otherwise noted.

Note 2: Inappropriate as a measure of investment providing service. Measure includes Nonoperating Plant and Goodwill.

Note 3: Year-over-year percentage change is inappropriate. Total plant additions over the period were \$3.3B, an amount comparable to the preceding 5 year period. Illinois Bell exceeded the \$3B infrastructure spending commitment under alternative regulation by 10%.

Total Plant Additions over the period 2000-2004 were \$3.8B. Illinois Bell exceeded the \$3B SBC/Ameritech Merger Condition 7 amount by 26%.

Note 4: Source is Illinois Bell's Annual Monitoring Report, Exhibit B, Intrastate Amount, Column (e).

Note 5: Internal source.

672

673

674 **Q. Please provide an example of how Dr. Selwyn's discussion of the ARMIS data is**
 675 **misleading.**

676 **A. Dr. Selwyn asserts that AT&T Illinois' net earnings increased from 2004 to 2005,**
 677 **resulting in a 21.04% return on shareholder's equity for 2005, up from 14.7% in 2004.**

678 **Dr. Selwyn asserts that these earnings are at "supracompetitive levels." Dr. Selwyn,**
 679 **however, presents no analysis of comparable "competitive" earnings to support that**

680 **assertion. Moreover, the return on equity figure which Dr. Selwyn cites is not indicative**

681 **of the profitability of AT&T Illinois' local exchange services. To the contrary, the net**

682 **earnings and return on equity figures relied on by Dr. Selwyn represent earnings for all of**

683 AT&T Illinois' operations, both interstate and intrastate, and both regulated (including
684 competitive and non-competitive) and non-regulated. In this regard, as shown in my
685 Table 5, in 2005, local service revenues (which includes all business and residential local
686 exchange services) were approximately \$1.4 billion, equal to only 39% of the total
687 operating revenue of approximately \$3.7 billion.

688
689 Moreover, Dr. Selwyn's testimony is extremely misleading even as it relates to AT&T
690 Illinois' overall net earnings. Dr. Selwyn asserts that AT&T Illinois has experienced a
691 "persistent increase in earnings" (AG Ex. 1.2, p. 37), which Dr. Selwyn suggests is
692 indicated by the net earnings figures for 2002 through 2005, as shown on his Table 2. Dr.
693 Selwyn, however, neglected to include in his Table 2 the net earnings and return on
694 equity figures for 2001, even though other financial results for 2001 are shown in the
695 Table. As shown by my Table 5, when the full results for 2001 are included, it is clear
696 that, far from a "persistent increase in earnings," AT&T Illinois experienced a 48.9%
697 *decrease* in net earnings, from \$653.18 million in 2001 to \$333.88 million in 2005. The
698 2005 return on equity is also less than the return on equity for 2001.

699

700 **Q. Does Dr. Selwyn ignore more pertinent evidence regarding AT&T Illinois'**
701 **earnings?**

702 A. Yes. As shown in my Table 5, AT&T Illinois' overall earned return on intrastate plant
703 investment was 8.98%, a very small increase over the 8.66% return in plant investment in
704 2004 and a 53% *decrease* from the 18.96% return on intrastate plant investment for 2001.
705 The rate of return on intrastate plant investment is a far better indication of the

706 profitability of AT&T Illinois intrastate operations than the return on equity percentages
707 cited by Dr. Selwyn.

708

709 **Q. Are there other financial results which refute Dr. Selwyn's claim that AT&T Illinois**
710 **has "undiminished monopoly power?"**

711 A. Yes. As indicated in my Table 5, Dr. Selwyn's assertion completely ignores the facts
712 that, over the period from 2001 through 2005 (the time period "analyzed" by Dr.
713 Selwyn):

- 714 • the number of AT&T Illinois' switched access lines (including business and
715 residential) *decreased* by 1,079,579 (of which 943,366 were residential), or 17%; and
716
- 717 • AT&T Illinois' annual local service revenues *decreased* by \$982 million, or 40%.
718
- 719 • Moreover, as previously discussed, since 2000 the number of AT&T Illinois'
720 residential access lines decreased by approximately 1.4 million, or 32%.
721

722 Dr. Selwyn ignores these relevant local results and misses the point completely. These
723 trends are evidence of an extremely competitive market for local services, not "monopoly
724 power."

725

726 **Q. Dr. Selwyn asserts that the data shown in his Table 2 shows that "SBC (now AT&T,**
727 **Inc.) has been steadily *disinvesting* in its Illinois operations for at least the past four**
728 **years." (AG Ex. 1.2, p. 38). Is Dr. Selwyn's assertion valid?**

729 A. No. First, Dr. Selwyn's assertion regarding "disinvestment," like most of the assertions
730 on his supplemental testimony, has nothing whatsoever to do with the question being

731 addressed in this proceeding (whether the residential services at issue were properly
732 classified as “competitive”), much less the issues addressed by the Joint Proposal.

733
734 Furthermore, Dr. Selwyn’s allegations regarding “disinvestment” are based on an
735 extremely misleading discussion of the ARMIS data. In particular, Dr. Selwyn asserts
736 that AT&T Illinois’ “gross plant-in-service increased by only \$1.04 billion.” (AG Ex.
737 1.2, p. 38). That number, however, reflects only the difference in the 2001 and 2005 end-
738 of-year balances of Total Plant, including non-operating plant and goodwill. As shown
739 on Table 5, the increase in the year end balance of Telecom plant-in-service (which
740 represents investment in plant actually used to provide service) from 2001 to 2005 was
741 approximately \$1.13 billion.

742
743 More importantly, both the \$1.04 and \$1.13 billion figures are net of retirements and do
744 not, therefore, reflect the full amount of AT&T Illinois’ investment in plant additions.
745 For the five year period from 2001 through 2005, AT&T Illinois’ investment in plant
746 additions was \$3.3 billion, three times the amount suggested by Dr. Selwyn. This
747 investment is about the same as the investment in plant additions for the preceding five
748 year period (1996-2000) (\$3.7 billion). I would also note that investment in total plant
749 additions during the period from 2000 through 2004 was \$3.8 billion, which exceeded by
750 26% AT&T Illinois’ obligation under merger condition 7 of the Commission’s
751 SBC/Ameritech merger approval order, which required AT&T Illinois to spend \$3 billion
752 on infrastructure improvements during the time period.

753

754 **Q. Dr. Selwyn also asserts that “the number of IBT full-time equivalent employees**
755 **dropped by 4,581, from 15,768 at the end of 2001 to only 11,187 as of December 31,**
756 **2005, a 27% decrease.” (AG Ex. 1.2, p. 38). Do you have any comments in response**
757 **to this assertion?**

758 A. Yes. Once again, Dr. Selwyn’s assertion is not relevant to any issue in this case and is
759 based on a misleading use of statistics. The numbers used by Dr. Selwyn represent the
760 number of employees on AT&T Illinois’ payroll. There are, however, numerous
761 employees who support AT&T Illinois’ operations who are formally employees of
762 AT&T Illinois’ service company affiliate and other affiliates. As shown in Table 5, while
763 the total number of Illinois employees (including those employed by affiliates of AT&T
764 Illinois) decreased between 2001 through 2005, the percentage reduction was
765 approximately 19%, not 29%.

766
767 **Q. Dr. Selwyn asserts that the drop in employment is “not consistent with a company**
768 **that is being seriously challenged by competition.” (AG Ex. 1.2, p. 39). Do you**
769 **agree?**

770 A. No. To the contrary, the drop in the number of employees is a direct result of the loss of
771 business to competition and the competitive pressures to control expenses.

772
773 **Q. Have the employment levels and the investment in plant additions over the past five**
774 **years been sufficient to enable AT&T Illinois to provide quality service?**

775 A. Yes. Since 2001 AT&T Illinois has not missed a single annual Part 730 or annual
776 Alternative Regulation service quality measure. In my opinion, these outstanding service

777 results are driven by a number of factors, each of which refute Selwyn's incorrect
778 assumptions. First, the highly competitive marketplace in Illinois generally, and the
779 Chicago LATA in particular, creates a strong incentive to ensure AT&T Illinois maintains a
780 high level of service quality in Illinois. In addition, AT&T Illinois has invested over \$3.3
781 billion to upgrade its local network to maintain and improve network reliability. Moreover,
782 AT&T Illinois maintained employment levels to ensure excellent customer service and
783 believes it has the best-trained and best-equipped workforce in the State, the vast majority of
784 whom are union members. All of these factors are completely consistent with a rational
785 business response to very real and ever increasing competition.

786

787 **Q. Does Dr. Selwyn's reference to the increase in the depreciation reserve support his**
788 **claim of "disinvestment?"**

789 A. No. The \$3.3 billion investment in plant additions is the relevant measure of AT&T
790 Illinois investment in plant improvements over the period 2001 through 2005. In this
791 regard, all capital-intensive companies incur substantial depreciation expense. Their
792 investments in capital assets are recovered over long periods of time. Depreciation
793 expense does not necessarily mean that plant is being physically replaced. Moreover,
794 even where assets are actually retired, they are not necessarily worn out. Depreciation
795 reflects not only the wear and tear associated with use and age, but, more importantly,
796 technological obsolescence. Thus, to the extent that AT&T Illinois is replacing older
797 technologies with state-of-the-art equipment, this is precisely what can be expected of a
798 company operating in a highly competitive market.

799

800 Dr. Selwyn raised similar arguments in Dockets No. 92-0448/93-0239. In that docket, he
801 claimed that Ameritech Illinois was “disinvesting” in its network, because projected
802 depreciation expense over the five years of the Plan would exceed the \$3 billion
803 commitment. Dr. Selwyn made a similar argument in Docket Nos. 98-0252/98-0335/00-
804 0764. The Commission ignored Dr. Selwyn’s arguments in both of those proceedings
805 and those arguments should be ignored again.

806

807 **F. DSL COMMITMENTS**

808 **Q. Dr. Selwyn asserts that the provisions of the Stipulation and Joint Proposal related**
809 **to expansion of DSL do not represent “very much of a commitment” at all “on the**
810 **part of AT&T.” (AG Ex. 1.2, p. 41). Do you agree with Dr. Selwyn’s assertion?**

811 A. No, AT&T’s DSL commitments are significant. If the Joint Proposal is approved, AT&T
812 Illinois has committed to expanding the number of wire centers with DSL from 91% of
813 the wire centers operated by AT&T Illinois in the Chicago LATA to 99% of such wire
814 centers within one year after the Effective Date. In addition, AT&T Illinois has
815 committed to investing in and upgrading to loop plant in order to expand the availability
816 of DSL from 86% of the total living units in the Company’s service territory within the
817 Chicago LATA to 90% of such living units, again, within one year after the Effective
818 Date.⁸

819

⁸ The Effective Date is defined in the Joint Proposal as 35 Days after the date of a final Commission order approving AT&T Illinois’ competitive classification pending in this docket and the Joint Proposal or, in the event that an application(s) for rehearing is (are) filed with respect to such an order, ten days after the Commission’s denial of such application for rehearing. Since a final order must be entered in this case by August 30, 2006, the one year period for AT&T Illinois to fulfill its DSL commitments will begin in the fourth quarter of 2006.

820 **Q. Dr. Selwyn asserts that the cost of meeting the DSL commitments is “minimal.”**

821 **(AG Ex. 1.2, p. 42). Do you have any comments in response to this assertion?**

822 A. Yes. Dr. Selwyn’s assertion misses the point. What is relevant is not the cost to the
823 Company of meeting its commitment. Rather, what is important is the benefit to
824 consumers associated with the expansion of the availability of DSL. In any event, Dr.
825 Selwyn’s assertion is wrong. In support of his assertion, Dr. Selwyn cites a response to a
826 data request in which AT&T Illinois stated that, if the Joint Proposal is approved
827 “investment for DSL in Illinois will increase, *****BEGIN CONFIDENTIAL AND**
828 **PROPRIETARY*****END**
829 **CONFIDENTIAL AND PROPRIETARY***.**” As stated, this figure is the *minimum*
830 investment. It represents the cost of adding DSLAMs in additional wire centers. It does
831 not include the cost of increasing the percentage of living units in the Chicago LATA
832 with access to DSL from the current 86% to 90%. Contrary to Dr. Selwyn’s assertion,
833 such an increase is not “marginal.” In fact, there was virtually no increase in that
834 percentage during the year 2005. To meet the 90% commitment, AT&T Illinois must
835 deploy fiber-fed remote terminals to reach customers that live beyond 18,000-route feet
836 from the central office. The estimated investment in plant additions and upgrades in the
837 Chicago LATA needed to meet the 90% commitment is approximately *****BEGIN**
838 **CONFIDENTIAL AND PROPRIETARY*****END**
839 **CONFIDENTIAL AND PROPRIETARY***.** Thus, the total cost necessary to meet
840 both the 99% wire center and the 90% living unit commitments in the Chicago LATA is
841 estimated to be at a minimum, approximately *****BEGIN CONFIDENTIAL AND**

842 **PROPRIETARY*****END CONFIDENTIAL AND**

843 **PROPRIETARY***.**

844

845 **Q. Dr. Selwyn suggests that AT&T Illinois has plans to expand the number of wire**
846 **centers with DSL to 99% and to increase the percentage of living units to which**
847 **DSL is available to 90% even if the Joint Proposal is not approved. Is Dr. Selwyn**
848 **correct?**

849 A. No. Dr. Selwyn’s suggestion is based purely on speculation. In fact, AT&T Illinois
850 currently does not have plans to make the investment that would be necessary to meet the
851 stipulated DSL thresholds if the Joint Proposal is not approved. In support of his
852 speculation, Dr. Selwyn assumes that AT&T Illinois has a “strong economic incentive to
853 expand the availability of DSL and, as such, is not really ‘committing’ to do anything that
854 it would not do otherwise.” Dr. Selwyn’s assumption is wrong. As previously discussed,
855 the estimated cost of meeting the stipulated thresholds for wire centers and living units is
856 substantial. AT&T Illinois has a greater incentive to focus on growing its broadband
857 business in areas where DSL is already deployed than it does to incur the substantial cost
858 of expanding into new areas. Dr. Selwyn’s assumption that AT&T Illinois is “not really
859 ‘committing’ to do something that it would not be doing anyway” is also not supported
860 by recent experience. The current percentages of wire centers with DSL (91%) and total
861 living units with DSL availability (86%) have not changed since December 2004. The
862 network investment made by AT&T Illinois to expand the availability of DSL in the
863 years 2004 and 2005 combined was *****BEGIN CONFIDENTIAL AND**

864 **PROPRIETARY*****END CONFIDENTIAL AND**

865 **PROPRIETARY*****, 25% less than the estimated cost of expanding availability from
866 the current 86% of total living units to 90%.

867

868 **Q. Dr. Selwyn questions the benefit of the DSL commitments, asserting that AT&T’s**
869 **merger requirement to offer DSL on a stand-alone basis expires two years after that**
870 **commitment takes effect. (AG Ex. 1.2, p. 43). Do you have any comments in**
871 **response to Dr. Selwyn’s testimony in this regard?**

872 **A. Yes. The merger condition speaks for itself and states:**

873 Within twelve months of the Merger Closing Date, SBC/AT&T will deploy and
874 offer within its in-region territory ADSL service to ADSL-capable customers
875 without requiring such customers to also purchase circuit switched voice grade
876 telephone service. SBC/AT&T will continue to offer this service in each state for
877 two years after the “implementation date” in that state. For purposes of this
878 condition, the “implementation date” for a state shall be the date on which
879 SBC/AT&T can offer this service to eighty percent of the ADSL-capable premises
880 in SBC’s in-region territory in that state. Within twenty days after meeting the
881 implementation date in a state, SBC/AT&T will file a letter with the Commission
882 certifying to that effect. In any event, this commitment will terminate no later than
883 three years from the Merger Closing Date.

884

885 As is clear from its text, the condition remains in effect two years after the date on which
886 AT&T can offer naked DSL service to 80% of the ADSL-capable premises in its in-
887 region territory in a state. After AT&T has incurred the expense of adjusting its systems
888 and procedures to meet the 80% test, it will be able to determine more accurately the
889 demand for this service and the profitability of continuing to offer it. Dr. Selwyn's
890 speculation regarding the benefits of this commitment made to and accepted by the FCC
891 will be answered in the competitive marketplace, and there is no reason for anyone to
892 speculate that this merger condition will not have either the short term benefit of bringing

893 a new service to the marketplace or positive long-term effects in a marketplace in which
894 there are alternatives to circuit-switched voice. In any event, this provision of the
895 Stipulation and Joint Proposal does not require this Commission’s approval, nor is it
896 necessary for this Commission to second-guess the FCC’s approval of this merger
897 condition, as Dr. Selwyn appears to suggest.

898

899 **G. OTHER ISSUES**

900 **Q. Dr. Selwyn asserts that “most customers” who purchase multiple customer calling**
901 **features “may make little or no use of features” other than Call Waiting and Caller**
902 **ID.” (AG Ex. 1.2, p. 31). Does Dr. Selwyn provide any support for that assertion?**

903 **A.** No. Dr. Selwyn simply assumes that most customers purchase plans with features that do
904 not want, but does not provide any evidence to support that assumption. Dr. Selwyn
905 further asserts that only *****BEGIN CONFIDENTIAL AND PROPRIETARY*****
906 *******END CONFIDENTIAL AND PROPRIETARY***** of local
907 measured customers purchase features other than Call Waiting and Caller ID. (AG Ex.
908 1.2, pp. 31, 35). The alleged source for this assertion is the response to a data request in
909 which AT&T Illinois was asked to identify the number of local measured service
910 customers who purchase one feature and that one feature is something other than Call
911 Waiting or Caller ID. This figure does not include features purchased by stand-alone
912 customers who purchase two or more features. As discussed in Mr. Panfil’s Rebuttal
913 Testimony, 20% of AT&T Illinois’ stand-alone customers subscribe to two features and
914 18% subscribe to three or more features. Even if one were to erroneously assume that
915 every customer who subscribes to only two features subscribes to both Call Waiting and

916 Caller ID, there are at least approximately 150,000 (830,236 x 18%) stand-alone
917 customers in the Chicago LATA who purchase features in addition to Call Waiting and
918 Caller ID.

919

920 **Q. Dr. Selwyn asserts that AT&T Illinois “does not offer a stand-alone unlimited long**
921 **distance calling service.” (AG Ex. 1.2, p. 31). Is Dr. Selwyn correct?**

922 A. No. In support of his assertion, Dr. Selwyn refers to a response to a data request in which
923 AT&T Illinois discussed the \$15 National Connections Select price for long distance
924 services offered by its affiliate, AT&T LD, which is available to customers who
925 subscribe online and purchase local access line, Caller ID and two other features.
926 However, AT&T offers an unlimited long distance calling plan for \$30 per month which
927 is available to any customer.

928

929 **Q. Dr. Selwyn is critical of Ms. McKibbin’s testimony regarding the potential savings**
930 **to customers who may choose to switch from certain packages to one of the “safe**
931 **harbor” packages. (AG Ex. 1.2, p. 33). Specifically, Dr. Selwyn asserts that the**
932 **“correct regulatory solution would be for IBT to simply rerate its Economy Local**
933 **Solution, Economy Solution and U-Select-3 customers to the appropriate ‘safe**
934 **harbor’ service now, and provide those customers with the result that would arise**
935 **under competitive market conditions.” (Id.). Does Dr. Selwyn’s assertion make**
936 **sense?**

937 A. No. Contrary to Dr. Selwyn’s suggestion, AT&T Illinois has not “conceded” that all
938 customers in the referenced packages would save money by switching to one of the “safe

939 harbor” packages. Moreover, the packages referred to by Dr. Selwyn are not identical to
940 any of the “safe harbor” packages. Again, the “safe harbor” packages are primarily
941 intended to provide a “safe harbor” from potential increases in stand-alone network
942 access and usage rates to stand-alone customers who make few calls or desire two or
943 fewer features. The U-Select-3 package, for example, provides for three features. The
944 customers to whom these packages are attractive have numerous competitive alternatives
945 to choose from and these alternatives constrain AT&T Illinois’ ability to increase rates
946 for those packages. Although certain customers on those packages may conclude that it
947 is beneficial to switch to one of the safe harbor packages, there is no basis for
948 automatically changing the price and terms of the services currently being provided to
949 those customers.

950

951 **V. CONCLUSION**

952 **Q. Does this conclude your testimony?**

953 **A. Yes.**