

24 Commission to direct SBC to implement the type of early termination charge
25 provisions in long-term contracts with business customers for usage, data and
26 other services that the Commission ordered SBC to implement in the ASCENT
27 case.

28 Second, SBC has not really attempted to defend the termination charge
29 provisions that it had in place at the time that TDS Metrocom filed its complaint.
30 Instead, SBC has developed a comprehensive new set of termination liability
31 policies for those services that SBC asserts were not specifically covered by the
32 ASCENT order, and has in its testimony attempted to defend the reasonableness
33 of its new termination liability policies.

34 5. Q. Please summarize your understanding of SBC Illinois' new termination liability
35 policies for Usage, Centrex and Data and other services for business customers.

36 A. As I indicated in Answer 28 of my direct testimony and as SBC witnesses discuss
37 in their testimony, the revised SBC termination liability policies are to be as
38 follows: (1) for Usage services, 35% of the customer's remaining obligation under
39 the tariff plan or agreement; (2) for Centrex services, 25% of the customer's
40 remaining obligation under the tariff plan or agreement; and (3) for Data and
41 other services, 50% of the customer's remaining obligation under the tariff plan or
42 agreement.

43 6. Q. Do SBC's new termination liability policies resolve the concerns that led TDS
44 Metrocom to file its complaint?

45 A. No. TDS Metrocom's preference would still be for the Commission to require
46 SBC to implement the form of termination charge provision that it ordered in the

47 ASCENT case (Docket 00-0024), which I described in my direct testimony.
48 Having said that, I will acknowledge, as I did in Answer 29 of my direct
49 testimony, that SBC's revised termination liability policies with the reduced
50 percentages of remaining contract plan or tariff revenues are an improvement in
51 that they produce a lower termination charge amount than did previous
52 termination liability provisions that required the customer to pay 75% or 100% of
53 remaining revenue under the contract or tariff plan as a termination charge.
54 However, the termination charges produced by SBC's new termination liability
55 provisions are still too high and will continue, in my judgment, to significantly if
56 not completely limit any switching by business customers taking service from
57 SBC under term contracts and multi-year tariff plans.

58 7. Q. Why do you believe that the termination charges produced by the new SBC
59 termination liability provisions are still too high?

60 A. I say this for two reasons. First, the termination charges produced by the new
61 policies are still large in the absolute. In Answer 29 of my direct testimony I
62 listed the termination charge amounts per remaining year of the contract under
63 SBC's new policies, for 12 Usage Service Agreements that SBC had provided to
64 TDS Metrocom in discovery as representative. SBC provided a similar
65 calculation in Mr. Gillespie's Schedule BGS-6 for the "Customer A" and
66 "Customer B" contracts cited in TDS Metrocom's complaint. The revised
67 termination charge amounts are still large and would, in my judgment and
68 experience, still discourage customers from switching carriers.

69 Second, as I understand the basis for SBC's new termination liability
70 percentages, they are intended to represent the annual revenue under the contract
71 or tariff plan less SBC's saved costs if the contract is terminated and SBC no
72 longer has to provide the service to the customer. By stating that the termination
73 liability should be 35% of remaining revenues for Usage contracts or tariff plans,
74 25% of remaining revenues for Centrex, and 50% of remaining revenues for Data
75 services, SBC is indicating that it has 35%, 25% and 50% profit margins,
76 respectively, on long-term contracts and tariff plans for these service categories –
77 even after providing discounted prices to the customer in the term contract or
78 tariff plan. (In fact, as summarized on SBC witness Mr. Flitsch's Schedule RF-1,
79 the studies that SBC performed to develop its new termination liability provisions
80 actually show higher margins for these services than the actual percentages that
81 SBC has adopted for its termination liability provisions.) Such high profit
82 margins seem inconsistent with SBC's contention that the business
83 telecommunications services market in SBC Illinois' serving area is highly
84 competitive. Something does not make sense here. Either SBC's profit margins
85 on long-term contracts and tariff plans for business customers are not as high as
86 SBC has depicted, or the market is not very competitive.

87 8. Q. SBC contends that the business services market is quite competitive as evidenced
88 by SBC's estimate that CLECs now serve approximately 35% of business access
89 lines in SBC Illinois territory. Do you agree?

90 A. No. Even based on its own market share estimates, SBC Illinois still has 65% of
91 the business access lines. A market share of 65% may seem like a small number

92 only because SBC once had almost 100% of the market. While I am not a Ph.D.
93 economist or an anti-trust expert, as a businessman I would view a 65% market
94 share in any industry as giving the company that possessed that market share
95 market power. Further, it is obvious that the business lines served by CLECs are
96 divided up among numerous CLECs and that no single CLEC has a market share
97 in any way approaching that of SBC.

98 9. Q. Although stating that TDS Metrocom should be free to use whatever termination
99 charge policy it wishes, SBC witnesses comment that the form of termination
100 liability provision that TDS Metrocom proposes may produce unusual or
101 anticompetitive results in that it produces a lower termination charge in the early
102 years of a term contract and a higher termination charge in the later years as the
103 contract term approaches completion. They note that in contrast the “percent of
104 remaining revenue” approach produces higher termination charges in the early
105 years of a term contract and lower termination charges in the later years as the
106 contract approaches expiration. Do you have any response?

107 A. Yes. The “return the discount” approach advocated by TDS Metrocom (and
108 specified by the Commission in the ASCENT decision) is more pro-competitive
109 because it produces lower termination charges in the earlier years of the contract.
110 It is in the early months of a long-term contract when the potential
111 anticompetitive impacts of a termination charge in terms of discouraging the
112 customer from considering other suppliers may be most pronounced, because the
113 large termination charge at that point effectively locks up the customer with SBC
114 for two or more years into the future. In contrast, in the last few months of a

115 customer's term contract, a potential new carrier may not be interested in trying to
116 get the customer to terminate the contract and switch regardless of the termination
117 charge – the new carrier can simply wait the relatively few remaining months
118 until the existing contract expires, or even try to sign the customer to a new
119 contract to go into effect when the customer's old contract expires.

120 SBC witnesses cite some example calculations in which, in the latter
121 stages of a contract, the “return the discount approach” could produce a
122 termination charge several times higher than the remaining revenue under the
123 contract. This is obviously not a meaningful example since in the situation
124 depicted, the customer (if interested in switching) or the new supplier could just
125 pay the remaining contract revenue – or, as I described above, simply wait the
126 remaining months until the current contract expires.

127 I would also observe that in the ASCENT decision, the Commission
128 addressed the issue of the higher termination charge amount produced by the
129 “return the discount” approach as the contract approached expiration by
130 specifying that the termination liability provision could not require the customer
131 to return the discount for years of the contract that were already completed. In
132 other words, the return the discount calculation could only be applied with respect
133 to approximately the 12 months preceding the customer's early termination of the
134 contract. As noted in Mr. Gillespie's direct testimony, TDS Metrocom advised
135 SBC in discovery that TDS Metrocom is not recommending that the Commission
136 require SBC to adopt this limitation on the application of the “return the discount”
137 approach. However, if the Commission is concerned about the fact that the

138 “return the discount” approach produces higher termination charges as a contract
139 approaches expiration, the testimony of SBC witnesses including Dr. Frankel
140 effectively makes the case for requiring the limitation specified in the ASCENT
141 case.

142 10. Q. Do you have any comments on the Commission Staff’s testimony?

143 A. Yes. The Staff witnesses appear to be generally supportive of TDS Metrocom’s
144 concerns and recommendations. However, Staff witness Mr. Koch’s primary
145 recommendation is that the Commission order the adoption by SBC of its new
146 termination liability provisions on an interim basis and then conduct a rulemaking
147 on termination charge provisions to address the issues associated with termination
148 charges on an industry-wide basis. While I appreciate Staff’s interest in
149 addressing these issues in a comprehensive manner through a process that can
150 include all interested industry participants, TDS Metrocom does not believe that a
151 rulemaking proceeding is necessary. It could also be a significant drain on the
152 resources of those CLECs that choose (or are required) to participate. TDS
153 Metrocom believes that there is enough factual content in the record of this case
154 (and that enough legal content can be developed by the attorneys in their briefs)
155 for the Commission to resolve the pertinent issues in its order in this case.

156 11. Q. What should the Commission do?

157 A. It continues to be TDS Metrocom’s position that SBC should be required to adopt
158 the form of termination charge provision for all of its multi-year tariff and
159 contractual product and service offerings for business customers that I described

160 in my answers to Question nos. 17 and 18 of my direct testimony. This is our
161 primary recommendation.

162 However, if the Commission decides that it should allow SBC to use the
163 “percent of remaining revenue” form of termination liability provision, then it
164 would be TDS Metrocom’s position that the percentages of 35%, 25% and 50%
165 that SBC is applying for Usage, Centrex and Data services multi-year contracts
166 and tariff plans are too high, for the reasons I discussed earlier. The Commission
167 should direct SBC to implement lower, “not to exceed” percentages. While it will
168 be necessary for the Commission to exercise judgment in this regard, it is TDS
169 Metrocom’s recommendation that the percent of remaining revenues percentages
170 should not exceed 25% for any of these categories of services.

171 12. Q. Are there any other aspects of the ASCENT decision that are important to the
172 issues in this case?

173 A. Yes. Finding (10) of the ASCENT order provided as follows:

174 “[C]alculation of a termination charge, pursuant to the formula
175 described in Finding (9), should be performed by Ameritech upon
176 termination of service by the customer or upon oral or written
177 request from a customer, whichever occurs first; when such
178 calculation is requested by a customer, it should be performed, and
179 the results communicated to the customer, within three business
180 days; the customer should be permitted to designate a
181 telecommunications services provider as an agent for the purpose
182 of requesting and receiving such calculation; in the event of a
183 dispute with respect to such calculation, the burden of proving the
184 correctness of the calculation should lie with Ameritech.”

185
186 Regardless of the form of termination penalty that the Commission orders in this
187 case, or even if the Commission agrees with SBC and does not mandate any
188 particular form of termination charge, it is important that SBC be required to

189 continue to provide timely calculations of termination charges to customers and,
190 with proper customer authorization, to other telecommunications carriers. A
191 competitive local exchange carrier such as TDS Metrocom has absolutely no
192 chance to compete with SBC Illinois for the business of a customer that SBC has
193 signed to a long-term contract if we cannot obtain timely termination charge
194 calculations from SBC. Again, TDS Metrocom is only requesting that SBC
195 Illinois be required to provide termination charge calculations to competing
196 suppliers if authorized to do so by the customer, as specified in Finding (10) of
197 the ASCENT order.

198 13. Q. In its complaint and in your direct testimony, TDS Metrocom has requested that
199 the Commission should order SBC Illinois to reimburse TDS Metrocom for its
200 legal fees and related costs for bringing and prosecuting its complaint. Does TDS
201 Metrocom continue to believe that the Commission should award this relief?

202 A. Yes. As I noted earlier, SBC has not really attempted to defend its previous
203 termination charge policies, but rather has defended against the complaint
204 primarily on the grounds that it is adopting new termination liability policies.
205 (See, for example, Mr. Gillespie's direct testimony at lines 212-232, especially
206 lines 230-232, where he states: "Since these new policies will be in effect in the
207 near future, they should be the focus of this proceeding, not the old policies that
208 are being replaced.") Further, it is clear that SBC Illinois did not really devote
209 any significant attention and resources to comprehensively reviewing and
210 revamping its termination liability provisions into a consistent set of policies, with
211 lower percent of remaining revenue charges, until prodded to do so by TDS

212 Metrocom's complaint. For example, as SBC witness Mr. Gillespie stated in his
213 direct testimony (lines 401-402), "I do not dispute that [sic; the] fact that the filing
214 of the TDS' Complaint prompted SBC Illinois to take a hard look at its existing
215 tariff and ICB practices." Therefore, even if the Commission does no more in this
216 case than approve SBC's new, less onerous termination liability policies, it is
217 clear that the filing of TDS Metrocom's complaint has resulted in a benefit to
218 CLECs, consumers and the competitive telecommunications market in Illinois,
219 which I understand provides appropriate justification for ordering SBC Illinois to
220 reimburse TDS Metrocom for its legal fees and costs.

221 14. Q. How does TDS Metrocom envision the determination being made as to what costs
222 it should be reimbursed for?

223 A. TDS Metrocom would only be seeking reimbursement for its legal fees and
224 related out-of-pocket expenses, such as photocopying costs. We would envision
225 that after entry of a Commission order directing SBC to reimburse TDS
226 Metrocom for these costs, TDS Metrocom would submit a complete statement of
227 the costs incurred to SBC with supporting documentation such as invoices. If
228 SBC disputed any of the amounts or the documentation provided for the amounts
229 and the parties were unable to resolve the dispute within a reasonable time period
230 such as 30 days, the parties could bring the dispute before the Commission for
231 resolution.

232 15. Q. Do you have any comments on lines 584-594 of Mr. Gillespie's direct testimony
233 and his Schedules BG-4 and BG-5?

234 A. Yes. Schedule BG-4 is a copy of TDS Metrocom’s response to SBC Illinois data
235 request 2.5 which asked, “Does TDS currently have the same termination liability
236 policies in all states in which it operates?” The “Definitions and Instructions” to
237 SBC’s Second Set of Data Requests, which included item 2.5, defined “TDS” as
238 “TDS MetroCom”. TDS Metrocom responded to data request 2.5 by stating that
239 “TDS Metrocom states that its termination liability policy is the same in every
240 state in which it operates.” This statement is true. Schedule BG-5 is a copy of a
241 tariff of TDS Telecom in effect in Wisconsin which includes an early termination
242 provision of the “percent of remaining revenue” variety. TDS Telecom is a
243 separate company from TDS Metrocom and TDS Metrocom has no control or
244 influence over TDS Telecom’s pricing or tariff policies. (Indeed, while Mr.
245 Gillespie uses the term “TDS” in this answer and throughout his testimony, he
246 defines “TDS” at lines 30-31 to mean “TDS Metrocom, LLC”.)

247 16. Q. Does this conclude your prepared rebuttal testimony?

248 A. Yes, it does.