

REBUTTAL TESTIMONY

of

**Rochelle Phipps
Senior Financial Analyst**

**Finance Department
Financial Analysis Division
Illinois Commerce Commission**

Commonwealth Edison Company

**Proposal to implement a competitive procurement process by establishing Rider
CPP, Rider PPO-MVM, Rider TS-CPP and revising Rider PPO-MI**

Docket No. 05-0159

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INTRODUCTION

1. Q. Please state your name and business address.

A. My name is Rochelle Phipps. My business address is 527 East Capitol Avenue, Springfield, Illinois 62701.

2. Q. By whom are you employed and in what capacity?

A. I am employed by the Illinois Commerce Commission (“Commission”) as a Senior Financial Analyst with the Finance Department of the Financial Analysis Division.

3. Q. Describe your qualifications and background.

A. In May 1998, I received a Bachelor of Arts degree in Finance from Illinois College, Jacksonville, Illinois. In May 2000, I received a Master of Business Administration degree from the University of Illinois at Springfield. I have been employed by the Commission since June 2000.

4. Q. What is the purpose of your testimony in this proceeding?

A. I will be addressing the credit requirements provided in Article 6 of ComEd Exhibits 9.5, 9.6 and 9.7, which are Commonwealth Edison Company’s (“ComEd” or “Company”) proposed supplier forward contracts (“SFCs”).

18 **5. Q. Please summarize your conclusions and recommendations.**

19 A. First, Section 6.1 of the Company's proposed SFCs allows the Company
20 to unilaterally reduce its credit requirements. I recommend that the
21 Commission reserve the right to conduct an after-the-fact review of any
22 reduction in credit requirements allowed under Section 6.1 of the SFCs.
23 Second, the provision in Section 6.4 of ComEd Exhibits 9.5 and 9.6 and
24 Section 6.3 of ComEd Exhibit 9.7 that requires notching down the
25 corporate issuer credit rating from Moody's Investors Service is
26 unnecessary and should be eliminated from the Company's proposed
27 SFCs. Finally, ComEd has not shown that its proposed credit
28 requirements are based on any quantitative analysis of their impact on
29 auction prices or the degree of protection they provide ratepayers in the
30 event of a supplier default. This suggests the optimal credit requirements
31 will only be determined through experience. Therefore, the Commission
32 should not conclude that ComEd's proposed credit requirements strike the
33 optimal balance between protection against default risk and bidder
34 participation. Nonetheless, given the optimal credit requirements will only
35 be determined through experience and there are no alternative proposals
36 to consider, I recommend approval of ComEd's proposed credit
37 requirements.

38 **UNILATERAL REDUCTION IN CREDIT REQUIREMENTS**

39 **6. Q. Section 6.1 of the Company's SFCs state, "The Company may**
40 **establish less restrictive creditworthiness standards under this**

41 **Article 6 in a non-discriminatory manner”. (ComEd Exhibits 9.5, 9.6**
42 **and 9.7) Do you object to this provision?**

43 A. No. This provision gives the Company the flexibility to respond to an
44 industry event, or unanticipated conditions in the wholesale marketplace,
45 which will benefit customers and suppliers. (Company response to ICC
46 Staff data request FD 1.01) Nevertheless, as a result of the Company’s
47 reservation of a right to change the SFC credit requirements, the
48 Commission must reserve the right to conduct an after-the-fact review of
49 any reduction in credit requirements described in Section 6.1 of the SFCs
50 since it would lower the level of protection against a supplier default. That
51 is, there is no basis to currently assess the reasonableness of unspecified
52 future changes in credit requirements. Thus, it should be made clear that
53 the Commission has the ability to review any such changes after the fact if
54 they do occur. Furthermore, ComEd should clarify whether the SFCs
55 permit ComEd to restore the credit requirements to their initial level as
56 circumstances permit.

57 I also recommend that in the event that the Company changes the credit
58 requirements for any of the SFCs, it file a report with the Commission that
59 identifies the effective date, explains the reason for the change and
60 summarizes any facts and analyses on which the decision to change the
61 credit requirements was based. The report should be provided to the
62 Manager of the Finance Department and filed with the Chief Clerk of the
63 Commission within 15 days of the changes in credit requirements.

64 **7. Q. Are you suggesting that any increase in energy costs associated**
65 **with a ComEd decision to alter its credit requirements pursuant to**
66 **Section 6.1 of the SFCs would indicate that decision was imprudent?**

67 A. No. An increase in energy costs associated with a ComEd decision to alter
68 its credit requirements does not necessarily mean that decision was
69 imprudent. Nevertheless, the Commission should have the opportunity to
70 assess the Company's actions to alter its credit requirements pursuant to
71 Section 6.1 of the SFCs, given that such actions would alter Illinois
72 ratepayers' exposure to the potential costs of a supplier default.

73 **8. Q. How should the Company's proposed Rider CPP be modified to**
74 **incorporate the Commission's ability to conduct an after-the-fact**
75 **review of any reduction in credit requirements described in Section**
76 **6.1 of the SFCs?**

77 A. ICC Staff witness Dr. Eric Schlaf proposes adding language to the
78 Limitations and Contingencies section of ComEd's proposed Rider CPP,
79 through which the Commission could investigate whether the Company's
80 decision to modify its credit requirements was prudent. (ICC Staff Exhibit
81 13.0)

82 **"NOTCHING DOWN" CORPORATE ISSUER CREDIT RATINGS**

83 **9. Q. Each of the Company's proposed SFCs state the following:**

84 **For the ... Supplier to be granted an unsecured line of credit,**
85 **the ... Supplier: (1) must be rated by at least two of the**
86 **following rating agencies: S&P, Moody's or Fitch, and (2) must**
87 **have a minimum senior unsecured debt rating (or if**
88 **unavailable, a corporate issuer credit rating discounted by one**
89 **notch) of at least "BBB-" from S&P, "Baa3" from Moody's, or**
90 **"BBB-" from Fitch (a "Minimum Rating"). (Section 6.4 of**
91 **ComEd Exhibits 9.5 and 9.6 and Section 6.3 of ComEd Exhibit**
92 **9.7)**

93 **Please describe what is meant by "notching down" corporate issuer**
94 **credit ratings.**

95 A. Credit ratings are assigned different notations to reflect the relative
96 creditworthiness of companies or securities that have the same credit
97 rating. Standard & Poor's ("S&P") and Fitch Ratings ("Fitch") use a "+" or
98 "-“ to distinguish the relative creditworthiness of companies or securities in
99 the same credit rating category whereas Moody's Investors Service
100 ("Moody's") uses numbers (i.e., 1, 2 or 3). For example, S&P may assign
101 an entity a BBB+, BBB or BBB- credit rating or Moody's may assign an
102 entity a Baa1, Baa2 or Baa3 credit rating. Notching down a corporate
103 issuer rating refers to discounting a corporate issuer rating by one
104 "degree." That is, if S&P has assigned an entity a corporate issuer credit
105 rating of BBB but no senior unsecured credit rating, then under the
106 Company's proposed SFCs, the BBB issuer credit rating would be
107 "notched down" to BBB- to establish that entity's allowable credit limit.
108 Similarly, for a supplier that has a Baa2 corporate issuer rating from
109 Moody's but no senior unsecured credit rating, then under the Company's
110 proposed SFCs, that Baa2 issuer credit rating would be notched down to a
111 Baa3 credit rating to establish that entity's allowable credit limit.

112 **10. Q. In direct testimony, Staff witness Dr. David Salant stated, “ComEd**
113 **should explain why it is necessary to ‘notch down’ corporate issuer**
114 **credit ratings from Moody’s Investor’s Service, Inc. to determine**
115 **suppliers’ (and guarantors’) creditworthiness under Article 6 of its**
116 **supplier forward contracts”. (ICC Staff Exhibit 1.0, Appendix 2.0, p. 7,**
117 **lines 133-135) Did the Company explain why it is necessary to “notch**
118 **down” corporate issuer credit ratings from Moody’s?**

119 A. No. ComEd Exhibit 12.4 incorrectly states that the Company provided
120 clarification on this issue in response to ICC Staff data request FD 1.04.
121 To the contrary, the Company’s response to that data request did not
122 address Moody’s issuer credit ratings; it only provided a reason for
123 notching down S&P’s corporate issuer credit ratings.¹

124 **11. Q. Why do you disagree with the Company’s proposal to “notch down”**
125 **corporate issuer credit ratings from Moody’s?**

126 A. According to Moody’s, “[i]ssuer credit ratings are opinions of the ability of
127 entities to honor senior unsecured financial obligations and contracts”.
128 (*emphasis added*, Moody’s Investors Service, “Moody’s Rating Symbols &
129 Definitions,” August 2003, p. 8) That is, Moody’s issuer ratings are already
130 equivalent to unsecured credit ratings. Consequently, the Company’s
131 SFCs should be modified to eliminate the notching requirement with
132 respect to Moody’s issuer credit rating.

¹ Staff does not object to “notching down” either S&P’s or Fitch’s issuer credit ratings for the purpose of establishing the amount of suppliers’ unsecured credit lines.

133

CREDIT REQUIREMENTS

134 **12. Q. In Direct Testimony, Staff requested that the Company provide**
135 **calculations justifying its choices with respect to its proposed credit**
136 **requirements in rebuttal testimony. (ICC Staff Exhibit 1.0, pp. 96-97,**
137 **lines 2186-2188) Did the Company provide those calculations?**

138 A. No. The Company has not shown that its proposed credit requirements
139 are based on any quantitative analysis of their impact on auction prices or
140 the degree of protection they provide ratepayers in the event of a supplier
141 default. This suggests the optimal credit requirements will only be
142 determined through a trial and error process.

143 **13. Q. ComEd's proposed credit requirements differ from those proposed**
144 **by Ameren in Docket Nos. 05-0160/0161/0162 Consolidated ("Ameren**
145 **proceeding"). (ComEd Exhibit 10.5) Do the credit requirements**
146 **proposed by ComEd in this proceeding need to be identical to those**
147 **proposed by Ameren in Docket Nos. 05-0160/0161/0162?**

148 A. No. Currently the precise level of credit requirements that would strike the
149 optimal balance between providing adequate protection against default
150 risk and adversely affecting participation by qualified bidders is unknown.
151 Consequently, there may be an advantage to ComEd proposing different
152 requirements for unsecured lines of credit than proposed in the Ameren
153 proceeding in that the Commission will have the opportunity to
154 simultaneously evaluate the impact of two variations of credit limit

155 proposals – those proposed by ComEd in this proceeding and those
156 proposed by Ameren in the Ameren proceeding.

157 The credit requirements included in ComEd’s proposed SFCs and those
158 proposed in the Ameren proceeding are more alike than different. Similar
159 to Ameren, ComEd proposes to only offer unsecured lines of credit to
160 investment grade suppliers and suppliers with investment grade
161 guarantors. Similar to the Ameren, ComEd proposes to offer unsecured
162 credit lines that equal the lesser of a percentage of tangible net worth or a
163 dollar cap, based on a sliding scale according to the supplier’s (or
164 guarantor’s) credit rating. The difference between ComEd’s and Ameren’s
165 proposals is in the amount of the dollar caps. The dollar cap for an
166 unsecured line of credit for suppliers with the lowest investment grade
167 rating (*i.e.*, BBB-/Baa3) is capped at \$15 million under ComEd’s proposal
168 and \$20 million in the Ameren proceeding whereas the dollar cap for
169 suppliers that fall within the highest credit rating category (*i.e.*, A- and
170 above/A3 and above) is \$60 million under ComEd’s proposal and \$80
171 million in the Ameren proceeding. Given the similarity between ComEd’s
172 and Ameren’s proposed credit requirements and the fact that the optimal
173 level of credit requirements is unknown at this point in time, I do not object
174 to ComEd’s proposed credit requirements differing from those proposed in
175 the Ameren proceeding.

176 **14. Q. Does this conclude your rebuttal testimony?**

177 A. Yes.